XI. Hence this intellect becomes manifold, when it wishes to understand that which is beyond intellect. Endeavouring, therefore, to come into contact with it as with that which is simple, it falls from it always receiving another multiplied nature in itself. Hence, it originates from it not as intellect, but as sight not yet seeing. But it proceeds from it containing in itself that which it has multiplied. Hence, it indefinitely desires another thing, possessing at the same time a certain phantasm in itself. It proceeds, however, receiving another thing in itself, which causes it to be multitudinous. For again, it has an impression1 of the vision (of that which is beyond itself), or it would never become the recipient of it. Thus, therefore, it becomes manifold from the one; and thus as intellect it sees itself, and then becomes sight perceiving. This, however, is then intellect when it possesses; and as intellect it possesses.1 But prior to this, it is desire alone, and a formless sight. This intellect, therefore, projects itself towards that which is beyond intellect: and when it receives it, it becomes (perceptive) “intellect. But it is always the recipient (of the ineffable), and always becomes intellect, essence, and intelligence, when it perceives intellectually. For prior to this it was not intelligence, in consequence of not possessing the intelligible; nor intellect, because it was not yet intellective. That, however, which is prior to these, is the principle of these, but not as inherent in them. For the firsfirst principle, or the from which, is not inherent in that of which it is the principle, but the things of which a thing consists, are inherent in that thing. That, however, from which each thing is derived, is not each thing, but is different from all things. Hence, it is not some one of all things, but is prior to all things; so that on this account, it is also prior to intellect. For again, all things are within intellect; so that for this reason likewise, it is prior to intellect. If, also, the natures which are posterior to it have the order of all things, and on this account likewise it is prior to all things, it is not proper that it should be a certain one of those things to which it is prior. You must not, therefore, denominate it intellect. Hence, neither must you call it the good, if the good signifies some one of all things. But if it signifies that which is prior to all things, let it be thus denominated. If, therefore, intellect is intellect because it is multitudinous, and the intellection of itself as it were intervening, though it is from itself, multiplies itself, it is necessary that the nature which is perfectly simple, and the first of all things, should be beyond intellect. For if it possessed intelligence, it would not be beyond, but would be intellect. But if it were intellect, it would also be multitude.
XII. What however hinders (it may be said, the firsfirst principle of things) from being thus multitude, so long as it is one essence ? For multitude here is not composition ; but the energies of it are multitude. If, however, the energies of it are not essences, but it proceeds from capacity into energy, it will not be multitude indeed, yet it will be imperfect in essence before it energizes. But if the essence of it is energy, and the energy of it is multitude, its essence will be as multitudinous as its energy. We admit, however, that this is the case with intellect, to which we attribute the intellection of itself; but we do not assert this of the principle of all things. For it is necessary that prior to multitude there should be the one, from which multitude proceeds; since in every number the one is first. Our opponents, however, may say, that this is indeed the case in number. For the things which are in a consequent order to unity are compositions; but what necessity is there in beings, that there should be a certain one from which the many proceed ? To this we reply, that the many without the one would be devised from each other, one thing casually proceeding to another, in order to the composition of multitude. Hence, they also say, that energies proceed from one intellect which is simple; so that they now admit there is something simple prior to energies. And in the next place, they should know that energies which are always permanent are hypostases. Energies, however, being hypostases, are different from that from which they proceed; since this indeed remains simple, but that which proceeds from it, is in itself multitude, and is suspended from its simple cause. For if they subsist, that from which they proceed at the same time in a certain respect energizing, there also there will be multitude. But if they are first energies producing that which is secondary, nothing prevents that which is prior to the energies from abiding in itself, and from conceding energies to that which is second, and which consists of energies. For that which is prior to energies is one thing, but the energies which proceed from it another; because from that not energizing (these derive their subsistence). For if this were not the case, intellect would not be the first energy. For (that which is entirely simple) did not as it were desire that intellect should be generated, and afterwards intellect was generated, this desire subsisting between the simple principle, and its offspring intellect. Nor in short, did this principle desire. For thus it would be imperfect, and the desire would not yet have that which it wished to obtain. Nor again, does it partly obtain the object of its wish, and partly not. For there is nothing to which the extension (of its desire is directed). But indeed, if any thing subsists after it, it subsists in consequence of this principle abiding in its accustomed habit. It is necessary, therefore, in order that something else may subsist, that this principle should be every where quiescent in itself. For if not, either it will be moved prior to being moved, and will perceive intellectually prior to intellectual perception, or its first energy will be imperfect, being an impulse alone. To what, therefore, can it thus be impelled ? For either we must admit that the energy flowing as it were from it, is analogous to the light proceeding from the sun, which energy is every intelligible and intellectual nature, and that this principle being established at the summit of the intelligible world reigns over it, without separating from itself, that which is unfolded into light from it; or we must admit that there is another light prior to this light, which emits its splendour, perpetually abiding in the intelligible. For that which proceeds from this principle is not separated from it, nor again, is the same with it. Nor is it a thing of such a kind as not to -be essence. Nor is it, as it were, blind; but it sees and knows itself, and is primarily gnostic. The principle itself, however, as it is beyond intellect, so likewise it is beyond knowledge. And as it is not in want of any thing, it is not in want of knowledge; but knowledge subsists in the nature which is next to this. For to know is one certain thing; but this principle is one without the addition of certain. For if it was a certain one, it would not be the one itself. For itself is prior to a certain or some particular thing.
