I. All beings are being3 through the one, both such as are primarily beings, and such as in any respect whatever are said to be classed in the order of beings. For what would they be, if they were not one? For if deprived of unity, they are no longer that which they were said to be. For neither would an army, or a choir, exist [as such], unless each of them was one. Nor would a herd exist, if it were not one. But neither would a house or a ship have an existence, unless they possess the one; since a house is one thing, and also a ship, which one if they lose, the house will no longer be a house, nor the ship a ship. Continued magnitudes, therefore, unless the one is present with them, will not have an existence. Hence, when they are divided, so far as they lose the one, they change their existence. The bodies, also, of plants and animals, each of which is one, if they fly from the one, in consequence of being broken into multitude, lose the essence which they before possessed, no longer being that which they were, but becoming instead of it other things, and continuing to be these so long as they are one. Health, likewise, then has a subsistence, when the body is congregated into one [i.e., when it possesses symmetry], and beauty then flourishes when the nature of the one confines the parts of the body. Virtue also exists in the soul when the soul tends to unity, and is united in one concord. Since, therefore, the soul conducts all things to one, by fabricating, fashioning, forming and co-arranging them, is it necessary to assert when we have arrived as far as to soul, that she supplies the one, and that she is the one itself? Or must we not say, that as when she imparts other things to bodies, such as morphe and form, it is not herself which she imparts, but things different from herself, thus also it is requisite to think if she imparts the one, that she imparts it as something different from herself; and that looking to the one, she.causes each of her productions to be one, in the same manner as looking to man, she fabricates man, assuming together with man the one contained in man. For of the things which are denominated one, each is in such a manner one as is the being which it possesses.1 So that things which are in a less degree beings, possess in a less degree the one; but those that have more of entity have also more of the one. Moreover, soul being different from the one, possesses more of it in proportion as it is more truly soul, yet is not the one itself. For soul is one, and in a certain respect the one which it possesses is an accident. And these are two things, soul and one, in the same manner as body and one. That indeed which is decrete multitude, as a choir, is more remote from the one, but that which is continuous is nearer to it. But soul which has more alliance with, participates more abundantly of the one. If, however, because soul cannot exist unless it is one, it should be said that soul and the one are the same, we reply in the first place, that other things also are what they are in conjunction with being one, but at the same time the one is different from them. For body and one are not the same; but body participates of the one. In the next place, each soul is a multitude, though it does not consist of parts. For there are many powers in it, viz., those of reasoning, appetition, and apprehension, which are connected by unity as by a bond. Soul, therefore, being itself one imparts the one, to other things. But she also suffers [i.e. participates] this one from something else.
II. Shall we say, therefore, that in each of the things which subsist according to a part, the essence of it and the one are not the same? In true being indeed, and true essence, essence, being, and the one, are the same. So that he who discovers being in these, will also discover the one, and will find that essence itself is the one itself. Thus, for instance, if essence is intellect, the one also is here intellect, viz., an intellect which is primarily being, and primarily one. And when it imparts existence to other things, thus, and so far as it imparts this, it also imparts the one. For what else besides intellect and being, can the one of these be said to be ? For either the one is the same with being, as a man is the same thing as one man; or it is as a certain number of each thing, as when you speak of a certain two. And thus the one is asserted of a certain thing alone. If, therefore, number pertains to beings, it is evident that the one also pertains to them: and what it is must be investigated. But if the one is nothing more than the energy of the soul attempting to number, the one will have no existence in things themselves. Reason however has said, that whatever loses the one, loses entirely at the same time its existence. