XIII. It remains to consider whether what the sensible world alone contains is in the intelligible world, or whether as man himself is different from the sensible man, so with respect to soul, soul itself is different from the soul which is here, and intellect itself from the human intellect. In the first place, therefore, it must be said, that it is not proper to think that all things which are here, are images of archetypes; or that the human soul is the image of soul itself, but that here also one soul differs from another in dignity. Perhaps, however, soul, so far as it is here, is not soul itself. But since each (rational) soul has a real subsistence, as likewise have justice and temperance, there is also in our souls true science and not images only, nor merely the similitudes of intelligibles, as in the sensible region. For true science, justice, and temperance themselves exist here, though after another manner than in the intelligible world. For they are denned in a certain place. So that where the soul emerges from the body, there also these subsist. For the sensible world, indeed, is in one place only; but the intelligible world is every where. Such things, therefore, as a soul of this kind possesses here, these things also are there. So that if the things which are in the sensible world, are assumed to be those which are in the number of visible objects, not only the natures which are in the regions of sense are there, but also more than these. But if among the natures which are said to be in the world, soul, and what soul contains are comprehended, then all such things are here as subsist there.
Postagens em Tratado 5 (V,9)