AGAINST THE GNOSTICS.1
I. Since it has appeared to us that the nature of the good is simple and the first; for every thing which is not the first is not simple; and since it has nothing in itself, but is one alone, and the nature of what is called the one, is the same with the good; for it is not first something else, and afterwards one, — nor is the good something else, and afterwards the good ; this being the case, when we say the one, and when we say the good, it is necessary to think that we speak of one and the same nature; not predicating any thing of it, but manifesting it to ourselves as much as possible. It is also called the first, because it is most simple ; and sufficient to itself, because it does not consist of many things. For if it did, it would be suspended from the things of which it consists. It likewise is not in any thing else, because every thing which is in another, is also derived from another. If, therefore, it is neither from, nor in another, and has not any composition in its nature, it is necessary that there should not be any thing superior to it. Hence, it is not requisite to proceed to other principles, but having admitted this, and next to this intellect which is primarily intellect, we ought afterwards to place soul, as the next in rank. For this is the order according to nature, neither to admit more, nor fewer than these in the intelligible. For those who admit fewer than these, must either say that soul and intellect are the same, or that intellect and that which is first are the same. It has, however, been frequently demonstrated by us, that these are different from each other.
II. It remains, therefore, that we should consider at present, if there are more than these three, what the natures are which exist besides these. For since the principle of all things subsists in the way we have shown, it is not possible for any one to find a more simple and elevated principle. For they [the Gnostics] will not say1 that there is one principle in capacity, but another in energy; since it is ridiculous in things which are in energy, and immaterial, to make many natures by dividing into capacity and energy. But neither in the natures posterior to these, is it to be supposed that there is a certain intellect established in quiet, but that another is as it were moved. For what is the quiet of intellect, what the motion and language of it ? And what will be the leisure of one intellect, and the work of the other? For intellect always possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, being constituted in a stable energy. But motion directed to, and subsisting about it, is now the employment of soul. Reason also proceeding from intellect into soul, causes soul to be intellectual, and does not produce a certain other nature between intellect and soul. Moreover, neither, is it necessary to make many intellects on this account, that one of them perceives intellectually, but another sees that it sees intellectually. For if in these, to perceive intellectually is one thing, but another to perceive that it sees intellectually, yet there must be one intuitive perception in these which is not insensible of its own energies. For it would be ridiculous to form any other conception than this of true intellect. But the intellect will be entirely the same, which perceives intellectually, and which sees that it sees intellectually. For if this were not the case, the one would be alone intelligent but the other would perceive that it was intelligent, and the former would be different from the latter. If, however, they say that these two [only] differ from each other in conceptions, in the first place indeed, they will be deprived of many hypostases ; and in the next place it is necessary to consider, whether any conception of ours can admit the subsistence of an intellect which is alone intelligent, and which does not perceive that it sees intellectually. For when a thing of this kind happens to us who are always attentive to impulses and cogitations, if we are moderately worthy, it becomes the cause to us of folly.
When, therefore, that which is truly intellect intellectually perceives itself in its intellections, and the intelligible of it is not externally posited, but intellect itself is also the intelligible, it necessarily follows that in intellectual perception it possesses itself, and sees itself. But seeing itself, it perceives itself not to be void of intelligence, but intelligent. So that in primarily energizing intellectually, it will also have a perception that it sees intellectually, both being as one; nor can there be any conception of duplicity there. If, likewise, always perceiving intellectually it is that which it is, what place can there be for the conception which separates intellectual perception from the perceiving that it sees intellectually ? If, however, some one should introduce a third conception to the second, which asserts that it perceives that it sees intellectually, and should say that it understands (i.e., sees intellectually), that what understands understands, the absurdity is still more apparent. And why may not assertions of this kind be made to infinity r The reason, likewise, proceeding from intellect which may be adduced, and from which afterwards another reason is generated in the soul, so as to become a medium between intellect and soul, deprives the soul of intellectual perception, if it does not derive this reason from intellect, but from some other intermediate nature. Hence it would possess an image of reason, but not reason itself. And in short, it would not have a knowledge of intellect, nor would it be intelligent.
