Plotino – Tratado 20,4 (I, 3, 4) — Definição de dialética

4. But this science, this Dialectic essential to all the three classes alike, what, in sum, is it?

It is the Method, or Discipline, that brings with it the power of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things – what each is, how it differs from others, what common quality all have, to what Kind each belongs and in what rank each stands in its Kind and whether its Being is Real-Being, and how many Beings there are, and how many non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings.

Dialectic treats also of the Good and the not-Good, and of the particulars that fall under each, and of what is the Eternal and what the not Eternal – and of these, it must be understood, not by seeming-knowledge [“sense-knowledge”] but with authentic science.

All this accomplished, it gives up its touring of the realm of sense and settles down in the Intellectual Kosmos and there plies its own peculiar Act: it has abandoned all the realm of deceit and falsity, and pastures the Soul in the “Meadows of Truth”: it employs the Platonic division to the discernment of the Ideal-Forms, of the Authentic-Existence and of the First-Kinds [or Categories of Being]: it establishes, in the light of Intellection, the unity there is in all that issues from these Firsts, until it has traversed the entire Intellectual Realm: then, resolving the unity into the particulars once more, it returns to the point from which it starts.

Now rests: instructed and satisfied as to the Being in that sphere, it is no longer busy about many things: it has arrived at Unity and it contemplates: it leaves to another science all that coil of premisses and conclusions called the art of reasoning, much as it leaves the art of writing: some of the matter of logic, no doubt, it considers necessary – to clear the ground – but it makes itself the judge, here as in everything else; where it sees use, it uses; anything it finds superfluous, it leaves to whatever department of learning or practice may turn that matter to account.

4. Qu’est-ce que cette dialectique, qu’il faut enseigner aussi au musicien et à l’amant ? C’est une science qui, pour chaque objet donné, rend capable d’exprimer par un discours ce qu’est cet objet, en quoi il diffère des autres, et ce qu’il a de commun avec eux, parmi quels objets et dans quelle classe il se trouve ; elle détermine encore si l’existence lui appartient, quel est le nombre d’êtres d’un genre donné, et le nombre d’êtres qui n’appartiennent pas à ce genre mais en diffèrent. La dialectique porte encore sur le bien et son contraire, et sur toutes les espèces subordonnées au bien et à son contraire ; elle définit l’éternel et le non éternel, procédant toujours scientifiquement et non par opinion. Elle arrête nos errements à travers les choses sensibles, en se fixant dans l’intelligible, et c’est là qu’elle borne son activité5 ; elle éloigne le mensonge et nourrit notre âme, selon le mot de Platon, dans la plaine de la vérité6 ; elle use de la méthode platonicienne de division pour discerner les espèces d’un genre, pour définir, et pour arriver aux genres premiers ; par la pensée, elle fait, de ces genres, des combinaisons complexes, jusqu’à ce qu’elle ait achevé de parcourir le domaine intelligible ; puis, par une marche inverse, celle de l’analyse, elle revient au principe. À ce moment, elle est en repos et reste en repos tant qu’elle est dans le monde intelligible ; elle ne fait plus de recherche curieuse ; elle se ramasse en une unité ; de là-haut, elle considère la logique qui traite des propositions et des syllogismes, et les lui laisse comme on laisse à d’autres l’art d’apprendre à écrire. Parmi les formes de ces raisonnements, certaines s’imposent nécessairement et avant toute éducation technique. La dialectique soumet à son examen ces formes naturelles ainsi que les autres, et elle estime que les unes sont utiles, tandis que les autres sont superflues et ne sont bonnes que dans les traités techniques qui s’occupent de ces questions.

