III. This nature, however, of intellect must be considered, which reason announces to be truly being, and true essence, previously confirming, by proceeding in another way, (what we have before asserted) that it is necessary there should be a certain nature of this kind. Perhaps, therefore, it is ridiculous to investigate whether intellect ranks in the order of beings; though perhaps some persons may be dubious concerning this. And they may be in a still greater degree dubious whether there is such an intellect as we have maintained there is, and which is separate (from soul). Likewise, whether this intellect is (real) beings, and whether it contains the nature of forms, about which we now propose to speak. We see, therefore, that all the things which are said to exist are composites, and that no one of them is simple, whether they are fashioned by art, or constituted by nature. For artificial substances consist of brass, or wood, or stone, and do not yet obtain perfection from these, till they are elaborated by the several arts, one of which produces a statue, another a bed, and another a house, and each effects this by the insertion of the form which it contains. Moreover, with respect to the things which are constituted by nature, such of them as are composed of many particulars, and which are said to be co-mingled, may be analyzed into the form which is inherent in all substances that are mingled together. Thus man may be analyzed into soul and body; and body into the four elements. But finding that each of these is a composite, consisting of matter and that which gives it form (for the matter of the elements is of itself formless) you will again also investigate respecting the soul, whether it now ranks among simple natures, or whether one thing in it has the relation of matter, but another, viz. the intellect which it contains, the relation of form; one indeed being analogous to the morphe in brass, but the other to the artist who produces that morphe. He, likewise, who transfers these very same things to the universe, will also here ascend to intellect, and will admit that it is truly the maker and demiurgus (of all things). He will, likewise, say that the subject matter receiving forms, becomes either fire or water, or air, or earth ; but that these forms proceed from another cause, and that this is soul. Again, also, he will assert, that soul imparts morphe to the four elements of the world; but that intellect becomes the supplier of productive principles to soul; just as productive principles being inserted from the arts in the souls of artists enable them to energize (according to art). “With respect to intellect, also, one which is as the form of the soul is analogous to morphe, but another which imparts this form, is analogous to the maker of the statue, in whom all things are inherent which he imparts. The things, however, which body receives, are now nothing more than images and imitations.
Postagens em Tratado 5 (V,9)