XIII. Hence, it is in reality ineffable. For of whatever you speak, you speak of as a certain thing. But of that which is beyond all things, and which is beyond even most venerable intellect, it is alone true to assert that it has not any other name (than the ineffable), and that it is not some one of all things. Properly speaking, however, there is no name of it, because nothing can be asserted of it. We, however, endeavour as much as possible to signify to ourselves something respecting it. But when we say doubting, it has therefore no perception nor intellection of itself, and consequently does not know itself, we ought to consider this, that when we assert these things, we should convert ourselves to their contraries. For we make it to be multitudinous, when we admit that it is knowable and has knowledge: and by attributing intellection to it, we make it to be in want of intelligence. But if it subsists together with intellection, intellectual perception will be superfluously added to it. For in short, intellection appears to be the co-sensation of the whole (of that which is intellective) many things concurring in one and the same, when any thing itself intellectually perceives itself, in which also intellection properly so called consists. Each of these many, however, is itself one certain thing unattended with investigation. But if intelligence is of that which is external, it will be something indigent, and not properly intellectual perception. That, however, which is perfectly simple, and truly self-sufficient, is not in want of any thing. But that which is secondarily self-suflicient, being in want of itself, is in want of the intellectual perception of itself. And that which is indigent with respect to itself, produces from the whole of itself the self-sufficient, becoming sufficient from all (the particulars of which it consists), dwelling with itself, and being conversant with itself by intellection; since co-sensation also, is the sensation of a certain multitude, as its name testifies. Intelligence, likewise, which is prior to sense, converts that which is intellective, and which is evidently multitudinous, to itself. For if it should alone say this, I am being, it would say this, as having discovered that it is so. And it would make this assertion reasonably. For being is multitudinous ; since when it extends itself to that which is simple, and says, I am being, it does not meet either with itself, or with being. For it does not speak of being as of a stone, when it speaks of it truly: but by one word it pronounces many things.1 For this existence, which is truly existence, is not spoken of as having nothing more than a vestige of being; since this is not being, and therefore may be said to have the relation of an image to its archetype. Hence, true being contains in itself multitude. What then ? will it not intellectually perceive each of the many it contains ? May we not say, that if you wish to assume the solitary and alone, you will not have intellectual perception?
Existence itself, however, is in itself multitudinous. And though you should speak of something else, that something else has existence. If, however, this be the case, if there is something which is the most simple of all things, it will not have an intellectual perception of itself. For if it had (it would also have a subsistence somewhere).2 Neither, therefore, does it intellectually perceive itself, nor is there any intellectual perception of it.