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether each thing that has a being, and each thing that is one are the same, and whether in short, being and the one are the same. If, however, the being of each thing is multitude, but it is impossible for the one to be multitude, each of these will he different from the other. Man, therefore, is an animal, is rational, and has many parts, and this multitude is hound together by unity. Hence, man is one thing, and unity another; since the former is partible, but the latter impartible. Moreover, being which ranks as a whole, and contains all beings in itself, will rather be many beings [than one], and will be different from the one. But by assumption and participation, it will possess the one. Being, likewise, has life and intellect: for it is not deprived of life. Hence, being is many things. If also it is intellect, it is thus again necessary that it should be multitudinous ; and this in a still greater degree, if it comprehends in itself forms or ideas. For idea is not unity, but is rather number. And this is true both of each idea, and of that which is all ideas collectively. Idea, likewise, is in such a manner one, as the world is one. In short, the one is the first of things, but intellect, forms, and being are not the first. For each form consists of many things, and is a composite, and posterior. For those things from which each form consists have a priority of subsistence. But that it is not possible that intellect can be the first of things is evident from the following considerations. It is necessary that intellect should consist in intellectual perception; and that the most excellent intellect, and which does not look to what is external to, should intellectually perceive that which is prior to itself. For being converted to itself, it is [at the same time] converted to the principle of itself And if indeed it is both intellective and intelligible, it will be twofold and not simple, and therefore not the one. But if it looks to something different from itself, it will entirely look to that which is more excellent than, and prior to itself. If, however, it both looks to itself, and to that which is better than itself, it will thus also be secondary. And it is requisite to admit that such an intellect as this present indeed with the good, and with that which is first, and that it beholds it. It likewise associates with, and intellectually perceives itself, and knows that it is itself all things. By no means, therefore, since it is thus various, is it the one. Neither, therefore, will the one be all things;2 since if it were, it would no longer be the one. Nor is it intellect. For thus it would be all things; intellect being all things. Nor is it being. For being likewise is all things.
III. What then will the one be; and what nature will it possess ? Or may we not say that it is not at all wonderful, it should not be easy to tell what it is, since neither is it easy to tell what being is, or what form is. But our knowledge is fixed in forms. When, however, the soul directs its attention to that which is formless, then being unable to comprehend that which is not bounded, and as it were impressed with forms by a former of a various nature, it falls from the apprehension of it, and is afraid it will possess [nothing from the view]. Hence, it becomes weary in endeavours of this kind, and gladly descends from the survey frequently falling from all things, till it arrives at something sensible, and as it were rests in a solid substance; just as the sight also, when wearied with the perception of small objects, eagerly converts itself to such as are large. When, however, the soul wishes to perceive by itself, and sees itself alone, then in consequence of being one with the object of its perception, it does not think that it yet possesses that which it investigates, because it is not different from that which it intellectually perceives. At the same time, it is requisite that he should act in this manner, who intends to philosophize about the one. Since, therefore, that which we investigate is one, and we direct our attention to the principle of all things, to the good, and the first, we ought not to be far removed from the natures which are about the first of things, nor fall from them to the last of all things, but proceeding to such as are first, we should elevate ourselves from sensibles which have an ultimate subsistence. The soul, likewise, should for this purpose be liberated from all vice, in consequence of hastening to the [vision of the] good; and should ascend to the principle which is in herself, and become one instead of many things, in order that she may survey the principle of all things, and the one. Hence it is requisite, that the soul of him who ascends to the good should then become intellect, and that he should commit his soul to, and establish it in intellect, in order, that what intellect sees, his soul may vigilantly receive, and may through intellect survey the one; not employing any one of the senses, nor receiving any thing from them, but with a pure intellect, and with the summit [and as it were, flower] of intellect, beholding that which is most pure. When, therefore, he who applies himself to the survey of a thing of this kind imagines that there is either magnitude, or figure, or bulk about this nature, he has not intellect for the leader of the vision; because intellect is not naturally adapted to pe« ceive things of this kind, but such an energy is the energy of sense, and of opinion following sense. But in order to perceive the one, it is necessary to: receive from intellect a declaration of what intellect is able to accomplish. Intellect, however, is able to see either things prior to itself, or things pertaining to itself, or things