X. He, therefore, who investigates many other particulars, or rather every particular respecting their opinions, will be able to show copiously what the nature of them is. We, indeed, are ashamed of certain of our friends,1 who before they were intimate with us were conversant with these opinions, and who still, I know not how, persevere in them, and endeavour to render them credible. We, however, speak to those with whom we are acquainted, and not to the many who are auditors of these men. For we shall effect nothing by endeavouring to persuade them not to be disturbed by the arguments of the Gnostics, which are not accompanied with demonstrations ; (for how is it possible they should ?) but are the assertions of arrogant men. For there is another mode of properly confuting those who dare to reprehend the doctrines of ancient and divine men, and a mode which adheres to the truth. We shall, therefore, dismiss the enquiry how they are to be persuaded. For those who accurately understand what has now been said, will know what the nature is of every other particular. We shall dismiss, however, the consideration of that assertion which surpasses every thing in absurdity, if it is requisite to call it an absurditv, viz. that soul and a certain wisdom verged downward, whether soul was the first that began to verge, or wisdom was the cause of this tendency to an inferior condition, or both had the same intention. They add, that other souls and the members of wisdom descended at the same time, and entered bodies, such for instance as those of men. They say, however, that the soul for the sake of which other souls descended, did not descend, as if it did not verge downward, but that it only illuminated the darkness j and that afterwards an image was from thence produced in matter. Again, also, after this fashioning an image of an image, they assert that it pervades through matter or materiality, or whatever else they may please to call it; for they call this by one name, and that by another, devising many appellations for the purpose of rendering what they say obscure. And thus they generate what is denominated by them the demiurgus. Making the world, likewise, to revolt from the mother, they say that it proceeds from the demiurgus as far as to the last of images.
XI. In the first place, therefore, if this soul did not descend, but illuminated the darkness, how can it be rightly said to have verged downward ? For it is not proper to say that it now verged, because something flowed from it such as light; unless one thing belonging to it was situated in the region beneath, but another proceeded locally to this region, and becoming near to it, illuminated it. But if this soul illuminated, abiding in itself, and not at all operating for this purpose, why did this soul alone illuminate, and not those natures also which are more powerful than it in the order of beings? If, however, they say that this soul, in consequence of forming a rational conception of the world, illuminated it from the discursive energy of reason, why did it not at one and the same time illuminate and make the world, but instead of this waited for the generation of images ? In the next place, this rational conception of the world, which is called by them a foreign land, and which was produced as they say by greater causes, did not occasion the makers of it to verge downward. Besides, how did it happen that matter being illuminated, made psychical images, but not the nature of bodies ? For the image of soul, would not be at all in want of darkness or matter ; but that which was generated would when generated follow its maker, and be suspended from him. Again, whether is this illumination from a reasoning process, essence, or as they say, a conception r For if it is essence, what is the difference between it, and that from which it proceeds ? But if it is another species of soul, and this rational, perhaps it is vegetable and generative. If, however, this be the case, how will it any longer be true that it made the world in order that it might be honoured for so doing; and how did it make it through arrogance and audacity, and in short, through imagination ? And still more absurd is it, that it should have made the world through a reasoning process. “Why, also, was it requisite, that the fabricator of the world should have made it from matter and an image r But if this illumination is a conception, in the first place it must be shown whence the name derives its origin ; and in the next place how it produces, unless it imparts to the conception a fabricative power. But how can there be production with a fiction r They will say, that this thing is first, and another is posterior to it. This, however, is asserted without any authority. Why, also, was fire the first thing produced (and afterwards other things) ?
XII. After what manner, likewise, did this image when just produced attempt to fabricate ? Was it through a recollection of what it previously knew ? But in short it had not then an existence, neither itself, nor the mother which they assign to it, in order that it might know this. In the next place, is it not wonderful, since they came into this world, not as images of souls, but as true souls, that scarcely one or two of them being raised from the world, and recovering their recollection, have been able to remember something of what they formerly saw; and yet this image, as soon as it was generated, formed a conception, though as they say, obscurely, of supernal natures ? Or that this should have been the case with the mother of it, who is a material image; and that it should not only have formed a conception of these natures, and of both this and the intelligible world, but should also have learned what the things are from which the sensible universe was generated? Whence did it conceive that fire should first be produced, and think that this was necessary? For why did it not conceive this of something else ? But if it was able to produce fire from the conception of it, why did it not produce the world from a conception of the world? For it is in a similar manner requisite, that the production of the world should be simultaneous with the conception of it. For both fire and the world were comprehended in the conception of them; since this image fabricated entirely in a more physical way. and not like the arts. For the arts are posterior both to nature and the world. And even now, in the individuals which are generated by natures, fire is not first produced, afterwards each particular, and in the next place the mixture of these, but the enclosure and circumscription of the whole animal, impressed in the menstrual effluxions. Why, therefore, might not matter be there circumscribed in the impression of the world, in which impression, earth and fire and the rest of things were comprehended ? But perhaps they would thus have made the world, in consequence of employing a more true soul. The artificer of the world, however, knew not how to make it in this manner, though he foresaw the definite magnitude of the heavens, the obliquity of the zodiac, the motion of the bodies under it, and (the central position of) the earth; and all this in such a way as to possess the causes through which they thus subsist; though such foreknowledge could not belong to an image, but entirely proceeded from a power derived from the best of things, and which they also though unwillingly acknowledge. For the illumination diffused through the darkness, compels them to assent to the true causes of the world. For why was it requisite to illuminate, if it was not entirely necessary ? For this necessity was either according to nature, or preternatural. And if, indeed, it was according to nature, this illumination always existed; but if it was preternatural, then among supernal beings that which is irregular had a subsistence, and evils existed prior to this world. Hence, this world is not the cause of evil, but supernal beings are the causes of evils to the world. And evil to the soul is not from the universe, but the evils that are here are derived from soul. And thus by a reasoning process we are led to refer the world to the first of things. But if matter also is the cause of evil, whence does it appear that it is so ? For soul verging downward, they say, the darkness, and illuminated it. Whence, therefore, did the darkness originate ? For if they say that soul verging downward produced it, then it will follow that the darkness did not exist prior to this downward tendency of the soul. Nor will the darkness itself be the cause of this tendency, but the nature of soul. This, however, is the same thing as to attribute the cause to precedaneous necessities. So that the cause is from the first of beings.
