Thomas Taylor: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS I-6

Perhaps, however, it is better to consider universal good, and inquire how it is said to subsist, though such an inquiry as this will be arduous, because the men who have introduced ideas are our friends [VIDE]. But it may perhaps seem to be better, and indeed necessary to the salvation of truth, to subvert the opinions even of our friends. For both being our friends [i. e. Plato and truth,] it is holy to give the preference to truth. Those, however, who have introduced this opinion, do not make ideas of things in which they admit there are the prior and the posterior. Hence, neither do they establish an idea of numbers. But good is predicated of essence, of quality, and of relation. That, however, which has a subsistence per se, and essence, are naturally prior to that which subsists as a relative. For this [i. e. a relative] resembles the branch of a tree, and an accident of being; so that there will not be a common idea in these. Again, good is predicated in as many ways as being; for it is predicated in essence, as god and intellect, [which are essences and are said to be good;] and in quality, as the virtues; in quantity, as the moderate; in relation, as utility; in time, as occasion; and in place, as a habitation; and after the same manner in the other predicaments. It is evident, therefore, that there will not be a certain common universal and one good; for it would not be predicated in all the categories, but in one alone [VIDE]. Farther still, since of things which subsist according to one idea, there is also one science, of all goods there would be one certain science; but now there are many sciences of things which are under one category. Thus, for instance, with occasion the art of commanding an army is conversant in war, but the medical art in disease. And with the moderate indeed, the medical art is conversant in food, but the gymnastic art in labour [VIDE]. It may, however, be doubted what their intention is in denominating every idea itself since in man itself, and in man, there is one and the same definition of man; for so far as man there is no difference between them. But if this be the case, neither so far as good [will be good itself and goods differ ;]1 nor will it be in a greater degree good, from being eternal; since neither is that which is white for a long time, more white than that which is white only for one day.2 The Pythagoreans, however, appear to speak more probably concerning the good; for they place the one in the coordination of things good ; whom Speusippus also seems to have followed. But the discussion of these things pertains to another treatise [VIDE]. A certain doubt, however, presents itself concerning the particulars we have just mentioned, because reasons are not assigned concerning every good; but things which are of themselves the objects of pursuit and love, are predicated according to one species; and those things which are effective of these, or in a certain respect preserve them, or impede their contraries, are predicated on account of these, and after another manner. It is evident, therefore, that goods may be predicated in two ways; and that some things, indeed, are good per se, but others are good on account of these. Separating, therefore, goods per se from things useful, let us consider whether they are predicated according to one idea. But what kind of goods can be said to be good per se ? Are they such as are pursued alone, apart from other things, such as to be wise, to see, and some pleasures and honours ? For these, though we pursue them on account of something else, yet at the same time may be ranked by some one among goods which are good per se. Or is the good per se nothing else except idea ? Form, therefore, or idea, will be vain.3 But if these also rank among goods which are good per se, it will be requisite that the same definition of the good should be conspicuous in all of them, just as there is the same definition of whiteness in snow and ceruse ; but of honour, and prudence, and pleasure, there will be other and different definitions, so far as they are goods. The good, therefore, is not something common according to one idea.4 In what manner, however, is it said that there is one idea of the good ? For it does not resemble things which are fortuitously homonymous. Is it because all goods are from one and are referred to one good ? Or is it rather according to analogy ? For as sight is in the body, so is intellect in the soul, and another thing in another.5 Perhaps, however, these things must be omitted at present for the accurate discussion of them will be better adapted to another philosophy. And in a similar manner concerning idea. For even if there is some one good which is predicated in common, Or which is something itself separate by itself, it is evident that it can neither be practicable, nor acquired by man. But now that which is practicable by man, and which he may obtain, is the object of investigation. Perhaps, however, the knowledge of this separate good may to some one appear to be better with respect to those goods which may be acquired, and which are practicable. For having this as an exemplar, we may in a greater degree know those things which are good for us, and by knowing may more easily obtain them. This assertion, therefore, has indeed a certain probability, but it seems to be dissonant to the sciences. For all the sciences aspire after a certain good, and investigate that which is wanting, omitting the knowledge of it; though it is not reasonable to suppose that all artists are ignorant of and do not search for an aid of such great importance. It is likewise dubious what advantage a weaver or a carpenter would derive to their arts from the knowledge of the good itself; or how he who surveys the idea itself of the good, will become more skilled in medicine, or in commanding an army [VIDE]. For it appears that the physician does not in this way consider health, but that he considers the health of man, and perhaps rather the health of this particular man. For he restores to health an individual. And thus much concerning these things.


