The following account of the virtues is extracted from the Notes to my Translation of the ” Phaedo ” of Plato: The first of the virtues are the physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they are the result of energies in a former life. Of these Plato speaks in the ” Politicus ” and the ” Laws.” The ethical virtues, which are above these, are ingenerated by custom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato delivers in the “Laws.” They pertain however at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the political virtues, which pertain to reason alone; for they are scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational part as its instrument; through prudence adorning the gnostic, through fortitude the irascible, and through temperance the epithymetic power (or the power which is the source of desire) ; but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through justice. And of these virtues Plato speaks much in the ” Republic.” These virtues too follow each other. Above these are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato particularly unfolds these virtues in the ” Phaedo.” Prior to these however are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing itself to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one may be induced to think from the name, but also orectically: for it hastens to become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect possesses both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the converse of the political: for as the latter energize about things subordinate according to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the ” Theaetetus.”
According to Plotinus, there is also another gradation of the1 virtues besides these, viz. the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is first illuminated by the solar light, is different from that which illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain respect united and conjoined with it, and becomes as it were solar-form; so also our soul at first indeed is illuminated by intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and energizes uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the business indeed of philosophy to make us intellect; but of theurgy to unite us to intelligibles, so that we may energize paradigmatically. And as when possessing the physical virtues, we know mundane bodies (for the subjects to virtues of this kind are bodies); so from possessing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the universe, because fate is conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational, because they pertain to the irrational part. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic super-mundane; but as possessing the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic intelligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical virtues; justice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic. Observe too, that Plato in the “Phaedo” calls the physical virtues servile, because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the ethical okiographiai adumbrations, because their possessors only know that the energies of such virtues are right, but do not know why they are so. It is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which are in reality true virtues. He also separates them in another way, viz. that the political are not telestic, i.e. do not pertain to mystic ceremonies, but that the cathartic and theoretic are telestic. Hence, Olympiodorus adds, the cathartic virtues are denominated from the purification which is used in the mysteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine. On this account he accords with the Orphic verses, that
The soul that uninitiated dies,
Plung’d in the blackest mire in Hades lies.
For initiation is the divinely-inspired energy of the virtues. Olympiodorus also further observes, that by the thyrsus-bearers, Plato means those that energize according to the political virtues, but by the Bacchuses those that exercise the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in matter as Titans, through the great partibility of our nature; but we rise from the dark mire as Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at the time of death: and Bacchus is the inspective guardian of death, because he is likewise of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic sacred rites.
All the virtues likewise exhibit their proper characters, these being every where common, but subsisting appropriately in each. For the characteristic property of fortitude is the not declining to things subordinate; of temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature; of justice, a proper energy, and which is adapted to being; and of prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil. Olympiodorus farther observes, that all the virtues are in the Gods. For many Gods, says he, are adorned with their appellations; and all goodness originates from the Gods. Likewise, prior to things which sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there should be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the virtues first appear ? Shall we say in the psychical ? For virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the soul. Hence the Chaldaean oracles conjoin fontal virtue with fontal soul, or in other words, with soul subsisting according to cause. But may it not also be said, that the virtues naturally wish to give an orderly arrangement to that which is disordered ? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic order. How then will they be cathartic there? May we not say, Olympiodorus adds, that through the cathartic virtues considered according to their casual subsistence in Jupiter the demiurgus, he is enabled to abide in his accustomed mode, as Plato says in the ” Timaeus” ? And farther still, according to ancient theologists, he ascends to the tower of Saturn, who is a pure intellect.
As this distribution of the virtues, however, is at present no less novel than important, the following discussion of them from the Aphormai pros ta noetas, or Auxiliaries to Intelligibles, of Porphyry, is added both for the sake of the philosophic reader, and because it elucidates what is said by Plotinus on this subject. The substance of it is indeed evidently derived from Plotinus.
“There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the political character, and another to the man who tends to contemplation, and on this account is called theoretic, and is now a beholder. And there are also other virtues pertaining to intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate from soul. The virtues indeed of the political character, and which consist in the moderation of the passions, are characterised by following and being obedient to the reasoning about that which is becoming in actions. Hence, looking to an innoxious converse with neighbours, they are denominated, from the aggregation of fellowship, political. And prudence indeed subsists about the reasoning part; fortitude about the irascible part; temperance, in the consent and symphony of the epithymetic with the reasoning part; and justice in each of these performing its proper employment with respect to governing and being governed. But the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative life, consist in a departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence also, they are called purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from corporeal actions, and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are the virtues of the soul elevating itself to true being. The political virtues, therefore, adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of purifications. For it is necessary that he who is adorned by these, should abstain from doing any thing precedaneously in conjunction with body. Hence in purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize alone, gives subsistence to prudence ; which derives its perfection through energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly passive with the body, constitutes temperance. Not to fear a departure from body as into something void, and nonentity, gives subsistence to fortitude. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there is no resistance [from the irrational part], justice is produced. The disposition therefore, according to the political virtues, is surveyed in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man conformable to nature. But the disposition according to the theoretic virtues, is beheld in apathy ;1 the end of which is a similitude to God.