XIV. How, therefore, can we speak of it ? We are able indeed to say something of it, but we do not speak it. Nor have we either any knowledge, or intellectual perception of it. How, therefore, do we speak of it, if we do not possess it? May we not say, that though we do not possess it by knowledge, yet we are not entirely deprived of the possession of it; but we possess it in such a way that we can speak of it, but cannot speak it ? For we can say what it is not, but we cannot say what it is; so that we speak of it from things posterior to it. We are not, however, prevented from possessing it, though we cannot say what it is. But in the same manner as those who energize enthusiastically, and become divinely inspired, perceive indeed, that they have something greater in themselves, though they do not know what it is; but of the things by which they are excited they speak, and from these receive a certain sensation of the moving power, which is different from them; — in this manner also we appear to be affected about that which is perfectly simple, when possessing a pure intellect we employ it, and conclude that this is the inward intellect which is the source of essence, and of other things which belong to this arrangement. We are sensible, therefore, that the nature which is perfectly simple is not these things, but that it is something more excellent, more ample, and great, than that which we denominate being, because it is also superior to reason, intellect, and sense, imparting, but not being these.
XV. But how does it impart them ? Shall we say by possessing, or by not possessing them? If, however, it indeed possesses them, it is not simple. But if it does not possess them, how does multitude proceed from it? For perhaps some one may admit that one simple thing may proceed from it, though even in this case it may be inquired how any thing can proceed from that which is entirely one. At the same time, however, it may be said, that one simple thing may flow from it, in the same manner as a surrounding splendour from light. But how do many things proceed from it ? May we not say, that what proceeds from is not the same with it ? If, therefore, it is not the same with, it is not better than it. (For what is better, or in short, more excellent than the one ? It is therefore inferior to it. But this is more indigent.) For what is in a greater degree indigent than the one, except that which is not one ? This, therefore, that is more indigent is many. At the same time, however, it aspires after the one. Hence it is one many. For the one saves every thing which is not one; and every thing is what it is through the one. For unless it becomes one, though it should consist of many things, it cannot yet be denominated being. And though it may be possible to say what each thing is, yet this is only in consequence of each thing being one, and participating of sameness. That, however, which has not multitude in itself, is not one by the participation of one, but is the one itself, not from another, but because it is this; from which other things also derive their subsistence, some indeed, proximately, but others remotely. But since that which is next to the one is characterized by sameness, and is posterior to the one, it is evident that the multitude of it is every where one. For being multitude at the same time it subsists in sameness, and without separation, because all things in it exist collectively at once (in impartible union). Each also of the natures which proceed from it, as long as it participates of life, is one many. For it cannot exhibit itself to the view as one all. That, however, from which this originates is one all, because it is a great principle. For the principle is in reality and truly one. But that which is next to the principle, being thus after a manner (exuberantly full of) and heavy with the one, becomes all things through its participation of the one; and whatever it contains is again all and one. What therefore is this all ? Is it not those things of which the one is the principle ? But how is the one the principle of all things ? Is it not because it is the saviour of them, causing each of them to be one ? Or is it also because it gave subsistence to them ? After what manner therefore ? Is it not because it antecedently contained them? We have however before observed, that thus it will be multitude. They are contained in it, therefore, in such a way as to subsist without distinction and separation.3 But the things contained in the second principle (after the one) are separated by reason: for they are now in energy. The one, however, is the power of all things. But what is the mode of this power ? For it is not said to be in power or capacity in the same manner as matter, because it receives: for matter suffers (in consequence of being passive); and thus the power of matter has an arrangement opposite to that of efficiency. How, therefore, does it produce the things which it has not? For it does not produce them casually; nor having considered what it is to do, does it then produce them. It has been said, therefore, by us, that if any thing proceeds from the one, it is different from it; but being different, it is not one. For this is what the one was. If, however, that which proceeds from the one is not one, it is now necessary that it should be two things, and should be multitude. For it is now same and different, quality, and other things. That the offspring of the one, therefore, is not one (alone) has been now demonstrated. But that it is multitude, and a multitude of such a kind as that which is surveyed in what is posterior to it, is deservedly a subject of doubt. And the necessity of the subsistence of that which is posterior to it, still remains to be investigated.
This impression is the one of intellect, the summit and as it were flower of its nature, and a vestige of the ineffable. For by seeing the ineffable, it becomes stamped as it were with its super-essential nature. ↩
The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, and are supplied from the version of Ficinus. But the meaning of Plotinus in this place is, that if the most simple of all things had an intellectual perception of itself, it would be in itself; and consequently would be somewhere. For an intellectual essence because self-subsistent, is said to be in itself. For so far as it is the cause of, it comprehends itself; but so far as it is caused, it is comprehended by itself. ↩
As all things proceed from the one, hence the one is all things prior to all. ↩