VI. Let, therefore, intellect be (real) beings, and possess all things in itself, not as in place but as itself, and as being one with them. But all things there subsist collectively at once, and yet nevertheless they are separated from each other; since the soul also which has many sciences in itself simultaneous, possesses them without any confusion. Each also, when it is requisite, performs what pertains to it, without the co-operation of the rest. And each conception energizes with a purity unmingled with the other inward conceptions. Thus, therefore, and in a still greater degree, intellect is at once all things; and again, not at once, because each is a peculiar power. Every intellect however, comprehends all things,1 in the same manner as genus comprehends species, and as whole comprehends parts. The powers of seeds, likewise, bring with them an image of what we have said. For in the whole seed, all things are without separation, and the reasons (or productive principles) are as it were in one centre. That there is one productive principle likewise of the eye, and another of the hand, is known from what is sensibly generated from them. With respect, therefore, to the powers in seeds, each of them is one whole productive principle, together with the parts comprehended in it. And that which is corporeal indeed in the seeds, possesses a certain quantity of matter which is as it were moist; but the productive principle itself is according to the whole of its form, and the same thing is also reason, generating a certain thing by the form of a soul, and which is the image of another more excellent soul. Some, however, denominate this principle which is inserted in the seeds, nature; which being thence excited from things prior to itself, in the same manner as light from fire, changes and gives form to matter; effecting this, not by impulsion, nor by employing levers (or any other mechanical power), but by imparting seminal productive principles.
Postagens em Tratado 5 (V,9)