III. Hence it must not be admitted that there are more principles than these [in the intelligible world], nor must these superfluous conceptions be adopted, which have no place there; but it must be said that there is one intellect always subsisting with invariable sameness, and in every respect without fluctuation, which imitates as much as possible its father; and with respect to our soul, that one part of it always abides on high,2 that another part of it is conversant with sensibles, and that another has a subsistence in the middle of these. For as there is one nature in many powers, at one time the whole soul tends upward in conjunction with the most excellent part, of itself, and of the universe, but at another time, the worst part being drawn down, draws together with itself the middle part. For it is not lawful that the whole of it should be drawn downward. This passion also happens to the soul, because it did not abide in that which is most beautiful, where the soul which does not rank as a part [continually] abiding, and of which we are not a part, imparts to the whole body of the universe, as much as it is able to receive from it. At the same time also, this soul remains free from all solicitude, not governing the world by the discursive energy of reason, nor correcting any thing [in itself;] but by the vision of that which is prior to itself, adorning the universe with an admirable power. For the more it looks to itself, the more beautiful and powerful it becomes, and possessing these excellencies from the intelligible world, it imparts them to that which is posterior to itself, and as it is always illuminated, it always illuminates.
III. Being therefore always illuminated, and continually possessing light, it imparts it to the uatures that are in a consequent order. And these are always contained and irrigated by this light, and enjoy life through it, as far as they are able. Just as if a fire being placed in a certain middle, whatever is capable of receiving heat, should be heated by it as much as possible; though the fire is limited by measure. But when the powers not being measured, are never-failing, how is it possible that they should have an existence, and yet nothing should participate of them ? It is, however, necessary that every thing should impart itself to something else; or the good will not be good, nor intellect be intellect, nor soul be soul; unless after that which lives primarily, there is also that which has a secondary life, as long as that exists which is primarily vitaL Hence it is necessary that all things should be perpetually consequent to each other, and should be generated by other things, because they depend on others for their subsistence. Things therefore that are said to be generated, were not generated at a certain time, but were and will be rising into existence; nor will they be corrupted, those things excepted which they contain, into which they may be resolved. But that which has nothing into which it can be resolved, will not be corrupted. H, however, some one should say that things which are in generation may be resolved into matter, we reply, and why may not matter also be dissolved ? But if it is said that matter may be dissolved, we ask what necessity there was that it should be generated r If they say it was necessary, and therefore it was generated, we reply, and it is also now necessary. But if it should be left alone, divine natures would not be every where, but would be circumscribed in a certain place, as if surrounded with a wall. If, however, this is impossible, matter is perpetually illuminated [by divinity].
IV. But if they say that soul suffering as it were a defluxion of its wings, made the world, we reply, that this does not befall the soul of the universe. If also they say this soul is deceived and in error, they should assign the cause of its deception and error. When likewise was it deceived ? For if from eternity, it will for the same reason remain in error. But if it began at a certain time to be deceived, why was it not deceived prior to that time ? We, however, do not say that the tendency of the soul downward produced the world, but rather the non-tendency of it. But if it tends downward, it is evident that this must arise from its forgetfulness of what the intelligible world contains. And if it is forgetful of these, how did it fabricate the world ? For whence can it make, except from the things which it saw there ? But if it fabricates recollecting the things that are there, it has not, in short, any tendency downward. For it does not possess nor see them obscurely, if it is without this tendency. And why, if it has any recollection of them, should it not wish to return thither ? For what can it suppose will happen to itself from fabricating the world ? For it is ridiculous to assert that it made the world, in order that it might be honoured, and is an opinion derived from the makers of statues. If, likewise, soul fabricated by a reasoning process, and did not naturally possess a producing power, how did it make this world ? When also will it destroy the world? For if it repented having made it, why does it defer its destruction ? But if it does not yet repent, neither will it ever, as being now accustomed to it, and becoming through time more friendly towards it. If, also, it defers the destruction of the world on account of partial souls, waiting for their union with it, these souls ought not to have descended again into generation, having experienced in a former descent, the evils which are here; so that prior to the present time they would have ceased to descend. Nor must we grant them that this world was produced in an evil condition, because there are many molestations in it. For this arises from forming too exalted an opinion of this sensible world, and conceiving it to be the same with that which is intelligible, and not the image of it. For what more beautiful image of it could have been generated ? What other tire could be a better image of the fire which is there, than the fire which is here ? Or what other earth than this, of the earth which is there ? What sphere, also, could be more accurate and venerable, or more orderly in its motion [than that of this sensible universe], after the comprehension which is there of the intelligible world in itself ? And what other sun after the intelligible sun, can be prior to this which is the object of sight ?