XIII. He therefore who blames the nature of the world, does not know what he does, nor whither this audacity of his tends. This, however, arises from the Gnostics not knowing the successive order of things, viz. of first, second, and third natures, this order always extending itself as far as to the last of things, and from not considering that subordinate beings ought not to revile such as are first^ but should mildly yield to the nature of all things; and that they should betake themselves to the first of beings, abandoning the tragic fears, which they fancy are produced from the spheres of the world, all which are the causes of bland effects. For what do they contain of a terrible nature, with which those that are unskilled in arguments, and such as are strangers to erudite and elegant knowledge, are terrified r For though the bodies of these spheres are of a fiery2 characteristic, yet it is not proper to be afraid of them, since they subsist with commensuration both to the universe and to the earth. But they ought to look to the souls of these spheres, by whom they imagine themselves to be considered as beings of a very honourable nature, though their bodies transcendently surpass ours both in magnitude and beauty, and contribute to and co-operate with natural effects. For otherwise subordinate beings would not be generated, as long as the first of things subsist. These spheres also give completion to the universe, of which they are likewise mighty parts. If men, however, jjossess something honourable beyond other animals, much more do the starry spheres, which do not exist in the universe for tyrannical purposes, but impart to it ornament and order. But with respect to those things which are said to be effected by them, these are to be considered as signs of future events; and that things which are generated are produced accompanied with different fortunes. For it is not possible that the same things should happen to each individual, since they are much distant from each other, in the times of their generation, the places in which they reside, and in the dispositions of the soul. Nor again, is it fit to require that all things should be (perfectly) good, nor, because this is impossible, rashly to blame (the order of the universe). Nor is it proper to think that these inferior differ in no respect from superior natures, or to conceive that to be evil which is more defective with respect to the possession of wisdom, and is less good, and thus always considering a thing to be evil in proportion as it is more inconsiderable. Just as if some one should say that nature is evil, because it is not sense. And that which is sensitive is evil, because it is not reason. For those who thus think must be compelled to assert that evil also subsists in the intelligible world. For there, likewise, soul is inferior to intellect, and intellect to something else (or the good).
XIV. After another manner, also, they especially make supernal natures not to be incorruptible. For when they write incantations, and utter them as to the stars, not only to (the bodies and) souls of these, but also to things superior to soul, what do they effect? They answer, charms, allurements, and persuasions, so that the stars hear the words addressed to them, and are drawn down; if any one of us knows how in a more artificial manner to utter these incantations, sounds, aspirations of the voice, and hissings, and such other particulars as in their writings are said to possess a magical power. If, however, they are not willing to assert this, but that sounds possess certain incorporeal powers, it will follow that while they wish to render their assertions more venerable, they ignorantly subvert their renown. They likewise pretend that they can expel disease. And if, indeed, they say that they effect this by temperance and an orderly mode of life, they speak rightly, and conformably to philosophers. But now when they assert that diseases are daemons, and that they are able to expel these by words, and proclaim that they possess this ability, they may appear to the multitude to be more venerable, who admire the powers of magicians; but they will not persuade intelligent men that diseases have not their causes either from labours, or satiety, or indigence, or putrefaction, and in short from mutations which either have an external or internal origin. This, however, is manifest from the cure of diseases. For disease is deduced downward, so as to pass away externally, either through a flux of the belly, or the operation of medicine. Disease, also, is cured by letting of blood, and fasting. Perhaps, however, (they will say) that the daemon is then hungry, and the medicine causes him to waste away; but that sometimes health is suddenly obtained, through the daemon departing, or remaining within the body. But if this is effected while the daemon still remains within, why, while he is within, is the person no longer diseased ? And if he departs, what is the cause of his departure ? For what did he suffer ? Is it because he was nourished by the disease ? The disease, therefore, was something different from the daemon. In the next place, if the daemon enters without any cause, why is not the body always diseased r But if he enters when the cause of the disease is present, why is the daemon necessary in order to the body becoming diseased ? For the cause is sufficient to produce the fever. At the same time, however, it is ridiculous, that as soon as the cause of the disease exists, the daemon should immediately be present, as if subsisting in conjunction with the cause. The manner, however, in which these things are asserted by the Gnostics, and on what account is evident; since for the sake of this, no less than of other things, we have mentioned these daemons. Other particulars, however, we shall leave to the consideration of the reader. And this must every where he considered, that he who pursues our form of philosophy, will, besides all other goods, genuinely exhibit simple and venerable manners, in conjunction with the possession of wisdom, and will not endeavour to become insolent and proud; but will possess confidence accompanied with reason, much security and caution, and great circumspection.3
- Tratado 33 (II, 9, 15-18) — AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. (Thomas Taylor)
- Tratado 33 (II, 9) — AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. (Thomas Taylor)
Plotinus, I suppose, alludes here to Origen the Christian father, I among others, who had formerly been one of his disciples. ↩
The lire of which the heavenly bodies consists is unburning and innoxious, perpetually shining, as Proclus says in the “Timaeus,” with vivific heat, illuminative power, purity, and transparent light. ↩
There are four lines more in this section in the original ; but the meaning of them is so very obscure, that I have not attempted to translate them. ↩