I. In investigating the essence of soul, if we show that it is neither body, nor the harmony in incorporeal natures; and likewise if we omit what is said of its being the entelecheia,1 or perfection of the body, as not true, as the words [taken literally] imply, and as not manifesting what the soul is; and if also we should say that it is of an intelligible nature, and a divine allotment, perhaps we shall assert something perspicuous concerning its essence. At the same time, however, it will be better to proceed still further than this. For this purpose, therefore, we shall make a division into a sensible and intelligible nature, and place soul in the intelligible. Hence, let it be at present admitted that it ranks among intelligibles: and let us in another way investigate that which is proximate to, or the peculiarity of, its nature. We say, therefore, that some things are primarily partible, and in their own nature dissipable; but these are such as have no part the same, either as another part, or as the whole; and in which it is necessary that the part should he less than all and the whole. These, however, are sensible magnitudes and masses, each of which has an appropriate place, nor is it possible among these, that the same thing should be in many places at once. But there is another essence opposed to this, which in no respect admits of a separation into parts, since it is without parts, and therefore impartible. It likewise admits of no interval, not even in conception, nor is indigent of place, nor is generated in a certain being, either according to parts, or according to wholes, because it is as it were at one and the same time carried in all beings as in a vehicle; not in order that it may be established in them, but because other things are neither able nor willing to exist without it. It likewise possesses an essence which subsists according to sameness, and is the foundation of all following natures, being as it were a centre in a circle, the lines drawn from which and terminating in the circumference, nevertheless permit it to abide in itself. For they possess from the centre their generation and being, participate of the point, and have for their principle that which is impartible. They also proceed, suspending themselves from the centre. This, therefore, [of which the centre in a circle is an image] being primarily impartible in intelligibles, and the leader among beings, and again that which is in sensibles being in every respect partible, — this being the case, prior to that which is sensible, but which nevertheless is something near to and in it, there is another certain nature, which is partible indeed, yet not primarily so like bodies, but becomes partible in bodies. Hence, when bodies are divided, the form which is in them is also divided, though it still remains a whole in each of the divided parts ; the same thing in this case becoming many, each of which is perfectly distant from the other, in consequence of the form becoming entirely partible. Of this kind are colours, and all qualities, and each morphe, which is capable of being wholly at one and the same time in many things, that are separated from each other, and which has no part suffering the same thing with another part. Hence this must be admitted to be in every respect partible.
Again, besides the nature which is perfectly indivisible, there is another essence proximately suspended from it, and which has indeed from it the impartible, but by a progression from thence, hastening to another nature, is established in the middle of both; viz. in the middle of that which is impartible and primary, and that which is divisible about bodies, and is inherent in bodies. This nature does not subsist after the same manner as colour and every quality, which are indeed every where the same in many masses of bodies, yet the quality which is in one mass, is entirely separate from the quality in another, so far as one mass is also separate from another. And though the magnitude should be one, yet that which is the same in each part, has no communion whatever so as to produce co-passivity, because this sameness is at the same time attended with [a predominant] difference. For the sameness is passion, and is not itself also essence. That, however, in this middle nature which accedes to an impartible essence, is itself essence, and is ingenerated in bodies, about which also it happens to be divided; yet it does not suffer this, till it gives itself to bodies. When, therefore, it is inherent in bodies, though it should be inherent in the greatest body, and which is every where most extended, yet though it gives itself to the whole, it does not depart from the unity of its nature. Yet it is not one in the same manner as body. For body is one by continuity, but one part of it is different from another, and is situated in a different place. Nor again is it one, in the same manner as one quality. The nature, however, which is at once partible and impartible, and which we say is soul, is not one like that which is continued, having another and another part; but it is partible indeed, because it is in all the parts of that in which it subsists; and impartible, because the whole of it is in all the parts, and likewise in each of the parts. He, therefore, who perceives this, and beholds the power of it, will know what a divine and admirable thing soul is, and that it possesses a supernatural essence; not indeed having magnitude, but being present with all magnitude, and existing in this place, and again not existing in it, and this not by a different, but the same nature. So that it is divided into parts, and again not divided; or rather, it is neither divided, nor generated divisible. For it remains with itself a whole. But it is divided about bodies, because bodies in consequence of their proper partibihty, are not able to receive it impartibly. So that the distribution into parts, is the passion of bodies, and not of soul.
The cause, according to Aristotle, by which the animal is vitally moved, is the rational soul, but the cause by which the animal thus moved is defined or bounded, is entelecheia, or form, which imparts to it perfection. See my Introduction to, and translation of, Aristotle’s treatise ” On the Soul.” ↩