I. Is it therefore necessary, that intellect should be in itself various, in order that by one of the things contained in itself, having surveyed the rest, it may be thus said to understand itself, as if it would not be able to be converted to, and have an intellectual perception of itself, if it was entirely simple ? Or is it also possible for that which is not a composite, to have the intellection of itself? For that which is said to perceive itself intellectually because it is a composite, and because by one of the things in itself it understands the rest, just as if by sense we should apprehend the form1 of ourselves, and the other nature of the body, will not have a truly intellectual perception of itself. For in a thing of this kind, the whole will not be known, unless that which understands other things that are with itself, understands also itself; since otherwise we shall not have the object of investigation, viz., that which perceives itself, but we shall have one thing perceiving another. It is necessary, therefore, to admit that the intellectual perception of itself is the province of a simple nature, and how this is effected must, if possible, be considered; or we must abandon the opinion that there is something which truly intellectually perceives itself. To abandon, however, this opinion is not easy, since the rejection of it is attended with many absurdities. For if we do not admit that to assign this power to the soul is not very absurd, yet not to ascribe it to the nature of intellect is perfectly absurd; viz., if we grant that it has indeed a knowledge of other things, but has no knowledge and science of itself. For sense, and not intellect, will have an apprehension of. things external; and if you are willing to grant it, this will also be the case with the dianoetic power and opinion. But whether intellect has a knowledge of these or not, it is fit to consider. It is evident, indeed, that intellect knows such things as are intelligible. Does it, therefore, know these alone, or also itself that know these? And does it thus far know itself, that it knows these alone, but does not know what itself is ? Hence, it will perceive that it knows some things belonging to itself, but it will not know what itself is; or it will both know the things which are its own, and itself. And what the mode of this knowledge is, and how far it extends, must be considered.
II. In the first place, however, we must inquire concerning the soul, whether the knowledge of itself is to be attributed to it, what the gnostic power of it is, and how it subsists. With respect to the sensitive power, therefore, of the soul, we must immediately say that its energy is directed to externals alone. For though there is a co-sensation of things which inwardly take place in the body, yet here the apprehension is of things which are external to sense: for then there is a sensation of the passions which are in the body. But the power in the soul which reasons, and which forms a judgment of the phantasms adjacent from sense, collects and divides them, surveys the impressions as it were which are derived from intellect, and possesses about these the same power [as intellect]. It likewise assumes intelligence, as knowing and adapting new and recently acceding impressions to those in itself which are ancient. And this knowledge and adaptation, we say, are the reminiscences of the soul. The intellect of the soul, also, stops as far as this in its power. [It must be investigated, therefore, whether the reasoning power also,] is converted to, and knows itself, or whether this must be referred to intellect. For if we attribute a knowledge of itself to this part, we must admit that it is intellect; and in this case, we must investigate in what it differs from a superior intellect. But if we do not grant that it has a knowledge of itself, by a reasoning process we must proceed to the intellect which is superior, and we must consider what it is for this to know itself. And if we grant that this is also the province of the reasoning power, we must investigate what the difference is between the two in self-knowledge. For if there is no difference, then this our intellect is the highest. This dianoetic part, therefore, of the soul, is it converted to itself, or not ? Or has it [only] a knowledge of the impressions which it receives both from intellect and sense ? And in the first place, it must be investigated how it possesses this knowledge.
III. For sense, indeed, sees a man, and transmits the figure of him to the dianoetic part. But what does this part say ? Perhaps it does not yet say any thing, but only knows that it is a man, and there stops. Unless, indeed, it should consider with itself, who this is, if it happens that it has before met with him, and should say, employing memory for this purpose, that it is Socrates. If, however, it should also evolve the form of the man, it will then distribute into parts those things which it received from the imagination. And if it should also say, Is he a good man ? it will make this inquiry from the information which it derived through sense. But that which it says on this occasion, it will now possess from itself, containing in itself a rule by which it forms a judgment of good. How then does it contain the good in itself ? May we not say, so far as it is boniform, and is corroborated to the perception of a thing of this kind, in consequence of intellect shining upon it ? For the pure part of the soul is this, and receives the supervening vestiges of intellect. Why, however, is not this intellect, but the rest beginning from the sensitive power is soul ? May we not say, because it is necessary that soul should consist in the discursive energies of reason ? But all these are the works of the reasoning power. Why, however, do we not grant to this part the power of intellectually perceiving itself, and thus become liberated from doubt ? Is it because we assign to it the office of considering, and being busily employed about externals; but we conceive it to be the province of intellect, to survey both itself, and the forms which it contains? If, however, some one should say, what therefore prevents this part from considering things pertaining to itself, by another power ? He who says this, does not investigate either the dianoetic or reasoning power, but assumes a pure intellect. What then prevents a pure intellect from existing in the soul ? We reply, nothing prevents this. But farther still, it is necessary to inquire, whether this pure intellect is something belonging to soul ? We reply, it does not belong to the soul, and yet it is our intellect, being different from the dianoetic power, and proceeding on its summit. At the same time, however, it is ours, though we must not con-numerate it with the parts of the soul. Or we may say, that it is ours, and yet not ours. Hence we use, and do not use it; but we always employ the dianoetic power. And it is ours indeed, when we use it, but not ours when we do not use it.2 But what is it to use a pure intellect ? Is it to pronounce ourselves as becoming either such an intellect, or conformable to it ? For we are not intellect. We subsist, therefore, conformable or according to it, the first reasoning power being the recipient of it. For we are sentient through sense, and we ourselves perceive sensibly. Are we therefore thus dianoetically perceived, and do we thus dianoetically energize? Or shall we say that we indeed are reasoning beings, and that we intellectually perceive the conceptions which are in dianoia ? For we are this. But the conceptions arising from the energies of intellect, are in such a way above us, as those arising from the energies of sense are beneath us. And we are this peculiarity of soul, viz., the middle of a twofold power, the worse and the better; sense being the worse, but intellect the better power. And with respect to sense, indeed, it seems that we always grant it to be ours; for we are always sentient; but this is dubious with respect to intellect, because we do not always use it1 and because it is separate. But it is separate because it does not verge to us, but we rather looking on high, tend to it. Sense, however, is our messenger, but intellect is our king.