effected by itself. And the things indeed contained in itself, are pure; but those prior to itself are still purer and more simple; or rather this must be asserted of that which is prior to it. Hence, that which is prior to it, is not intellect, but something more excellent. For intellect is a certain one among the number of beings; but that is not a certain one, but is prior to every thing. Nor is it being; for being has, as it were, the form of the one.1 But that is formless, and is even without intelligible form. For the nature of the one being generative of all things, is not any one of them. Neither, therefore, is it a certain thing, nor a quality, nor a quantity, nor intellect, nor soul, nor that which is moved, nor again that which stands stall. Nor is it in place, or in time; but is by itself uniform, or rather without form, being prior to all form, to motion and to permanency. For these subsist about being which also cause it to be multitudinous. Why, however, if it is not moved, does it not stand still ? Because it is necessary that one or both of these should subsist about being. And that which stands still, stands still through permanency, and is not the same with it. Hence permanency is accidental to it, and it no longer remains simple. For when we say that the one is the cause of all things, we do not predicate anything as an accident to it, but rather as something which happens to us, because we possess something from it, the one in the mean time subsisting in itself. It is necessary, however, when speaking accurately of the one, neither to call it that, nor this. But we running as it were externally round it, are desirous of explaining the manner in which we are affected about it. And at one time, indeed, we draw near to it, but at another time fall from it, by our doubts about it.
IV. In this affair, however, a doubt especially arises, because the perception of the highest God is not effected by science, nor by intelligence, like other intelligibles, but by the presence of him, which is a mode of knowledge superior to that of science. But the soul suffers an apostasy from the one, and is not entirely one when it receives scientific knowledge. For science is reason, and reason is multitudinous. The soul, therefore, in this case, deviates from the one, and falls into number and multitude. Hence it is necessary to run above science, and in no respect to depart from a subsistence which is profoundly one; but it is requisite to abandon science, the objects of science, every other thing, and every beautiful spectacle. For every thing beautiful is posterior to the supreme, and is derived from him, in the same manner as all diurnal light is derived from the sun. Hence Plato says, he is neither effable, nor to be described by writing. We speak however, and write about him, extending ourselves to him, and exciting others by a reasoning process to the vision of him; pointing out, as it were, the way to him who wishes to behold something [of his ineffable nature]. For doctrine extends as far as to the way and the progression to him. But the vision of him is now the work of one who is solicitous to perceive him. He, however, will not arrive at the vision of him, and will not be affected by the survey, nor will have in himself as it were an amatory passion from the view, (which passion causes the lover to rest in the object of his love) nor receive from it a true light, which surrounds the whole soul with its splendour, in consequence of becoming nearer to it; he, I say, will not behold this light, who attempts to ascend to the vision of the supreme while he is drawn downwards by those things which are an impediment to the vision. He will likewise not ascend by himself alone, but will be accompanied by that which will divulse him from the one, or rather he will not be himself collected into one. For the one is not absent from any thing, and yet is separated from all things; so that it is present, and yet not present with them. But it is present with those things that are able, and are prepared to receive it, so that they become congruous, and as it were pass into contact with it, through similitude and a certain inherent power allied to that which is imparted by the one. When, therefore, the soul is disposed in such a way as she was when she came from the one, then she is able to perceive it, as far as it is naturally capable of being seen. He, therefore, who has not yet arrived thither, but either on account of the above-mentioned obstacle is deprived of this vision, or through the want of reason which may conduct him to it, and impart faith respecting it; such a one may consider himself as the cause of his disappointment through these impediments, and should endeavour by separating himself from all things to be alone. But with respect to arguments in the belief of which he is deficient, he should conceive as follows:
