28 Ya hemos dicho que la acción y la pasión deben ser calificadas de movimientos; que es posible dividir los movimientos en absolutos, acciones y pasiones; que los otros géneros mencionados son reductibles a los anteriores; que lo relativo consiste en la relación de una cosa a otra y que ambos correlativos coexisten simultáneamente. Cuando lo relativo es resultado de la relación de una sustancia, no será relativo en cuanto sustancia, sino en cuanto parte de una sustancia —tal es el caso de la mano o de la cabeza— o en cuanto causa, principio o elemento de la misma. Es posible, además, dividir los relativos como los han dividido los antiguos: discriminándolos unos como causas, otros como medidas, otros a título de exceso o defecto y otros, en general, por el criterio de semejanzas o desemejanzas. Y esto es lo que hay acerca de estos géneros.
XXVIII. Nous avons établi qu’agir et pâtir sont des mouvements; que, parmi les mouvements, les uns sont absolus, les autres constituent des actions ou des passions (112).
Nous avons également prouvé que les autres choses qu’on appelle des genres doivent être ramenées aux genres que nous avons reconnus (113).
Nous avons aussi parlé de la relation : nous avons dit que c’est une habitude, une manière d’être d’une chose à l’égard d’une autre, qui résulte du concours de deux choses; nous avons expliqué que, lorsqu’une habitude de la substance constitue un rapport, cette chose est un relatif, non en tant qu’elle est substance, mais en tant qu’elle est une partie de la substance, comme le sont la main, la tête, la cause, le principe ou l’élément (114). On peut diviser les relatifs suivant la méthode des anciens, dire que les uns sont des causes efficientes, que les autres sont des mesures, que ceux-ci consistent dans l’excès ou le défaut, que ceux-là se distinguent parleurs ressemblances et leurs différences.
Voilà ce que nous avions à dire sur les genres de l’être.
CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY.
28. We have demonstrated that acting and experiencing were movements; that, among the movements, some are absolute, while others constitute actions or passions.
We have also demonstrated that the other things that are called genera must be reduced to the genera we have set forth.
We have also studied relation, defining it as a habit, a “manner of being” of one thing in respect of another, which results from the co-operation of two things; we have explained that, when a habit of being constitutes a reference, this thing is something relative, not so much as it is being, but as far as it is a part of this being, as are the hand, the head, the cause, the principle, or the element. The relatives might be divided according to the scheme of the ancient (philosophers), by saying that some of them are efficient causes, while others are measures, that the former distinguish themselves by their resemblances and differences, while the latter consist in excess or in lack.
Such are our views about the (categories, or) genera (of existence).
28. We have already indicated that Activity and Passivity are to be regarded as motions, and that it is possible to distinguish absolute motions, actions, passions.
As for the remaining so-called genera, we have shown that they are reducible to those which we have posited.
With regard to the relative, we have maintained that Relation belongs to one object as compared with another, that the two objects coexist simultaneously, and that Relation is found wherever a substance is in such a condition as to produce it; not that the substance is a relative, except in so far as it constitutes part of a whole – a hand, for example, or head or cause or principle or element.
We may also adopt the ancient division of relatives into creative principles, measures, excesses and deficiencies, and those which in general separate objects on the basis of similarities and differences.
Our investigation into the kinds of Being is now complete.