Plotino – Tratado 2,4 (IV, 7, 4) — A alma não é nem sopro nem uma “maneira de ser”

4. Mas mesmo eles [Estoicismo] são conduzidos pela verdade a testemunhar que deve haver uma forma de alma [psyche] anterior aos corpos [soma] e superior a eles, quando colocam que o sopro [pneuma] possui um intelecto [noûs] e que é um fogo [pyr] inteligente. É como se, sem fogo nem sopro, aquilo que tem um nível superior não poderia ser contado entre as realidades, e buscasse um lugar onde se estabelecer. Mas o que eles deveriam buscar, é ao invés onde estabelecer estes corpos, que devem o ser nas potências [dynamis] da alma. Mas se se supõe que a vida [zoe] e a alma não são outra coisa senão o sopro, o que é então esta “maneira de ser” [pos echon] da qual eles não param de falar e junto a qual eles se refugiam quando são obrigados a colocar uma natureza ativa diferente dos corpos? Se portanto todo sopro não é uma alma, pois existe inumeráveis sopros que não são almas, então eles dirão que a alma é um sopro que tem “uma certa maneira de ser”, e eles adicionarão seja que esta “maneira de ser”, quer dizer esta disposição, é alguma coisa, seja que ela nada é. Em realidade, se a “maneira de ser” nada é, a alma seria somente um sopro e a maneira de ser não seria senão uma palavra. Mas eles se encontrariam então na obrigação de dizer que a alma e o deus nada são senão palavras enquanto só a matéria existe. Mas se os seres têm uma disposição outra que o substrato [hypokeimenon] e a matéria [hyle], e se esta disposição se encontra na matéria sem todavia ser ela mesma material posto que ela não é por sua parte composta de matéria, então ela será uma “razão” [logos] e não um corpo, e isto será uma outra natureza. E a impossibilidade que a alma seja um corpo qualquer se torna ainda mais manifesta pelas razões seguintes. Um corpo é um efeito quente ou frio, duro ou mole, líquido ou sólido, negro ou branco, e assim em relação a todas as qualidades corporais que diferem segundo elas seja em tal ou tal corpo. E se o corpo é somente quente, ele aquece; se é somente frio, ele esfria, assim a vinda e a presença do leve produzem a leveza, o pesado pesa, o negro negreja e o branco branqueia. Pois não é próprio do fogo esfriar, assim como não do frio esquentar. Mas a alma produz por sua parte efeitos diferentes segundo os seres vivos; e por vezes mesmo efeitos contrários no mesmo ser vivo. Ela endurece partes e amolece outras, ela torna algumas densas e outras raras, algumas negras e outras brancas, algumas leves e outras pesadas. E no entanto, se a alma fosse um corpo, ela não deveria produzir [poiein] senão um só efeito, em função de cada qualidade de seu corpo, e principalmente de sua cor [chromo]. Mas é um fato que ela produz vários.

4. Los mismos (estoicos), conducidos por la verdad, confiesan que es conveniente, antes incluso que los cuerpos, una forma de alma que sea superior a ellos, dado que, en su opinión, su soplo es algo inteligente y un verdadero fuego intelectual. Consideran así que la parte mejor de los seres no podría existir realmente sin un fuego y sin un soplo, por lo que tendría que buscar un lugar donde instalarse en él. Ahora bien, más justo sería buscar dónde habrán de radicar los cuerpos y cómo conviene verdaderamente que estén situados en las potencias del alma. Si afirman, en efecto, que la vida y el alma no son otra cosa que el soplo, ¿en qué consiste entonces para ellos esa famosa manera de ser a la que recurren, obligados como están a admitir una naturaleza activa diferente a los cuerpos? Supuesto que todo soplo no sea un alma, dado que existen miles de soplos inanimados, pero admitido lo que ellos dicen de que el alma es el soplo con una cierta manera de ser, habrá que concluir que esa disposición es una realidad o bien que no es nada. Pero si no es nada, el soplo existe solo y la manera de ser no es de hecho más que un hombre. Por este camino llegarán a afirmar que no hay nada más que la materia, y que tanto el alma como Dios son meros nombres, puesto que sólo existe la materia.

Ahora bien; si la disposición de los seres es algo distinto a su fundamento y a su materia, y si se da en la materia no obstante su carácter de inmaterial, puesto que no está compuesta de ella, habrá naturalmente una razón que no sea un cuerpo, sino algo diferente a él. Además, según lo que vamos a decir, no resulta menos manifiesto que es imposible que el alma sea un cuerpo cualquiera. Porque vamos a suponer que se tratase de un cuerpo cálido o frío, duro o blando, líquido o sólido, negro o blanco, dotado por otra parte de todas las cualidades propias de los cuerpos. De ser un cuerpo cálido, lo único que haría sería calentar; de ser un cuerpo frío, tan sólo enfriaría. Y, en el caso de que le correspondiese la ligereza, se aplicaría siempre a ella, lo mismo que si fuese pesado haría pesado todo lo demás. O ennegrecería, si fuese negro, o extendería su blancura, si fuese blanco. Porque no es propio del fuego el enfriar, ni tampoco del frío el calentar. Mas el alma actúa de manera diferente en unos y otros animales, e incluso en un mismo animal produce cosas realmente contrarias, haciendo por ejemplo sólidas algunas de sus partes y líquidas otras, condensando unas veces, rarificando otras, emblanqueciendo y ennegreciendo, aligerando o volviendo pesado lo que sea preciso. Y, sin embargo, parece que debiera producir tan sólo un único efecto, de acuerdo con las cualidades de su cuerpo y, en especial, con su color; pero está visto que produce varios.