V. It is however truly absurd, that they having a body like other men, together with desires, pains, and anger, should not despise the power of these, but assert that thty are able to come into contact with the intelligible, and yet that there is not in the sun a more impassive power, though it exists in a superior order, and has not as our bodies have, a predominant tendency to a change of quality, and that it has not likewise a wisdom more excellent than we have whose origin is recent, and who are prevented by so many impediments from arriving at truth. Nor again, is it fit to assert that the soul of the vilest men is immortal and divine, but that all heaven and the stars that are there, do not participate of immortality, though they consist of things far more beautiful and pure [than any thing terrestrial], and though it is evident that whatever is there is orderly and elegant; especially since they blame the disorder which is about the earth, as if an immortal soul would choose this inferior abode, and willingly though more excellent be subservient to a mortal soul. The introduction also of this other soul by them is absurd, which according to them derives its composition from the elements. For how can a composition from the elements possess any life? For the mixture of these produces either the hot or the cold, or that which is mingled from both, or the dry, or the moist, or a compound from these. How, likewise, is soul the connecting bond of the four elements, since it consists from and is posterior to them ? But when they also add animadversion and will, and ten thousand other things to this soul, it may be asked why they ascribe these to it. Farther still, they do not honour this sensible fabrication of things, nor this visible earth, but they say that there is a new1 earth produced for them, into which they are to ascend from hence ; and that this new earth is the productive principle of the world ; though why is it necessary that they should dwell in the paradigm of a world which they hate ? Whence likewise does this paradigm subsist ? For this, according to them, derived its subsistence from the maker of the world, verging to terrestrial natures. If, therefore, by the maker of the universe great attention is paid to the production of another world, after the intelligible world which he possesses, why is this attention requisite ? And if he was thus attentive prior to the world, was it in order that souls might be saved ? How is it, therefore, that they are not saved ? So that the world was made in vain. But if he was thus attentive posterior to the world, receiving his knowledge by a spoliation of form from matter, in this case, the skill which souls derive from experience, is sufficient to their salvation. But if they think that the form of the world should be assumed in souls, from whence is this novel doctrine derived ?
VI. And why is it requisite to speak of the other hypostases which they introduce, such as transmigrations, repercussions, and repentances ?3 For if they say that these are the passions of soul when it repents, and repercussions, when it contemplates as it were the images of beings, and not beings themselves, — these are vain assertions, adduced for the purpose of establishing a peculiar sect. For as they do not adhere to the ancient wisdom of the Greeks, they fabricate such fictions as these. For the Greeks knew and asserted without any arrogance and pride, that there are methods of ascent from the cavern [of sense] and gradual progressions to a more and more true survey [of an intelligible essence.] And, in short, some things are assumed by the Gnostics from Plato, but others are innovations of their own, in order that they may establish a peculiar philosophy, and are deviations from the truth. For the punishments and rivers in Hades, and transmigrations into other bodies, are derived from Plato. The admission, likewise, of multitude in intelligibles, viz. of being and intellect; and another demiurgus, and soul, is assumed from what is said in the ” Timaeus.” For Plato there says,” Intellect, therefore, perceiving ideas in which is animal itself, understood by the discursive energy of reason, that the universe should contain as many as are there.” But they not understanding Plato, introduce an intellect at rest, containing all things in itself: a second intellect besides this, contemplating what the first contains; and a third intellect energizing dianoetically. Frequently, likewise, the fabricating soul is assumed by them for the reasoning intellect. And they fancy that this soul is the Demiurgus, according to Plato; not knowing who the Demiurgus is. And, in short, they falsely ascribe to Plato the mode of fabrication which they introduce, and many other. things, and pervert the opinions of the man; as if they alone understood an intelligible nature, but he, and other blessed men were ignorant of it. Denominating, likewise, the intelligible multitude, they fancy that they have accurately discovered its nature; though at the same time, by the multitude which they introduce, they draw down the intelligible nature into a similitude with that which is sensible and subordinate. For it is necessary to consider intelligible multitude as subsisting according to the least possible number, and ascribing all things to that which is posterior to the first, not to investigate any other intelligibles; that being all things, and the first-intellect and essence, and such other beautiful essences as exist after the first nature. But we should admit that the form of soul ranks in the third place.
Moreover, we should investigate the differences of souls, in passions, or in nature, so as not in any respect to reprehend divine men, but should benevolently receive their assertions, as being sanctioned by antiquity, adopting what has been well said by them, respecting the immortality of the soul, the intelligible world, and the first God; as also, that it is necessary the soul should fly from an association with the body, and that a separation from the body is a flight from generation to real essence. For if they were clearly to assert these things, which are admitted by Plato, they would do well. No one, however, will envy their wishing to dissent from these dogmas; nor their endeavours to establish their own opinions among their auditors, by defaming and insolently attacking the doctrines of the Greeks. But they ought to demonstrate that their own peculiar opinions, which are different from those of the Greeks, are right; and should benevolently and philosophically adduce the opinions of the ancients. Justly, also, looking to truth when they oppose the ancients, they ought not to aim at renown by censuring those who from a remote period have been celebrated by no contemptible men, nor assert that they are better than them. For what the ancients have said concerning intelligibles, is much better, and more replete with learning than what they say; and is easily known to be so by those who are not deceived by the fraud which at present invades mankind. Indeed, the additions which the Gnostics have made to what they received from the ancients, will be found to be by no means appropriate; and hence in their oppositions to them, they introduce manifold generations and corruptions. They likewise find fault with this universe, reprobate the communion of the soul with body, and blame the governor of the world. They also confound the demiurgus with soul, and ascribe the same passions to the soul of the world as to partial souls.
That this world, therefore, never began, nor will ever cease to be, but will continue in existence, as long as intelligibles have a subsistence, has been elsewhere shown by us. And that the communion of our soul with the body, is not better for the soul, has been asserted prior to them. But that the soul of the universe should receive any thing from ours, is just as if some one adducing the tribe of potters or braziers, in a well-governed city, should blame the whole city [on their account]. It is necessary, however, to be persuaded that the soul of the universe governs in a way very different from ours; and not bound to body as our souls are. For besides ten thousand other differences which we have elsewhere enumerated, this also ought to be considered, that we are bound by the body, the bond being now in reality produced. For the nature of body being bound in the whole soul, binds together with itself whatever it may comprehend; but the soul of the universe is not bound by the things which it binds. For it has dominion over them. Hence it is not passively affected by them. We, however, are not the lords of these. But so much of the soul of the world as is raised to the divine nature which is above it, so much of it remains entire and simple, and without impediment; and so much of it as imparts life to the body with which it is connected, receives nothing from it. For, in short, that which is in something different from itself, necessarily receives the passive properties of that in which it is. But this no longer imparts any thing of itself to that which possesses its own proper life. Just as if one thing should be centrically inserted in another, and which is co-passive with that in which it is inserted; but the latter being decayed, should permit the former to have its own life; since, neither when the fire which is in you is extinct, is the wholeness of fire extinguished. Nor if the whole of fire should perish, this would not affect the soul of the universe, but the composition of the mundane body. And if in each of the remaining elements there should be a certain’ world, this would not affect the soul of the universe, since the composition of the world is different from that of each of the animals which it contains. For the soul of the world stands as it were over its body, and orders it to abide; but here the elements secretly as it were withdrawing themselves, are bound in their proper order by a secondary bond. In the former case, however, they have no place into which they can fly. Hence, it is neither necessary to contain them internally, nor by external compression to impel them inwardly; but each remains where nature from the first intended it should remain. And if any one of them is naturally moved, those tilings to which motion is not natural are affected by it. The bodies, however, which are naturally moved, are moved in a beautiful manner, as being parts of the whole; but certain things are corrupted, in consequence of not being able to sustain the order of the whole. Just as if in a great dance, which is conducted in a becoming manner, a tortoise being caught in the middle of the progression, should be trod upon, not being able to escape the order of the dance; though if the tortoise had arranged itself with the dance, it would not have suffered from those that composed it.
To inquire, however, why the world was made, is the same thing as to ast why soul is; and why the demiurgus made it ? For this indeed, in the first place, is the inquiry of those who suppose there is a beginning of perpetuity. In the next place, they fancy that the demiurgus became the cause of the fabrication of the world, through being changed from one thing to another. Hence, they are to be taught, if they are equitably disposed, what the nature of these things is, that they may cease to revile what is honourable, which they will easily do, if they become properly cautious respecting such like particulars. For no one can rightly blame the administration of the universe, since in the first place it demonstrates the magnitude of an intelligible nature. For if it proceeds into life in such a way, as not to have an indistinct and confused life, such as the smallest natures in it possess, which are perpetually generated night and day through the abundant life it contains ; but is continued, clear and abundant, and is every where a life exhibiting an inestimable wisdom, how is it possible not to assert that it is a perspicuous and beautiful statue of the intelligible Gods ? But if though it imitates the intelligible paradigm it is not the same with it, this is conformable to nature ; since if it were the same with, it would no longer imitate it. The assertion, however, is false, that it imitates this paradigm in a dissimilar manner. For nothing is omitted, which a beautiful and natural image can possibly possess; since it was indeed necessary that this imitation should exist, but yet that it should not be an imitation resulting from the discursive energy of reason, and an artificial care. For it was not possible that the intelligible should be the last of things; since it was necessary that the energy of it should be twofold, one indeed abiding in itself, but the other proceeding into something else. Hence it was necessary that there should be something posterior to it. For that alone which is the most powerless of all things, has nothing of itself which proceeds downwards. But an admirable power flourishes in intelligibles, so that this power perpetually fabricates.
If, however, there is another [sensible] world better than this, what is it ? But if it is necessary that this world should exist, and there is no other, it is this world which preserves the imitation of the intelligible universe. For the whole earth indeed, is full of various animals, and of immortal beings; and all things are replete with these, as far as to the heavens. And with respect to the stars, both those which are in the inferior spheres, and those which are in the highest orb, what reason can be assigned why they are not Gods, since they are moved in order, and revolve with such beautiful bodies ? Why should they not possess virtue, or what can hinder them from obtaining it ? For those things have no place there, which are the causes of evils here; nor is that evil of body there, which here is disturbed and disturbs. What, likewise, prevents celestial natures from possessing intellectual energy, since they are always at leisure, and from receiving in their intellect divinity, and the other intelligible Gods. But to assert that our wisdom is more excellent than theirs, will be said by no one who is not insane ; since if souls have descended hither, through being compelled by the soul of the world, how since they suffer compulsion are they better than that soul? For in souls, that which has dominion is more excellent. And if souls descended hither voluntarily, why do you blame this sensible region, into which you willingly came ? Especially since you may be liberated from it, if it is not agreeable to you to stay. If, however, this universe is a place of such a kind, that it is possible to obtain wisdom in it, and while dwelling here to live according to a similitude of intelligibles, does not this testify that sensible are suspended from intelligible forms ?