V. Whoever fancies that beings are governed by fortune and chance, and are held together by corporeal causes, is very remote from God, and the conception of the one. Our arguments, likewise, are not addressed to these, but to those who admit that there is another nature besides bodies, and who ascend [at least] as far as to soul. It is necessary, therefore, that these should be well acquainted with the nature of soul, both as to other things, and to its being derived from intellect; from which also participating of reason, it possesses virtue. After these things, however, he should admit the subsistence of another intellect, different from that which reasons, and which is denominated rational. He should likewise consider reasonings to subsist now as it were in interval and motion, and sciences to be such-like reasons in the soul, with an [evolved] and manifest subsistence; in consequence of intellect which is the cause of sciences being now infused “into the soul. Hence in this case, the soul has as it were a sensible perception of intellect, through apprehending it incumbent on soul, and containing in itself the intelligible world, a tranquil intellect, and a quiet motion, and having and being all things, — a multitude without separation, and again a separate multitude. For it is. neither separated like the reasons [i.e. forms or ideas in the human soul] which are perceived by our intellect one at a time, [and not simultaneously,] nor is it a confused multitude. For each of the forms contained in it proceeds separate from the rest; in the same manner as in the sciences, where all things subsisting in an impartible nature, at the same time each is separate from the rest. This multitude, therefore, subsisting at once is the intelligible world, which is immediately united to the first principle of things, and which the same reason that demonstrates the existence of soul says has a necessary subsistence. This, however, has a more principal subsistence than soul, yet is not the first of things, because it is not [profoundly] one, and simple. But the one, and the principle of all things, is simple. Hence that which is prior to the most honourable thing among beings, if it is necessary there should be something prior to intellect, which wishes indeed to be one, yet is not one, but has the form of one, because intellect is not in itself dispersed, but is truly present with itself, and does not, in consequence of its proximity to the one, divulse itself, though in a certain respect it dares to depart from the one; — that, I say, which is prior to intellect and is the one, is a prodigy, and is not being, lest here also the one should be predicated of another thing, to which no name is in reality adapted. But if it is necessary to give it a name, it may appropriately be called in common one, yet not as being first something else, and afterwards one. It is indeed on this account difficult to be known; but is principally to be known from its offspring essence. And intellect leads to essence. The nature also of the one is such, that it is the fountain of the most excellent things, and a power generating beings, abiding in itself without diminution, and not subsisting in its progeny. But we denominate it the one from necessity, in order that we may signify it to each other by a name, and may be led to an impartible conception, being anxious that our soul may be one. We do not, however, here speak of the one and the impartible in such a way as when we speak of a point or the monad. For that which is after this manner one, is the principle of quantity, which could not subsist unless essence had a prior existence, and also that which is antecedent to essence. It is necessary therefore to project the dianoetic power to these; but we should consider the monad and a point as having an analogical similitude to the one, on account of their simplicity, and their flying from multitude and division.
VI. How, therefore, can we speak of the one, and how can we adapt it to intellectual conception ? Shall we say that this may be accomplished, by admitting that it is more transcendently one than the monad and a point? For in these, indeed, the soul taking away magnitude and the multitude of number, ends in that which is smallest, and fixes itself in a certain thing which is indeed impartible, but which was in a partible nature, and is in something different from itself. But the one is neither in another thing, nor in that which is partible. Nor is it impartible in the same way as that which is smallest. For it is the greatest of all things, not in magnitude, but in power. So that it is without magnitude in power. For the natures also which are [immediately] posterior to it, are impartible in powers, and not in bulk. The principle of all things likewise must be admitted to be infinite, not because he is magnitude or number which cannot be passed over, but because the power of him is incomprehensible. For when you conceive him to be intellect or God, he is more [excellent] than these. And again, when by the dianoetic power you equalize him with the one, or conceive him to be God, by recurring to that which is most united in your intellectual perception, he even transcends these appellations. For he is in himself, nor is any thing accidental to him. By that which is sufficient to itself also the unity of his nature may be demonstrated. For it is necessary that the principle of all things should be most sufficient both to other things, and to itself, and that it should also be most un-indigent. But every thing which is multitudinous and not one, is indigent; since consisting of many things it is not one. Hence the essence of it requires to be one. But the one is not in want