VI. How, therefore, does intelligence see; what does it see; and, in short, how does it subsist ; and how is it generated from the one, so that it may see ? For now indeed the soul perceives the necessity of the existence of these things. It desires, however, to understand this which is so much spoken of by the wise men of antiquity, viz. how from the one being such as we have said it is, each thing has its subsistence, whether it be multitude, or the duad, or number; and why the one did not abide in itself, but so great a multitude flowed from it, as is seen to have an existence, and which we think should be referred to the one. We must say, therefore, as follows, invoicing God himself, not with external speech, but with the soul itself, extending ourselves in prayer to him, since we shall then be able to pray to him properly, when we approach by ourselves alone to the alone. It is necessary, therefore, that the beholder of him, being in himself as if in the interior part of a temple, and quietly abiding in an eminence beyond all things, should survey the statues as it were which are established outwardly, or rather that statue which first shines forth to the view, and after the following manner behold that which is naturally adapted to be beheld. With respect to every thing that is moved,1 it is necessary there should be something to which it is moved. For if there is nothing of this kind, we should not admit that it is moved. But if any thing is generated posterior to that to which the moveable nature tends, it is necessary that it should always be generated in consequence of that prior cause being converted to itself. Let, however, the generation which is in time be now removed from us who are discoursing about eternal beings. And if in the course of the discussion we attribute generation to things which exist eternally, let it be considered as indicative of cause and order. Hence, that which is from thence generated, must be said to be generated, the cause not being moved. For if something was generated in consequence of that cause being moved, the thing generated after the motion would be the third, and not the second from the cause. It is necessary, therefore, the cause being immoveable, that if any thing secondary subsists after it, this second nature should be produced, without the cause either verging to it, or consulting, or in short being moved. How, therefore, and what is it necessary to conceive about that abiding cause ? We must conceive a surrounding splendour, proceeding indeed from this cause, but from it in a permanent state, like a light from the sun shining, and as it were running round it, and being generated from it, the cause itself always abiding in the same immoveable condition. All beings, likewise, as long as they remain, necessarily produce from their own essence, about themselves, and externally from the power which is present with them, a nature whose hypostasis is suspended from them, and which is as it were an image of the archetype from which it proceeded. Thus fire emits from itself indeed heat, and snow not only retains cold within itself (but imparts it to other things). This, however, such things as are fragrant especially testify. For as long as they exist, something proceeds from them, of which whatever is near them partakes. All such things, likewise, as are now perfect generate; but that which is always perfect, always generates, and that which it produces is perpetual. It also generates something less than itself. What, therefore, is it requisite to say of that which is most perfect? Shall we say that nothing proceeds from it; or rather that the greatest things posterior to it are its progeny ? But the greatest thing posterior to it, and the second, is intellect. For intellect sees it, and is in want of it alone. But this most perfect nature is not in want of intellect. It is also necessary that the thing generated from that which is better than intellect, should be intellect.
And intellect is superior to all things after the first, because other things are posterior to it. Thus, for instance, soul is the reason of intellect, and a certain energy of it, just as intellect of that first God (who is beyond intellect). But the reason of soul is indeed obscure. For as it is the image of intellect, on this account it is necessary that it should loot to intellect. After the same manner also, it is necessary that intellect should look to the highest God, in order that it may be intellect. It sees him, however, not separated from him, but because it is after him, and there is nothing between; as neither is there any thing between soul and intellect. But every thing desires its generator. This also it loves, and especially when that which is generated and the generator are alone. When, however, that which generates is the most excellent of things, the thing begotten is necessarily present with it in such a manner, as to be separated by otherness alone.