IX. If, however, some one should blame wealth and poverty, and the inequality in the dispensation of every thing of this kind, in the first place, such a one is ignorant that the worthy man does not seek for equality in such like particulars; nor is of opinion that those who possess many things, have more [of good;] nor that rulers are better than private individuals, but suffers others to make such things as these the objects of their pursuit. He also knows that the present life is twofold, the one being that of worthy men, but the other that of the multitude. And that the life of worthy men tends to the summit, and that “which is on high ; but that the life which is merely human is again twofold, the one kind being mindful of virtue, and participating of a certain good, but the other pertaining to the vile rabble and to artificers, who administer to the necessities of more worthy men. But if one man slays another, or is vanquished by pleasure, through imbecility of mind, what is there wonderful in this, since the guilt is not in intellect, but in souls that are of a puerile nature ? And if this should happen to be an exercise of the victors and the vanquished, how is it possible that this also should not subsist rightly ? But if you should be injured, what dreadful thing is there in this to an immortal nature? And if you kill another [instead of being killed yourself,] you have what you wish. If, however, you still blame the administration of things, there is no necessity for you to continue any longer in life. But it is acknowledged that there are judicial decisions here, and punishments. How, therefore, is it right to blame a city for distributing to every one according to his desert, since virtue is honoured in it, and vice has its appropriate disgrace? There are, likewise, in the world, not only statues of the Gods, but the Gods themselves, beholding from on high, who easily, as it is said, escape the accusations of men, since they conduct all things in order from the beginning to the end, and distribute an appropriate allotment to every one, conformable to the mutations of lives, and to actions in a pre-existent state ; of which he who is ignorant, is of all men the most rash and rustic in divine concerns. It is requisite, however, that you should endeavour to become a most excellent character, and not think that you alone are able to become so; for thus you will not yet” be most excellent. But you ought to be persuaded that there are other transcendently good men, and also good daemons ; and much more Gods, who dwell in this world, and look to that which is intelligible; and especially that there is that most blessed soul the leader and ruler of this universe. From hence also, it is proper that you should celebrate the intelligible Gods; and besides all these, the great king which is there, and should demonstrate that the magnitude of his nature especially consists in the multitude of Gods. For it is the province of those who know the power of God, not to contract this power into one, but to show that the amplitude of divinity is as great as he himself has demonstrated it to be; since remaining that which he is, he has produced many Gods, all of whom are suspended from, and subsist through and by him. This world, likewise, is through him, and wholly looks to his divinity, as does also each of the Gods, who prophetically announce to men what they there behold, and by oracles unfold their will.
If, however, the Gods that proceed from, are not the same with the first God, this very thing also is according to nature. But if you wish to despise superior beings, and arrogantly extol yourself as not inferior to them, in the first place [it should be remembered,] that by how much more excellent any one is, by so much the more is he benevolently disposed towards all other beings, and towards mankind. And in the next place, it is proper to have a moderate conception of our own dignity, and unaccompanied with any rusticity: exalting ourselves only so far as our nature is able to ascend; conceiving that there is also a place with divinity for others, as well as for ourselves, and not, as if flying in a dream, arrange ourselves alone immediately after the highest God; and thus deprive ourselves of that power by which it is possible for the soul of man to become a God. But this is possible so far as intellect is the leader of the soul. To attempt, however, to pass beyond intellect, is to fall from intellect. But stupid men are persuaded when they suddenly hear such sounds as these: ” You are better, not only than all other men, but also than the Gods” For there is much arrogance among men [of the present time]. And he who prior to this was humble and modest, and a man of no consequence, becomes exalted beyond measure when he is told, ” You are the son of God, but other men whom you formerly admired, are not the sons of God; as neither are those beings which men honour conformably to the rites of their ancestors. It may be shown, however, without any labour, that you are more excellent than the heavens themselves.”4 Others, also, vociferate the same things. Just as if some one in the company of many persons who knew not how to numerate, should hear it said that he was a thousand cubits in height. If, therefore, he should think himself so tall as this, but should hear that other men were five cubits in height, he would only have a confused imagination that a thousand was a great number.