of itself. For it is the one. Moreover, that which is many, is in want of as many things as it is. And each of the things that are in it, as it subsists in conjunction with others, and is not in itself, is indigent of other things ; and thus a thing of this kind exhibits indigence, both according to parts and according to the whole. If, therefore, it is necessary there should be something which is most sufficient to itself, it is necessary there should be the one, which alone is a thing of such a kind, as neither to be indigent with reference to itself, nor with reference to another thing.3 For it does not seek after any thing in order that it may be, nor in order that it may be in an excellent condition, nor that it may be there established. For being the cause of existence to other things, and not deriving that which it is from others, nor its happiness, what addition can be made to it external to itself ? Hence its happiness, or the excellency of its condition, is not accidental to it. For it is itself [all that is sufficient to itself]. There is not likewise any place for it. For it is not in want of a foundation, as if it were not able to sustain itself. For that which is established in another thing is inanimate, and a falling mass, if it is without a foundation. But other things are established on account of the one, through which also they at the same time subsist, and have the place in which they are arranged. That, however, which seeks after place is indigent. But the principle is not indigent of things posterior to itself. The principle, therefore, of all things is unindigent of all things. For that which is indigent, is indigent in consequence of aspiring after its principle. But if the one was indigent of any thing it would certainly seek not to be the one; so that it would be indigent of its destroyer. Every thing, however, which is said to be indigent, is indigent of a good condition, and of that which preserves it. Hence to the one nothing is good, and, therefore, neither is the wish for any thing good to it. But it is super-good. And it is not good to itself, but to other things, which are able to participate of it. Nor does the one possess intelligence, lest it should also possess difference; nor motion. For it is prior to motion, and prior to intelligence. For what is there which it will intellectually perceive ? Shall we say itself ? Prior to intellection, therefore, it will be ignorant, and will be in want of intelligence in order that it may know itself, though it is sufficient to itself. It does not follow, however, that because the one does not know itself, and does not intellectually perceive itself, there will be ignorance in it. For ignorance takes place where there is diversity, and when one thing is ignorant of another. That, however, which is alone neither knows auy thing, nor has any thing of which it is ignorant. But being one, and associating with itself, it does not require the intellectual perception of itself; since neither is it necessary, in order that you may preserve the one, to adapt to it an association with itself. But it is requisite to take away intellectual perception, an association with itself, and the knowledge of itself, and of other things. For it is not proper to arrange it according to the act of perceiving intellectually, but rather according to intelligence. For intelligence does not perceive intellectually, but is the cause of intellectual perception to another thing. Cause, however, is not the same with the thing caused. But the cause of all things is not any one of them. Hence neither must it be denominated that good which it imparts to others ; but it is after another manner the good, in a way transcending other goods.
I.e. The nature of its being depends on the nature of the unity which it participates ; so that its being is more or less excellent according as this unity partakes in a greater or less degree of the one itself. ↩
It is well observed by Damascius in his MS. treatise Peri archon, that neither the one nor all things accords in reality with the nature of the one. For these are opposed to each other, and distribute our conceptions. For if we look to the simple and the one, we destroy its immensely great perfection: and if we conceive all things subsisting together, we abolish the one and the simple. But this is because we are divided, and look to divided peculiarities. In short, so far as it is the one, it is exempt from all things, and is without any multitude; but so far as it is the principle of all things, it is all things prior to all. ↩
As, however, a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the subsistence of the things of which it is the principle or cause; hence the one, so far as it is a principle or cause, will be indigent of the subsistence of these. ” Indeed,” as Damascius says, ” how is it possible it should not be indigent so far as it is the one? Just as it is all other things which proceed from it. For the indigent also is something belonging to all things.” Hence there is something even beyond the one, which has no kind of indigence whatever, which is in every respect incapable of being apprehended, and about which we must be perfectly silent. See the Introduction to my ” Plato,” and the additional notes to the 3rd Volume of it. ↩