I. One kind of intelligence is the intellectual perception of another thing, but another is the perception of a thing by itself, or when a thing perceives itself; the latter of which flies in a greater degree from duplicity, or doubleness in intellection. But the former wishes also to avoid this diversity, but is less able to accomplish its wish. For it has indeed with itself that which it sees, but it is different from itself. That, however, which intellectually perceives itself, is not separated essentially from the object of its perception, but being co-existent with it sees itself. Both, therefore, become one being. Hence it perceives in a greater degree because it possesses that which it perceives. It is also primarily intellective, because that which perceives intellectually ought to be both one and two. For if it is not one, that which perceives will be one thing, and that which is intellectually perceived another. Hence it will not be primarily intellective, because in consequence of receiving the intellectual perception of another thing, it will not possess that which it perceives, as something belonging to itself; so that the thing perceived will not be the per-ceiver itself. Or if it should possess it as itself, in order that it may properly perceive intellectually, two things will be one. Hence it is necessary that both should be one. Or if there is indeed one thing, but again, this one does not consist of two things, it will not possess intelligence; so that neither will it perceive intellectually. Hence it is necessary that the nature which is intellective should be simple and at the same time not simple. He, however, who ascends from soul will in a greater degree apprehend -that an intellective nature is a thing of this kind. For here [i.e. in soul] it is easy to divide, and duplicity may here be easily perceived. If some one, therefore, should make a twofold light, soul, indeed, according to the less pure, but the intelligible of it according to the purer light, and afterwards should cause that which sees to be a light equal to that which is seen, not having any further occasion to separate by difference, — he who does this, will admit that these two are one. And this perceives intellectually, indeed, because it is two things; but it sees because it is now one thing. Thus, therefore, such a one will apprehend intellect and the intelligible. Hence we, by a reasoning process, have made two things from one. On the contrary, however, it is two things from one, because it intellectually perceives, making itself to be two; or rather being two because it intellectually perceives; and because it is one thing [being intellective].
II. If, therefore, there is that which is primarily intellective, and also that which is after another manner [i.e. secondarily] intellective, that which is beyond the first intelligent nature, will not perceive intellectually. For it is necessary that it should become intellect in order that it may have intellectual perception. But being intellect it will also have the intelligible. And if it is primarily intellective, it will have the intelligible in itself. It is not, however, necessary that whatever is intelligible should have that which is intellective in itself, and perceive intellectually. For in this case, it will not only be intelligible, but also intellective. But being two things it will not be that which is first. Intellect, likewise, which possesses the intelligible, could not subsist without the existence of an essence which is purely intelligible; and which with respect to intellect, indeed, will be intelligible, but with reference to itself will be properly neither intellective, nor intelligible. For that which is intelligible, is intelligible to another thing. And intellect which darts itself forward by intelligence would have a vacuum, unless it received and comprehended in itself the intelligible which it intellectually perceives. For it is not intellective without the intelligible. Hence it is then perfect when it possesses the intelligible. It is necessary, however, prior to its perceiving intellectually, that it should have with itself a perfect essence. Hence, that with which the perfect is essentially1 present, will be perfect prior to intellectual perception. To this, therefore, nothing of intellectual perception is necessary. For prior to this it is sufficient to itself. Hence it does not perceive intellectually. There is, therefore, that which is not intellective; there is also that which is primarily-intellective; and there is that which is intellective in a secondary degree. Farther still, if that which is first perceives intellectually, something is present with it. Hence it is not the first, but that which is second. It is also not one, but is now many; and is all such things as it intellectually perceives. For if it only intellectually perceived itself, it would be many.1
III. If, however, it should be said, that nothing hinders this same thing which is the first from being many, we reply that in these many there will be a subject. For it is not possible for the many to subsist, unless the one exists, from which, or in which they subsist; or in short, unless there is a one which is prior to other things that are numbered among themselves, and which it is necessary to receive itself in itself alone. But if it subsists in conjunction with other things, it is necessary having received this with other things, but which at the same time is different from them, that we should suffer it to be with other things, but that we should also investigate this subject, no longer in conjunction with other things of which it is the subject, but itself by itself. For that which is the same in other things, will indeed be similar to this, but will not be this.2 It is necessary, however, that it should be alone, if it is to be seen in other things, unless it should be said that the being of it has its hypostasis in conjunction with other things. Hence, there will not be that which is itself simple; nor will there be that which is composed of many things. For since that which is simple has no subsistence, neither will that which is a composite of many things subsist. For because each simple thing is unable to exist, no one certain simple thing subsisting from itself, hence since that which is multitudinous is not able to have an hypostasis by itself, nor to impart itself to another thing, because it has no existence, how can there be that which is composed of all things, when it must consist of nonentities, which are not merely negations of a certain thing, but have no subsistence whatever ? If, therefore, a certain thing is multitude, it is necessary there should be one prior to the many. Hence, if that which is intellective is a certain multitude, it is necessary that there should not be intellectual perception in that which is not1 multitude. This, however, is the first [principle of things]. In the natures, therefore, posterior to it, there will be intellectual perception and intellect.