Farther still, they acknowledge that the providence of God is attentive to human concerns. Why, therefore, does he neglect the whole world, of which we are a part ? If it is because he is not at leisure to look to it, neither therefore is it lawful for him to survey that which is inferior and us. Why also, while he surveys us, does he not behold that which is external; and thus look to the world in which we are contained ? But if he does not look to that which is external, in order that he may not see the world, neither will he behold us. Divinity, however, knows the order of the world, and the manner in which men who are contained in it subsist. Those, also, who are dear to divinity, bear mildly whatever happens to them from the world, if any thing necessarily befalls them from the motion of all things. For it is not proper to look to what is pleasing to an individual, but we should direct our attention to the universe, and honour every one according to his desert; hastening to that goal to which all things that are able hasten, and by the attainment of which they become blessed; some things as far as they have ability obtaining an allotment adapted to their nature. Nor should any man ascribe this ability to himself alone. For it does not follow that a man possesses what he pretends to possess; since many assert they possess that of which they know they are destitute, and also fancy they have a thing when they have it not, and that they alone are the possessors of that which they alone do not possess.
“At the time in which Plotinus lived,” (says Porphyry in his life of our philosopher,) ” there were many Christians and others, who departing from the ancient philosophy, became heretics [with respect to it] ; viz. the followers of Adelphius and Acylinus, who being in possession of many of the writings of Alexander, Philocomus, Demostratus, and Lydus, and exhibiting the revelations of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nicotheus, Allogenes, Meses, and certain others, deceived many, and were themselves deceived. For they asserted, that Plato had not penetrated the depth of an intelligible essence. Hence Plotinus in his conferences adduced many arguments against them, and also wrote a book which we have inscribed ‘ Against the Gnostics,’ leaving the rest to our judgment.”
After this testimony of Porphyry, it is singular, as Fabricius observes, that Plotinus should not even once use the word Gnostics, in any part of his treatise against them. But as he was a man sparing of words beyond all other writers, he was perhaps satisfied with the inscription which he knew would be given to the book by Porphyry, and being wholly attentive to the conceptions of his own wonderful mind, did not busy himself with a repetition of names. Wherever this word, therefore, occurs in the following translation, it is inserted by me for the sake of perspicuity. ↩
This is one of the peculiar dogmas of Plotinus, which is however opposed, and I think very justly by Proclus, in the last Proposition of his Elements of Theology. ” For if,” (as he there says) ” something pertaining to the soul remains on high in the intelligible world, it will always perceive intellectually, without transition, or transitively. But if without transition, it will be intellect, and not a part of the soul. And if with transition, then from that which always, and from that which sometimes energizes intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, is impossible. ↩
Forms or ideas, according to the ancient wisdom of the Greeks, leap into matter, which is adapted by the exemplar of the universe to receive the images of them, and like a mirror gives back the influx of the ideas which it receives. Souls, therefore, falling from the intelligible world become deceived, by mistaking the resemblances of forms for forms themselves, till by repentance they return to their true country, from which they have been as it were banished, through their abode on the earth. The Gnostics perverting this doctrine, gave the names of essences to such like passions of the soul. ↩
Of this most stupid and arrogant opinion was the slashing Dr. Bentley, as Pope calls him, as is evident from the following extract:
” Nor do we count it any absurdity, that such a vast and immense universe should be made for the sole use of such mean and unworthy creatures as the children of men. For if we consider the dignity of an intelligent being, and put that in the scales against brute inanimate matter, we may affirm, without over-valuing human nature, that the soul of one virtuous and religious man, is of greater worth and excellency than the sun and his planets, and all the stars in the world.” See Bentley’s 8th Sermon at Boyle’s Lectures. ↩