IV. “We also reign when we energize according to it. But we energize according to it in a twofold respect; either because letters as it were, which are as laws, are inscribed in us by intellect; or because we are filled with it; or when it is present, are able to see and be sentient of it. We also know by such a spectacle, that we are able to learn other things, through a thing of this kind; so that we either learn the nature of the power which knows such an object as this, learning by the power itself; or we become a thing of this kind.3 Hence, that which knows itself is twofold; one indeed being the dianoetic part of the soul, but the other being superior to this. And, therefore, that which knows itself has a subsistence conformable to pure intellect itself. It also intellectually perceives itself through this, not as any longer man, but as having entirely become something else; and hastily withdrawing itself to that which is on high, it alone draws upward together with itself, the more excellent part of the soul, which is alone able to be winged with intelligence, in order that he who possesses it may there deposit what he knew. Does not the dianoetic part, therefore, know that it is dianoetic, and that it receives the knowledge of things external; that it forms a judgment also of the things which it investigates, and this by the rules in itself which it derives from intellect? Does it not also know that there is something better than itself which does not investigate, but possesses every thing in itself ? If, therefore, it says that it is from intellect, and is the second after, and the image of intellect, having all things as it were written in itself, as there he who writes and has written, will he, who thus knows himself, stop as far as to these things ? Shall we, however, employing another power, survey intellect knowing itself, or shall we assuming it, since it also is ours, and we are of it, thus both know intellect, and ourselves ? Or is not the latter of these necessary, if we are to know what that is in intellect, for itself to know itself ? Then, however, some one becomes himself intellect, when dismissing other things pertaining to himself, he beholds intellect through intellect, and by it also surveys himself, just as intellect likewise beholds itself.
The word used here by Plotinus is morphe, which, as we have elsewhere observed, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies. ↩
The intellect which is ours when we use it, and not ours when we do not, is a partial intellect of the Minerval series, which is proximately participated by dsemoniacal souls, and illuminates ours when we convert ourselves to it, and render our rational part intellectual. This in the ” Phsedrus ” is said to be the governor of the soul, and to be the only thing which perceives real being. But the soul also perceives it in conjunction with this intellect, when she is nourished by the summit of her reasoning power and by science. This intellect, likewise, is spoken of in the ” Timaeus,” and is denominated intelligence. For it is there said, that true being is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. Hence, as Proclus beautifully observes, ” when reason intellectually perceives eternal being, as reason indeed, it energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually, it energizes with simplicity, understanding each thing as simple, yet not understanding all things at once, but passing from some things to others. At the same time, however, it perceives each of the things which it sees transitively as one simple thing.”
In another part of his Commentary on the “Timaeus” (p. 321), he also admirably observes respecting this partial intellect as follows: “What the impartible is in each partial soul (i.e. in a soul such as ours) is truly dubious. For it must not be admitted, that there is an intellect in each, and this partial. May we not say, therefore, that each partial soul is essentially suspended from a certain daemon: and as every daemon has a daemoniacal intellect above itself, a partial soul also has this same intellect arranged as an impartible essence prior to itself ? Hence, the daemoniacal soul participates primarily of this intellect; but the partial souls that are under it, secondarily; and which also causes them to be partial. For each partial soul has the partible as its peculiarity, but has the impartible in common with the daemons that are above these souls and whose peculiarity is the impartible. Hence, too, daemons remain on high, but partial souls at a certain time descend, and divide themselves about bodies, as being more adapted to these. For if in partial souls, the genus of difference is exuberant, which is the reason why they are not always able to energize according to all their powers, it is necessary that they should be in a greater degree adapted to a life divisible about body, and in a greater degree be separated from an impartible essence; by this means preserving an analogy to each of the extremes. Just as it is necessary that the most divine of souls, through their similitude to intellect, should in a greater degree be exempt from partible natures, but be more united to the impartible essences above them, and from which they are connascently suspended. They also have an intellectual arrangement among souls. And it is reasonable to suppose, that the intellect of each daemon, so far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the daemon which proximately [i.e. immediately] participates it, but that it comprehends in itself the number of souls that are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of them. Each partial soul, therefore, will have its appropriate paradigm in this intellect, and not simply the whole of this intellect, in the same manner as the daemon who is essentially the leader of these souls. Defining, therefore, more accurately, we may say, that the impartible of each partial soul, is the form that is above it, which is comprehended in the one intellect that is allotted the government of the dsemoniacal series, under which each partial soul is arranged. And thus both the assertions are true, viz. that the intellect alone of each of these souls ranks among things which are always established on high, and that every partial soul is the medium of the impartible above it, and the partible nature posterior to it.” ↩