Míguez
11. Pero todavía hay más: como quiera que la inteligencia es una visión y una visión que contempla, es también una potencia que ha pasado al acto. Contará con una materia y una forma, ya que el ser una visión en acto implica precisamente estas dos cosas. Antes de ver, la inteligencia era una; de una ha pasado a ser dos, aunque estas dos cosas sean sólo una. En cuanto al sentido de la vista alcanza su plenitud y perfección con las cosas sensibles, pero la visión de la inteligencia culmina precisamente en el Bien.
Mas, si ella fuese el Bien, ¿qué le quedaría por ver o por hacer? Todas las demás cosas actúan por el Bien o en razón del Bien; el Bien, sin embargo, no tiene necesidad de nada, pues se basta consigo mismo. Al hablar del Bien, nada podréis añadirle por el pensamiento; porque si algo añadieseis, todo eso iría en su demérito. No conviene atribuirle el pensamiento, para no introducir en El algo extraño, haciendo así de El dos cosas, la inteligencia y el Bien. Porque es claro que la inteligencia tiene necesidad del Bien, pero el Bien no tiene necesidad de la inteligencia. De ahí que la inteligencia tome su forma del Bien y reciba de El su perfección, pues la forma que ella tiene proviene del Bien y la hace semejante al Bien. He aquí la huella del Bien que se ve -en la inteligencia y, según la cual, hemos de concebir su modelo. Conviene que pensemos el Bien verdadero de acuerdo con su huella en la inteligencia. El Bien dejó en la inteligencia que ve una señal de sí mismo; de modo que siempre se da en ella algún deseo, un deseo constante, que alcanza siempre su cumplimiento. El Bien, sin embargo, nada tiene que desear, porque, ¿cuál podría ser su deseo? Nada le queda por obtener, puesto que nada desea. No es, por tanto, la inteligencia, porque en la inteligencia hay un deseo y una tendencia a su propia forma.
Digamos que la inteligencia es bella y el más bello de todos los seres. En la luz y en el resplandor puros en que permanece abarca la naturaleza de los seres, y este mundo nuestro, realmente tan bello, no es más que una sombra y -una imagen suyas. Subsistente en la plenitud de su esplendor, no conoce lo no inteligible ni las tinieblas, ni lo que carece de medida; vive, pues, una vida feliz, y el estupor se apodera de quien la ve, si ha de penetrar en ella y hacerse también uno con ella. Lo mismo que el que levanta los ojos al cielo y advierte el resplandor de los astros piensa en seguida en su creador y trata de encontrarlo, así también el que ha visto y admirado el mundo inteligible debe intentar buscar a su creador; porque, ¿quién constituye su fundamento, y dónde está y cómo es el que ha engendrado un hijo como )a inteligencia, hermoso en su plenitud, que ha recibido por entero de su padre? Este padre no es la inteligencia, ni la propia plenitud de ser, sino algo anterior a ambas cosas, puesto que éstas son posteriores a él y tienen necesidad de alcanzar su plenitud y de pensar. Son vecinas, sin embargo, de aquello que no tiene necesidad de nada, ni siquiera de pensar. (La inteligencia) posee la verdadera plenitud y el pensamiento, porque ocupa el primer lugar (después del Bien). Antes de ella está el principio que de nada tiene necesidad y que nada posee; de otro modo, no sería verdaderamente el Bien.
Bouillet (sem 11)
Guthrie
THE SUPREME IS NOT INTELLIGENCE. WHICH ASPIRES TO THE FORM OF THE GOOD.
11. (10). A further consideration. Since intelligence is a sort of intuition, namely, a seeing (or actualizing) intuition (or vision), it really consists of a potentiality that has passed into actualization. It will therefore contain two elements, which will play the parts of (intelligible) matter, and of form, just like actualized vision, for actualized vision also implies duality. Therefore intuition, before being actualized, was unity. Thus unity has become duality, and duality has become unity. (Sense-) vision receives from sense-. objects its fulness, and its perfection, so to speak. As to intellectual vision, however, its fulness comes from a principle that is the Good. Now if intelligence were the Good itself, what would be the use of its intuition or its actualization? Other beings, indeed, aspire to the Good, as the goal of their activity; but the Good itself has need of nothing; and therefore possesses nothing but itself. After having named it, nothing should be added thereto by thought; for, to add something, is to suppose that He needs this attribute. Not even intelligence should be attributed to Him; that would be introducing therein something alien, distinguishing in Him two things, Intelligence and the Good. Intelligence needs the Good, but the Good has no need of Intelligence. On achieving the Good, Intelligence takes its form, for it derives its form from the Good; and it becomes perfect, because it assumes the nature (of the Good). The model (or, archetype) must be judged by the trace it leaves in Intelligence, conceiving of its true character according to the impression it leaves. Only by this impression does Intelligence behold and achieve the Good. That is why Intelligence aspires to the Good; and as Intelligence ever aspires to the Good, Intelligence ever achieves it. The Good itself, however, never aspires to anything; for what could He desire? Nor does He achieve anything, since He desires nothing. Therefore (the Supreme) is not Intelligence, whichever desires, and aspires to the form of Good.
