- Igal
- Bouillet
- Guthrie
- MacKenna
Igal
15 Entonces, ¿cómo es que los otros cuatro géneros forman parte integrante de la Sustancia sin hacerla todavía una sustancia cualificada?
—Porque tampoco la particularizan. Ahora bien, que el Ser es un género primario, ya lo hemos dicho; y que el Movimiento, el Reposo, la Alteridad y la Identidad no son otra cosa, es manifiesto; y que ese Movimiento no produce cualidad alguna, es acaso evidente, pero una explicación lo hará más claro. En efecto, si el Movimiento es acto de la Sustancia y el Ser y los géneros primarios en general están en acto, el Movimiento no puede ser accidental, antes bien, como es acto de un Ser en acto, ni siquiera puede ser ya concebido como parte integrante de la Sustancia, sino como la Sustancia misma. En consecuencia, el Movimiento no queda incluido en algo posterior ni en la cualidad, sino en el orden de lo simultáneo. Porque no es verdad que la Sustancia sea Ser y luego se mueva, ni que sea Ser y luego se estabilice, ni es una modalidad el Reposo. La Identidad y la Alteridad tampoco son posteriores, pues la Sustancia no se hizo múltiple posteriormente, sino que era lo que era: unimúltiple. Pero si era múltiple, había Alteridad, y si era unimúltiple, había también Identidad. Y esto basta para la Sustancia; pero cuando ésta se dispone a avanzar hacia lo de abajo, entonces surgen otras entidades que ya no producen sustancia, sino que cualifican y cuantifican la sustancia. Decimos que entonces surgen géneros no primarios.
Bouillet
XV. Comment quatre des genres complètent-ils donc l’essence, sans toutefois constituer telle essence (ποιὰ οὐσία) ? car ils ne forment pas une certaine essence. — Nous avons déjà parlé de l’Être premier et montré que ni le mouvement, ni la stabilité, ni la différence, ni l’identité ne sont rien d’autre que lui. Il est clair que le mouvement n’introduit pas davantage dans l’Être une qualité ; cependant il sera bon de s’arrêter à cette proposition pour l’éclaircir.
Si le mouvement est l’acte de l’essence, si l’Être et en général tout ce qui est au premier rang est essentiellement en acte, le mouvement ne peut être considéré comme un accident; mais, étant l’acte de l’Être qui est en acte, il ne peut plus être appelé un simple complément de l’essence, il est l’essence elle-même. Il ne doit être rangé ni parmi les choses postérieures à l’essence, ni parmi les qualités; il est contemporain de l’essence : car il ne faut pas croire que l’Être existât d’abord, puis qu’il se soit mû [ces deux choses sont contemporaines] ; il en est de même de la stabilité : on ne peut dire que l’Être était, puis qu’il est devenu stable. l’identité, la différence ne sont pas davantage postérieures à l’Être : l’Être n’a pas été d’abord un pour devenir ensuite multiple, mais il est par son essence un-multiple; en tant que multiple il implique différence ; en tant qu’un-multiple il implique identité. Ces choses suffisent donc pour constituer l’essence (42). Quand du monde intelligible on descend aux choses inférieures, on rencontre d’autres éléments qui ne constituent plus l’Essence absolue, mais une certaine essence possédant telle qualité, telle quantité : ce sont bien des genres, mais des genres inférieurs aux genres premiers.
Guthrie
THE FOUR OTHER CATEGORIES DO NOT TOGETHER FORM QUALITY.
15. However, how do four of these genera complete being, without nevertheless constituting the such-, ness (or, quality) of being? for they do not form a “certain being.” The primary Essence has already been mentioned; and it has been shown that neither movement, difference, nor identity are anything else. Movement, evidently, does not introduce any quality in I essence; nevertheless it will be wise to study the ques-, tion a little more definitely. If movement be thai actualization of being, if essence, and in general all that is in the front rank be essentially an actualization, | movement cannot be considered as an accident. As it is, however, the actualization of the essence which is in actualization, it can no longer be called a simple complement of “being,” for it is “being” itself. Neither must it be ranked amidst things posterior to “being,” nor amidst the qualities; it is contemporaneous with “being,” for you must not suppose that essence existed first, and then moved itself (these being contemporaneous events). It is likewise with stability; for one cannot say that essence existed first, and then later became stable. Neither are identity or difference any more posterior to essence; essence was not first unitary, and then later manifold; but by its essence it is one manifold. So far as it is manifold, it implies difference; while so far as it is a manifold unity, it implies identity. These categories, therefore, suffice to constitute “being.” When one descends from the intelligible world to inferior things, he meets other elements which indeed no longer constitute absolute “being,” but only a “certain being,” that possesses some particular quantity or quality; these are indeed genera, but genera inferior to the primary genera.
MacKenna
15. How then do the four genera complete Substance without qualifying it or even particularizing it?
It has been observed that Being is primary, and it is clear that none of the four – Motion, Stability, Difference, Identity – is distinct from it. That this Motion does not produce Quality is doubtless also clear, but a word or two will make it clearer still.
If Motion is the Act of Substance, and Being and the Primaries in general are its Act, then Motion is not an accidental attribute: as the Act of what is necessarily actual [what necessarily involves Act], it is no longer to be considered as the complement of Substance but as Substance itself. For this reason, then, it has not been assigned to a posterior class, or referred to Quality, but has been made contemporary with Being.
The truth is not that Being first is and then takes Motion, first is and then acquires Stability: neither Stability nor Motion is a mere modification of Being. Similarly, Identity and Difference are not later additions: Being did not grow into plurality; its very unity was a plurality; but plurality implies Difference, and unity-in-plurality involves Identity.
Substance [Real Being] requires no more than these five constituents; but when we have to turn to the lower sphere, we find other principles giving rise no longer to Substance (as such) but to quantitative Substance and qualitative: these other principles may be regarded as genera but not primary genera.