  1. In order to solve the doubt of Aristotle, it may be asked, how the good will be the same, and subsist after the same manner, in an immaterial and material nature, in an image and its paradigm, in that which is simple, and that which is composite, and in that which subsists according to participation, and that which is imparticipable ? Or how can there be the same definition of the very nature of a thing, in things so separated from each other as we have mentioned, unless the image and its archetype received the definition of essence after the same manner ? Besides, according to Aristotle himself, in things material and physical, the definition is then perfect when matter and form concur with each other; but if we should assume the same definitions in things immaterial, immaterial will be material natures. This, however, is impossible. There will not, therefore, be the same definitions of things prior to material, and material entities. 

  2. It may, however, be said in answer to this, that eternal good is in a greater degree good than that which is ephemeral. For if being is to every thing better than non-being, to exist perpetually will be better than to exist only for a time; since when existence is cut off from that which exists only for a time, then it is not being, but non-being ; and the eternal then existing, is better than non-being. A more excellent good, however, is said to be more excellent by intension; but that in which the essence of good has intension, is in a greater degree good. Neither is there the same comparison with each other, of that which endures for a long, with that which endures for a short time, and of the eternal with that which continues only for a day. For that which continues for a short, and that which continues for a long time, may partake of the same nature; but that which is eternal, and that which is ephemeral, cannot. For as that which is ephemeral consists of a material and flowing essence, and is indeed passing into existence, but never really is, so the eternal consists of an immaterial and unflowing essence, and has real being, and is above generation. 

  3. If, however, to be wise, to see, the pleasure arising from contemplation, and the honour of wise men, are, as Aristotle says, goods per se, yet they are not so per se as subsisting from and by themselves, as the archetypes of other things which are images, and energizing so as to generate things similar to themselves ; for such are the prerogatives of ideas according to Plato. But they are said to be per se, not as essences, but as things to be pursued on their own account. Aristotle, therefore, cannot be serious in what he says, since the objection is sophistical, arising from the term per se being predicated multifariously. 

  4. If, however, according to Aristotle, those things are good per se, which are alone objects of pursuit, and are mot desired for the sake of something else, and this definition according to him is adapted to all the goods he has enumerated, and to such others as are of the same kind, will there not be one definition in all of them so far as they are goods ? For the question is not whether so far as honour, and wisdom, and pleasure, there is no one definition of them, but whether there is one definition of them so far as they are goods. What hinders then there being a certain idea of good per se, to which goods per se are referred ? And, in the next place, each of these is not said to be good by an equal measure, as neither are all white things said to be equally white. For as these are said to be white from the participation of one colour, whiteness, and there is one definition indeed of whiteness, but the participation of this is not effected after the same manner in all of them, thus, also, there is one idea of goods, of which all goods per se participate, so that there is the same definition in them, so far as they participate of the same form. The good, however, which is participated is one thing, and that which is surveyed by itself, and has an imparticipable subsistence, or a subsistence not con-subsistent with any thing subordinate, is another; to which the multitude of resemblances, and which differ from each other, are referred. For that each of many goods is and is said to be good from participation is evident from this, that each of these is not equally good. But there being participation? it is evident that it will be according to the imparticipable, to which the participations are referred. 

  5. Ideas do not subsist in this way, but as things which are from themselves, and as wholes and paradigms. Each, likewise, is one with respect to a multitude which participates of, is referred to, and resembles it. The similitude, however, of the participants of ideas to ideas themselves is not convertible. For here the image resembles its archetype, but the archetype by no means resembles the image ; since if this were the case, as there would be a common similitude between the two, another idea would be requisite from which this similitude is derived, and thus there would be a procession to infinity.