“Since, however, of purification one kind consists in purifying, but another pertains to those that are purified, the cathartic virtues are surveyed according to both these significations of purification; for they purify the soul, and are present with purification. For the end of purification is to become pure. But since purification, and the being purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good resulting from them will be different from that which purifies; so that if that which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it is defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains after purification, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul also was not good, but is that which is able to partake of good, and is boniform. For if this were not the case, it would not have become situated in evil. The good, therefore, of the soul consists in being united to its generator; but its evil, in an association with things subordinate to itself. Its evil also is twofold; the one arising from an association with terrestrial natures; but the other from doing this with an excess of the passions. Hence all the political virtues, which liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated virtues, and are honourable. But the cathartic are more honourable, and liberate it from evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul when purified should associate with its generator. Hence the virtue of it after its conversion consists in a scientific knowledge of [true] being; but this will not be the case unless conversion precedes.
“There is therefore another genus of virtues after the cathartic and political, and which are the virtues of the soul energizing intellectually. And here, indeed, wisdom and prudence consist in the contemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But justice consists in performing what is appropriate in a conformity to, and energizing according to intellect. Temperance is an inward conversion of the soul to intellect. And fortitude is apathy; according to a similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally impassive. These virtues also, in the same manner as the others, alternately follow each other.
“The fourth species of the virtues, is that of the paradigms subsisting in intellect; which are more excellent than the psychical virtues, and exist as the paradigms of these; the virtues of the soul being the similitudes of them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence is science; but intellect that knows [all things] is wisdom. Temperance is that which is converted to itself. The proper work of intellect, is the performance of its appropriate duty [and this is justice]. But “fortitude is sameness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance of power. There are therefore four genera of virtues; of which, indeed, some pertain to intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are paradigmatic. Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and being filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying itself, and becoming purified froni the body, and the irrational passions. And others are the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving measure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation in the passions. And he, indeed, who has the greater virtues has also necessarily the less; but the contrary is not true, that he who has the less has also the greater virtues. Nor will he who possesses the greater, energize precedaneously according to the less, but only so far as the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the virtues, is, as we have said, generically different in the different virtues. For the scope of the political virtues, is to give measure to the passions in their practical energies according to nature. But the scope of the cathartic virtues, is entirely to obliterate the remembrance of the passions. And the scope of the rest subsists analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes according to the practical virtues, is a worthy man; but he who energizes according to the cathartic virtues, is a daemoniacal man, or is also a good daemon. He who energizes according to the intellectual virtues alone, is a God. But he who energizes according to the paradigmatic virtues, is the father of the Gods. We, therefore, ought especially to pay attention to the cathartic virtues, since we may obtain these in the present life. But through these, the ascent is to the more honourable virtues. Hence it is requisite to survey to what degree purification may be extended. For it is a separation from body, and from the passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may be effected, and to what extent, must now be said.
“In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who intends to acquire this purification, should, as the foundation and basis of it, know himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different essence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this foundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it were from different places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive with respect to the body. For he who energizes uninterruptedly according to sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the enjoyment resulting from pleasure, yet at the same time his attention is dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through sense1 in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or pains of sensibles, in conjunction with a promptitude, and converging sympathy ; from which disposition it is requisite to be purified. This, however, will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and the sensations of them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from pain, in order that [the rational part] may not be impeded [in its energies]. Pain also must be taken away. But if this is not possible, it must be mildly diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul is not copassive with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible be taken away ; and must by no means be premeditated. But if it cannot be entirely removed, deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but the unpremeditated motion must be the impulse of the irrational part. That however which is unpremeditated is imbecile and small. All fear, likewise, must be expelled. For he who requires this purification, will fear nothing. Here, however, if it should take place, it will be unpremeditated. Anger therefore and fear must be used for the purpose of admonition. But the desire of every thing base must be exterminated. Such a one also, so far as he is a cathartic philosopher, will not desire meats and drinks.
Neither must there be the unpremeditated in natural venereal connexions; but if this should take place, it must be only as far as to that precipitate imagination which energizes in sleep. In short, the intellectual soul itself of the purified man, must be liberated from all these [corporeal propensities]. He must likewise endeavour that what is moved to the irrational nature of corporeal passions, may be moved without sympathy, and without animadversion; so that the motions themselves may be immediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the reasoning power. This, however, will not take place while the purification is proceeding to its perfection; but will happen to those in whom reason rules without opposition. Hence in these, the inferior part will so venerate reason, that it will be indignant if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present, and will reprove itself for its imbecility. These, however, are yet only moderations of the passions, but at length terminate in apathy. For when co-passivity is entirely exterminated, then apathy is present with him who is purified from it. For passion becomes moved, when reason imparts excitation, through verging [to the irrational nature].”
This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions to reason. ↩