Thomas Taylor: Tratado 5,5 (V,9,5) — Que pensa o Intelecto?

V. It is necessary, however, to consider intellect truly so called neither as intellect in capacity, nor as proceeding from the privation to the possession of intellect. For if we do not, we must again investigate another intellect prior to this. But we must assume intellect in energy, and and which is always intellect. If such an intellect, however, has not an adventitious intellection, whatever it intellectually perceives, it perceives from itself. And whatever it possesses, it possesses from itself. But if it perceives intellectually by and from itself, it is itself that which it perceives. For if the essence of it was one thing, but the objects of its perception different from it, its very essence would be destitute of intellection ; and again, it would be intellect in capacity, but not in energy. Neither of these, therefore, must be separated from the other. With us, however, it is usual, from the things with which we are conversant, to separate in our conceptions intellect, and the objects of its perception. What therefore is its energy, and what does it intellectually perceive, in order that we may admit it to be those things which it perceives ? Is it not evident, that being intellect, it intellectually perceives in reality, and gives subsistence to beings? Hence it is itself beings. For it either intellectually perceives them existing elsewhere, or it perceives them in itself as being itself. It is impossible, therefore, that it can perceive them existing elsewhere. For in what other place can they exist ? Hence it intellectually sees itself, and perceives them in itself. For it does not perceive these, as some fancy, in sensibles. For each of the things which have a primary subsistence, is not a sensible object. For the form which is in sensibles is in matter, and is truly an image. Every form, also, which is in another thing, is derived from another thing, proceeds to it, and is the image of it. If, .likewise, it is necessary that intellect should be the maker of this universe, it will not intellectually perceive things in that which does not yet exist, in order that it may produce it. Hence, it is necessary that these things should be prior to the world, not as impressions from other things, but as archetypes, and primary natures, and the essence of intellect. If, however, some should say that [seminal] productive principles are sufficient, it is evident that these must be perpetual. But if they are perpetual and impassive, it is necessary that they should subsist in intellect, and in such an intellect as is prior to habit, and nature and soul. For these are in capacity. Intellect, therefore, is truly beings, not intellectually perceiving such things as are situated out of itself. For the objects of its perception are not external to itself. But it is as it were the first legislator, or rather the law itself of existence. Hence it is rightly said, that it is the same thing to perceive intellectually and to be, and that the science of things without matter, is the same with the things themselves. I have also investigated myself as one among the number of beings. And the same thing is testified by reminiscence. For no one of [real] beings subsists out of intellect, nor is in place; but they always abide in themselves, neither receiving mutation nor corruption. Hence, also, they are truly beings ; since if they were generated and corrupted, they would have an adventitious existence; and they would no longer be [real] beings, but that which is adventitious to them would be being-Sensibles, therefore, are indeed by participation that which they are said to be, the subject nature [i.e. matter] receiving form externally derived; as for instance, brass receiving form from the art of the statuary, and wood from the tectonic art; in consequence of art proceeding into these materials through an image. Art itself, however, abides in sameness, external to matter, and possesses in itself the true statue, and the true bed. This also in bodies, this universe which participates of images, evinces that real beings are different from bodies; since the former are immutable, but the latter mutable. The former, likewise, are established in themselves, and are not in want of place. For they are not magnitudes, but have an hypostasis intellectual, and sufficient to themselves. For the nature of bodies is indebted to something else for its preservation. But intellect, since it sustains through an admirable nature things which are of themselves in a perishable condition, does not seek where it may be itself established.