Plotino – Tratado 43,19 (VI, 2, 19) — Os gêneros primeiros e suas espécies: posição do problema

XIX. Puisque ces quatre choses [qui complètent l’essence (52), savoir, le mouvement, la stabilité, l’identité et la différence] constituent [avec l’Être] les genres premiers, il reste à examiner si chacun d’eux pris à part engendre des espèces, si, par exemple, l’Être pris en lui-même pourrait admettre des divisions dans lesquelles les autres genres n’entreraient pour rien. — Non, sans doute : car, pour engendrer des espèces, il faut que le genre admette des différences venues du dehors ; que ces différences soient des propriétés appartenant à l’Être en tant qu’être, sans être cependant lui-même. Mais alors d’où l’Être les tient-il? Ce ne peut être assurément de ce qui n’existe pas. Si c’est nécessairement de ce qui existe, comme il ne reste que trois genres d’êtres, il est évident que l’Être tient ses différences de ces genres, qui s’associent à lui et ont une existence simultanée. Mais par cela même que ces genres ont une existence simultanée [avec l’Être], ils servent à le constituer, puisqu’il se compose de tous ces éléments réunis. Comment alors peuvent-ils être autres que le tout qu’ils constituent? Comment ces genres font-ils de tous les êtres des espèces? Comment par exemple le mouvement pur peut-il former des espèces du mouvement? La stabilité et les autres genres donnent lieu aux mêmes questions. Il faut d’ailleurs prendre garde de perdre chaque genre dans les espèces, et, d’un autre côté, de le réduire à l’état d’un simple prédicat en ne le considérant que dans ses espèces. Il faut que le genre existe à la fois dans les espèces et en lui-même, que tout en se mêlant [aux espèces] il reste en lui-même pur et sans mélange : car, en concourant à l’essence autrement [par son mélange avec les espèces], il s’anéantirait lui-même. Telles sont les questions que nous avons à examiner.

Maintenant, comme nous avons dit précédemment que ce qui comprend en soi tous les êtres, c’est l’Intelligence et même chaque intelligence, que nous avons placé l’Être ou l’Essence au-dessus de toutes les espèces qui en sont les parties, et que nous avons dit que l’Être n’est pas encore l’Intelligence (53), nous reconnaissons par là même que l’Intelligence déjà développée est quelque chose de postérieur. Nous allons mettre à profit l’étude de cette question afin d’atteindre le but que nous nous sommes proposé [pour déterminer le rapport du genre avec les espèces qu’il contient] ; nous nous servirons de l’Intelligence comme d’exemple pour approfondir la connaissance des choses dont nous nous occupons.

ESSENCE DERIVES ITS DIFFERENCES FROM THE OTHER CO-ORDINATE CATEGORIES.

19. Since these four categories (which complete essence, namely, movement, stability, identity and difference) (with Essence as a fifth) constitute the primary genera, it remains to be examined whether each of them, by itself, can beget species; for instance, whether Essence, entirely by itself, could admit divisions in which the other categories would have no share whatever. No: for, in order to beget species, the genus would have to admit differences derived from outside; these differences would have to be properties belonging to Essence as such, without however being Essence. But from where then would Essence have derived them? Impossibly from what does not exist. If then they were necessarily derived from that which exists, as only three other genera of essences remain, evidently, Essence must have derived its differences from these genera, which associate themselves with Essence, while yet enjoying a simultaneous existence. But from this very fact that these genera enjoy an existence simultaneous (with Essence), they serve to constitute it, as it is composed of the gathering of these elements. How then could they be different from the whole that they constitute ? How do these genera make species out of all (these beings) ? How, for instance, could pure movement produce species of movement? The same question arises in connection with the other genera. Besides, we must avoid (two dangers:) losing each genus in its species, and, on the other hand, reducing it to the state of a simple predicate, by considering it only in its species. The genus must exist both in its species and in itself. While blending (with the species), it must in itself remain pure and unblended; for, if it should contribute to “being” otherwise (by blending with its species), it would annihilate itself. Such are the questions that must be examined.

INTELLIGENCE AS A COMPOSITE IS POSTERIOR TO THE CATEGORIES.

Now, we have above posited certain premises. Intelligence, and even every intelligence, includes within itself all (essences). We ranked (Essence or Being) above all species that are parts thereof. Essence is not yet Intelligence. From these it results that already developed Intelligence is already something posterior, We shall therefore make use of this study to achieve the goal we had set ourselves (namely, to determine the relation of the genus to its contained species). We shall therefore make use of Intelligence as an example to extend our knowledge of this subject.

19. Having established our four primary genera, it remains for us to enquire whether each of them of itself alone produces species. And especially, can Being be divided independently, that is without drawing upon the other genera? Surely not: the differentiae must come from outside the genus differentiated: they must be differentiae of Being proper, but cannot be identical with it.

Where then is it to find them? Obviously not in non-beings. If then in beings, and the three genera are all that is left, clearly it must find them in these, by conjunction and couplement with these, which will come into existence simultaneously with itself.

But if all come into existence simultaneously, what else is produced but that amalgam of all Existents which we have just considered [Intellect]? How can other things exist over and above this all-including amalgam? And if all the constituents of this amalgam are genera, how do they produce species? How does Motion produce species of Motion? Similarly with Stability and the other genera.

A word of warning must here be given against sinking the various genera in their species; and also against reducing the genus to a mere predicate, something merely seen in the species. The genus must exist at once in itself and in its species; it blends, but it must also be pure; in contributing along with other genera to form Substance, it must not destroy itself. There are problems here that demand investigation.

But since we identified the amalgam of the Existents [or primary genera] with the particular intellect, Intellect as such being found identical with Being or Substance, and therefore prior to all the Existents, which may be regarded as its species or members, we may infer that the intellect, considered as completely unfolded, is a subsequent.

Our treatment of this problem may serve to promote our investigation; we will take it as a kind of example, and with it embark upon our enquiry.