THE GOOD AS SUPREME NEITHER NEEDS NOR POSSESSES INTELLECTION.
No doubt Intelligence is beautiful; it is the most beautiful of things, since it is illuminated by a pure light, since it shines with a pure splendor, and contains the intelligible beings of which our world, in spite of its beauty, is but an adumbration and image. The intelligible world is located in a region resplendent with clearness, where is nothing either obscure or indefinite, where, within itself, it enjoys a blissful life. It entrances the human gaze, especially when one knows how to commune with it. But just as a view of heaven, and the splendor of the stars leads one to seek and conceive their author, likewise the contemplation of the intelligible world, and the fascination it exerts leads (the beholder) to seek its author. The question then arises, Who is He who has given existence to the intelligible world? Where and how did He beget this so pure Intellect, this so beautiful son who derives all of his fullness from his father ? This supreme Principle itself is neither Intelligence nor son, but is superior to Intelligence, which is His son. Intelligence, His son, succeeds Him, because the son needs to receive from the father both intellection and fullness, which is his food; so (the son) holds the first rank after Him who has need of nothing, not even intellection. Nevertheless Intelligence possesses fullness and true intellection, because it immediately participates in the Good. -Thus the Good, being above real fulness and intellection, neither possesses them, nor needs them; otherwise, He would not be the Good.
Taylor
(XI) Besides, consider after this manner, since intellect is a certain sight, and is sight perceiving, hence it is a power which has already proceeded into energy; it contains therefore something corresponding to matter, and something analogous to form, as likewise vision according to energy. But by the matter of intellect, I mean that which subsists among intelligibles; since vision according to energy possesses a twofold property: it was one therefore prior to its vision; and hence one is made two, and two one. To sensible vision, indeed, plenitude, from a sensible object, and its own perfection, as it were, arrives; but it is The Good which fills the vision of intellect; for if intellect were The One Itself’ what occasion would there be for it either to see or energize in any respect? For other natures indeed possess an energy about, and for the sake of, The Good, but The Good Itself is not indigent of any thing; and on this account nothing is present with it besides itself. When therefore you pronounce The Goody you should be careful to add nothing else in your intellectual conceptions; for if you add any thing, you immediately declare that the nature to which you have added something is destitute; and on this account you ought not to conjoin intelligence, lest you should by this means add something foreign, and produce two things, intellect and The Good. Intellect indeed requires the subsistence of The Goody but The Good is by no means indigent of intellect; and on this account intellect, pursuing The Goody possesses the form of good, and is perfected by The Good; while the form resident in intellect proceeds from The Goody and is endued with a boniform nature. But from the vestige of The Goody which is beheld in intellect, we ought to estimate the dignity of its exemplar, considering its reality from the impressed vestige of its nature, which intellect contains. It is from this impression therefore that intellect sees and possesses; and on this account there is always a desire in intellect, and intellect is perpetually desiring and pursuing. But The Good Itself is without desire; for what should it desire? Nor does it pursue any thing; for it has never desired: it is not therefore intellect, for in this there is desire, and an intimate conjunction with its own allvarious form. Intellect indeed is beautiful, and the most beautiful of all things, being situated in a pure light and in a pure splendour, and comprehending in itself the nature of beings, of which indeed this our beautiful material world is but the shadow and image; but intellect, that true intelligible world, is situated in universal splendour, living in itself a blessed life, and containing nothing unintelligible, nothing dark, nothing without measure; which divine world whoever perceives, will be immediately astonished, if, as is requisite, he profoundly and intimately merges himself into its inmost recesses, and becomes one, with its all-beauteous nature. And as he who diligently surveys the heavens, and contemplates the splendour of the stars, should immediately think upon and search after their artificer, so it is requisite that he who beholds and admires the intelligible world, should diligently inquire after its author, investigating who he is, where he resides, and how he produced such an offspring as intellect, a son beautiful and pure, and full of his ineffable sire. But his father is neither intellect nor a son, but superior to both; for intellect has a posterior subsistence, and is indigent of nourishment and intelligence, being situated the next in order to that nature which is superior to every kind of want. Intellect, however, possesses true plenitude and intelligence, because it possesses the first of all things; but that which is prior to intellect, is neither indigent nor possesses; for if this were the case, it would not be The Good Itself.