[4] Qu’est-ce donc que cette Dialectique, dont il faut ajouter la connaissance à ce qui précède? C’est une science qui nous rend capables de raisonner de chaque chose, de dire ce qu’elle est, en quoi elle diffère des autres, en quoi elle leur ressemble, où elle est, si elle est une essence; de déterminer combien il y a d’êtres véritables, quels sont les objets où se trouve le non-être au lieu de l’être véritable. Cette science traite aussi du bien et du mal, de tout ce qui est subordonné au bien et à son contraire, de la nature de ce qui est éternel et de ce qui ne l’est pas. Elle parle de toutes choses scientifiquement et non suivant la simple opinion. Au lieu d’errer dans le monde sensible, elle s’établit dans le monde intelligible; elle concentre sur ce monde toute son attention, et, après avoir éloigné notre âme du mensonge, elle la nourrit dans le champ de la vérité (06).Elle emploie alors la méthode platonicienne de division pour discerner les idées, définir chaque objet, s’élever aux premiers genres des êtres (07); puis, enchaînant par la pensée tout ce qui en dérive, elle poursuit ses déductions jusqu’à ce qu’elle ait parcouru le domaine de l’intelligible tout entier ; enfin, par une marche rétrograde, elle remonte au principe même d’où elle était d’abord partie (08). Se reposant alors, parce que ce n’est que dans le monde intelligible qu’elle peut trouver le repos, n’ayant plus à s’occuper d’une multitude d’objets, parce qu’elle est arrivée à I’unité, elle considère cette étude qu’on nomme Logique, et qui traite des propositions et des arguments, comme un art subordonné [à la Dialectique] autant que l’écriture l’est à la pensée ; elle y reconnaît quelques principes comme nécessaires et comme constituant des exercices préparatoires; mais, soumettant à sa critique ces principes mêmes comme toute autre chose, elle déclare les uns utiles, les autres superflus, et propres seulement à la méthode qui s’occupe de cette sorte de recherches.

WHAT DIALECTICS IS.

4. What then is this dialectics, knowledge of which must be added to mathematics? It is a science which makes us capable of reasoning about each thing, to say what it is, in what it differs from the others, in what it resembles them, where it is, whether it be one of the beings, to determine how many veritable beings there are, and which are the objects that contain nonentity instead of veritable essence. This science treats also of good and evil; of everything that is subordinated to (being), the Good, and to its contrary; of the nature of what is eternal, and transitory. It treats of each matter scientifically, and not according to mere opinion. Instead of wandering around the sense-world, it establishes itself in the intelligible world; it concentrates its whole attention on this world, and after having saved our soul from deceit, dialectics “pastures our soul in the meadow of truth,” (as thought Plato, Fedro). Then it makes use of the Platonic method of division to discern ideas, to define each object, to rise to the several kinds of essences (as thought Plato, Politico); then, by thought concatenating all that is thence derived, dialectics continues its deductions until it has gone through the whole domain of the intelligible. Then, by reversing, dialectics returns to the very Principle from which first it had started out (Eneada-V-1). Resting there, because it is only in the intelligible world that it can find rest, no longer needing to busy itself with a multitude of objects, because it has arrived at unity, dialectics considers its logic, which treats of propositions and arguments. This logic is an art subordinate to dialectics just as writing is subordinate to thought. In logic, dialectics recognizes some principles as necessary, and others as constituting preparatory exercises. Then, along with everything else, subjecting these principles to its criticism, it declares some of them useful, and others superfluous, or merely technical.

IV. What, then, is the dialectic which ought to be delivered in addition to the former particulars ? It is, indeed, a habit enabling its possessor to reason about every thing, to know what each thing is, and in what it differs from other things, what the common something is which it participates, where each of these subsists, if a thing is, what it is, what the number is of beings, and again of non-beings [which are not nothing] but different from beings. This, also, discusses the good, and that which is not good; such things as are under the good, and such as are under the contrary to it; and what that is which is eternal, and that which is not a thing of this kind. All these likewise it discusses scientifically, and not from opmion. Resting, also, from the wandering about a sensible nature, it establishes itself in the intelligible world, and there has its employment, dismissing falsehood, and nourishing the soul in what is called the plain of truth, employing for this purpose the division of Plato, and also for the separation of forms. It likewise employs this division for the purpose of defining what a thing is, and in order to obtain a knowledge of the first genera of things, intellectually connecting that which results from these, till it has proceeded through the whole of an intelligible nature; and again, by an analytic process it arrives at that to which it had proceeded from the first. Then, however, it becomes quiescent, because so far as it arrives thither it is at rest, and being no longer busily employed, but, becoming one, it surveys what is called logic, which is occupied about propositions and syllogisms, — just as if giving to another art, the knowledge of writing; some of which it considers as necessary, and prior to art. But it forms a judgment of these, as well as of other things, and thinks that some of them are useful, hut others superfluous, and pertaining to the method by which these are discussed.