IV. Farther still, if it is necessary that the good should be simple and unindigent, it will not be in want of intellectual perception. But that which is not necessary to it, will not be present with it; since, in short, nothing is present with it. Intellectual perception, therefore, will not be inherent in it, because neither will any thing else. Besides, intellect is something different from the good. For it becomes bom-form by the intellectual perception of the good. Again, as in two things where there is one aud another thing, it is not possible for this one which subsists in conjunction with something else to be the one itself, but it is necessary that the one which is one by itself, should be prior to that which is with another; thus also it is necessary, that where a certain one which is in a certain respect simple subsists in conjunction with another thing, there should prior to it be tlie one which is perfectly simple, and which has nothing in itself of the things contained in that which subsists in conjunction with others. For whence could one thing be another, unless prior to these that had a separate subsistence, from which the thing that is another is derived ? For that which is simple, cannot be derived from another. But that which is multitudinous or two, must necessarily be suspended from another thing. Hence, that which is first may be assimilated to light; that which is next to it, to the sun; but that which is the third, to the moon, deriving light from the sun. For soul, indeed, has an adventitious intellect, which, as soul is of an intellectual nature, colours it [with a light derived from the good]. Intellect, however, contains in itself an appropriate light of its own; for it is not light alone, but that which is illuminated essentially. But that which imparts this light, since it is not any thing else, is a simple light, affording to intellect the power of existing that which it is. Why, therefore, should this simple light be in want of any thing ? For it is not the same with that which is in another; since that which is in another is different from that which subsists itself by itself.
V. Farther still, that which is multitudinous will seek: itself, and will wish to verge to and be co-sentient of itself. Where, however, will that which is entirely one proceed to itself ? And where will it be in want of co-sensation ? For this same thing is more excellent than all co-sensation and inteDection. For intellectual perception is not the first of things, either with respect to existence, or dignity of nature; but it is the second thing, and generated posterior to the subsistence of the good. As soon as generated, also, it moved itself towards the good. But being moved towards, it also knew it. And intellectual perception is this, viz. a motion towards the good, and an aspiration after it. For desire generated intelligence, and is consubsistent with it. For sight is the desire of seeing. The good, therefore, is not at all in want of intellectual perception. For there is not any thing else beside itself which is the good of it; since when that also which is different from the good intellectually perceives it, it does this in consequence of being boniform, and possessing a simibtude to the good. It bkewise intellectually perceives that which it sees, as good and desirable to itself; and in consequence of receiving as it were the imagination of good. And if it is always thus affected, it is alway this [i.e. it is always boniform]. For again, in the intellection of itself, it accidentally perceives the good. For looking to the good, it intellectually sees it, and also sees itself energizing. But the energy of all things is directed to the good.
VI. If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, intelligence will have no place whatever in the good. For the good which is present with an intellective1 nature is different from the good itself. Hence the good is unenergetic. For why is it necessary that energy should energize ? For in short, no energy whatever has again energy. But if to other energies which are directed to another thing, we attribute something else, it is however necessary, that the first energy from which other energies are suspended, should be that very thing which it is, and that nothing else should be added to it. An energy, therefore, of this kind is not intellectual perception. For it does not possess that which it intellectually perceives ; since it is the first energy. In the next place, neither does intelligence intellectually perceive, but that which possesses intelligence. Again, therefore, two things take place in that which perceives intellectually. But that which is first is by no means two. Farther still, the truth of this may be seen in a still greater degree by him who considers how this twofold nature subsists in every thing which is more clearly intellective. For we say, indeed, that beings as beings, that each thing itself [by itself,] and truly existing beings, are in the intelligible place; and this not merely because some things abide invariably the same in essence, but others, and these are such as are in the sensible region, continually flow and are not permanent. For perhaps there are some things in sensibles of a permanent nature. But we assert this of intelligibles, because they possess the perfection of existence. For it is necessary that the essence which is primarily so called, should not be the shadow of existence, but should have the fulness of being. Existence, however, is then full, when it receives the form of intellectual perception, and of life. Hence, in [real] being, to perceive intellectually, to live, and to exist, are consubsistent. If, therefore, it is being, it is also intellect, and if it is intellect it is being. And intellectual perception is simultaneous with existence. Hence, to perceive intellectually is many things, and not one thing. It is necessary, therefore, that with the nature which is not a thing of this kind, there should not be intellectual perception. Hence, among the several forms contained in true beings, there are man, and the intellectual perception of man; horse, and the intellectual perception of horse; the just, and the intellection of the just. Hence too, all things there are double, and the one is two. And again, two passes into one. But that which is the first of things is not either of these; nor does it consist of all the things which are two; nor is it, in short, two. It has been, however, elsewhere shown by us, how two derives its subsistence from the one. But since the one is beyond essence, it is also beyond intellectual perception. There will be no absurdity therefore, in asserting that the one does not know itself. For being one it does not possess with itself that which it may learn. But neither is it necessary that it should kuow other things. For it imparts to them something better and greater than the knowledge of them; and this is the good of other things. But it rather imparts to them the ability, as much as possible, of coming into contact with it in the same thing.
The intelligible is prior to intelligence; for the former is characterized by essence, but the latter by intellect. And being is prior to intellect. The intelligible, however, contains in itself intellect casually. Hence it has a knowledge which is beyond intellect. Much more, therefore, is the ineffable principle of things, who is beyond the intelligible, above the possession of intellectual perception. For his knowledge like his nature is more impartible than every centre, and more ineffable than all silence. For it is, if it be lawful so to speak, a darkness which transcends all gnostic illumination. Hence by energizing about it, knowledge is refunded into ignorance. ↩
For the imparticipable or exempt one, is not consubsistent with any thing, but the participable one is consubsistent either with being, or life, or intellect, or soul, or body. See my translation of Proclus ” Elements of Theology.” ↩