If, therefore, there is a certain end [telos] of actions [praxis], which we wish [to obtain] for its own sake, but we desire other things on account of this, and our choice is not directed to all things for the sake of something else (for thus there would be a progression to infinity, so that appetite would -be empty and vain)—if this be the case, it is evident that this end will be the good [agathon], and that which is the most excellent [ariston]. Will not, therefore, the knowledge [gnosis] of this end be of great importance with respect to life [bios] ? For by having, like archers, a mark at which we may aim, we shall obtain what is fit in a greater degree. If this, however, be the case, we must endeavour to adumbrate what it is, and show to what science or power it belongs. But it would seem that it belongs to that power [dynamis] which is the most principal, and is especially architectonic. And the political [politike] power [or science] appears to be a thing of this kind. For this ordains what sciences [episteme] ought to be instituted in cities [polis], and which of them ought to be learnt by the several individuals, and to what extent. We likewise see that the most honourable of the powers or faculties are arranged under this power; as, for instance, the military [strategike], the economical [oikonomia], and the rhetorical [rhetorike] powers. Since, however, the remaining practical sciences use this political science, and since it also legally establishes what ought to be done, and from what it is requisite to abstain, the end of this science will comprehend in itself the ends of the other sciences; so that this will be human good [anthropinon agathon] itself. For though the good of an individual and a city is the same, yet to obtain and preserve the good of a city, appears to be something greater and more perfect. For we must be satisfied, indeed, if we can effect the good of an individual alone; but it is more beautiful and divine to effect the good of a nation and cities. These are the things, therefore, which the method being political requires.
Thomas Taylor: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS I-2
- Aristóteles (EN:1112a15-1112b25) – deliberação
- Aristóteles: Ética a Nicômaco
- Ética a Nicômaco (II, 1) – habituação – éthos
- Ética a Nicômaco (III, 1): ação voluntária e involuntária
- Ética a Nicômaco (VI, 3) – modos de desencobrimento – episteme
- Ética a Nicômaco (VI, 4) – produção e ação
- Ética a Nicômaco (VI, 5) – phronesis (prudência, sensatez)
- hexis (McEvilley)
- Hughes: Estilo e estrutura “Ética a Nicômaco”
- Thomas Taylor: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS