XIV. Is this nature, therefore, which comprehends all things in the intelligible, to be considered as the first principle of things ? But how is this possible, since that which is truly the principle is one, and entirely simple, hut multitude subsists in beings ? After what manner, however, this all-comprehending nature subsists besides the one, how multitude exists, and how all these subsist, and why and whence intellect is all these, must be shown by beginning the discussion from another principle. With respect, however, to things generated from putrefaction, and to things artificial, whether there are forms of these, and also of mud and clay in the intelligible world, it must be said, that such things as intellect derives from- the first principle, are all of them most excellent. But the above-mentioned particulars are not among the number of these, nor does intellect consist of the forms of such particulars. Soul, however, which is derived from intellect, receives from matter other things [besides what she receives from intellect], and such particulars as the above are in the number of these. The discussion of these, however, will be rendered clearer by recurring to the doubt, how multitude proceeds from the one. In the mean time it is evident that such composite natures as are casual are not derived from intellect, but from a concurrence of sensibles in themselves, and do not subsist in forms. Those things, also, which are produced from putrefaction, are the progeny of a soul which is perhaps incapable of effecting any thing else; for if this were not the case, it would produce something conformable to nature. It produces, therefore, where it is able. But with respect to the arts, such of them as are referred to things natural to man, are comprehended in [the soul of] man. The art also, which is universal, is prior to other arts, and soul itself is prior to universal art, or rather this must be asserted of the life which is in intellect, before it became soul and which is necessary to the generation of soul. And this life it is requisite to denominate soul itself.
Thomas Taylor: Tratado 5,14 (V,9,14) — Há Formas das coisas sem valor e compostos acidentais?
- Bouillet: Tratado 5 (V, 9) – DE L’INTELLIGENCE, DES IDÉES ET DE L’ÉTHER
- Enéada V, 9 – Sobre o Intelecto, as ideias e aquilo que é
- Enéada V, 9, 1 — Três gêneros de homens
- Enéada V, 9, 10 — As Formas e o mundo inteligível.
- Enéada V, 9, 11 — Há Formas dos produtos da técnica?
- Enéada V, 9, 12 — Há Formas dos indivíduos?
- Enéada V, 9, 13 — Há Formas de coisas que não se encontram no sensível?
- Enéada V, 9, 14 — Há Formas das coisas sem valor e compostos acidentais?
- Enéada V, 9, 2 — Qual é o lugar além do mundo d’aqui de baixo?
- Enéada V, 9, 3 — A natureza do Intelecto.