IF THE SOUL IS NOT SIMPLE MATTER, SHE MUST BE A SUBSTANTIAL FORM.

4. (f) (If the soul is anything but simple matter, she must be constituted by a substantial form.) Those who claim that the soul is a body are, by the very force of the truth, forced to recognize the existence, before and above them, of a form proper to the soul; for they acknowledge the existence of an intelligent spirit, and an intellectual fire (as do the Stoics, following in the footsteps of Heraclitus, Stobaeus). According to them, it seems that, without spirit or fire, there cannot be any superior nature in the order of beings, and that the soul needs a location where she may be built up. On the contrary, it is bodies alone that need to be built up on something, and indeed, they are founded on the powers of the soul. If really we do believe that the soul and life are no more than a spirit, why add the qualification “of a certain characteristic,” (Eneada-II, 4, 1) a meaningless term employed when forced to admit an active nature superior to that of bodies. As there are thousands of inanimate spirits, not every spirit is a soul. If only that spirit is a soul which possesses that “special characteristic,” this “special characteristic” and this “manner of being” will either be something real, or will be nothing. If they are nothing, there will be nothing real but spirit, and this alleged “manner of being” is nothing more than a word. In that system, therefore, nothing but matter really exists. God, the soul, and all other things are no more than a word; the body alone really subsists. If, on the contrary, that “manner of being” is something real, if it is anything else than substrate or matter, if it resides in matter without being material or composed of matter, it must then be a nature different from the body, namely, a reason (by a pun) (Eneada-II-6).

THE BODY EXERTS A UNIFORM ACTION, WHILE THE SOUL EXERTS A VARIED ONE.

(g.) (The body exerts an uniform action, while the soul exerts a very diverse action.) The following considerations further demonstrate the impossibility of the soul being a body. A body must be hot or cold, hard or soft, liquid or solid, black or white, or qualities differing according to its nature. If it is only hot or cold, light or heavy, black or white, it communicates its only quality to what comes close to it; for fire could not cool, nor ice heat. Nevertheless, the soul produces not only different effects in different animals, but contrary effects even in the same being; she makes certain things solid, dense, black, light, and certain others liquid, sparse, white, or heavy. According to the different quality of the body, and according to its color, she should produce but a single effect; nevertheless, she exerts a very diverse action.

4. Our opponents themselves are driven by stress of fact to admit the necessity of a prior to body, a higher thing, some phase or form of soul; their “pneuma” [finer-body or spirit] is intelligent, and they speak of an “intellectual fire”; this “fire” and “spirit” they imagine to be necessary to the existence of the higher order which they conceive as demanding some base, though the real difficulty, under their theory, is to find a base for material things whose only possible base is, precisely, the powers of soul.

Besides, if they make life and soul no more than this “pneuma,” what is the import of that repeated qualification of theirs “in a certain state,” their refuge when they are compelled to recognize some acting principle apart from body? If not every pneuma is a soul, but thousands of them soulless, and only the pneuma in this “certain state” is soul, what follows? Either this “certain state,” this shaping or configuration of things, is a real being or it is nothing.

If it is nothing, only the pneuma exists, the “certain state” being no more than a word; this leads imperatively to the assertion that Matter alone exists, Soul and God mere words, the lowest alone is.

If on the contrary this “configuration” is really existent – something distinct from the underlie or Matter, something residing in Matter but itself immaterial as not constructed out of Matter, then it must be a Reason-Principle, incorporeal, a separate Nature.

There are other equally cogent proofs that the soul cannot be any form of body.

Body is either warm or cold, hard or soft, liquid or solid, black or white, and so on through all the qualities by which one is different from another; and, again, if a body is warm it diffuses only warmth, if cold it can only chill, if light its presence tells against the total weight which if heavy it increases; black, it darkens; white, it lightens; fire has not the property of chilling or a cold body that of warming.

Soul, on the contrary, operates diversely in different living beings, and has quite contrary effects in any one: its productions contain the solid and the soft, the dense and the sparse, bright and dark, heavy and light. If it were material, its quality – and the colour it must have – would produce one invariable effect and not the variety actually observed.

IV. Compelled by truth, the authors of the above mentioned hypothesis also testify, that it is necessary there should be a certain form of soul prior to and more excellent than bodies. For they introduce a spirit endued with intellect, and an intellectual fire, as if it was not possible there could be a better condition among beings without fire and spirit, and without a place in which it might be established, though they ought to have investigated where bodies are to be placed; for it is necessary that these should be established in the powers of soul. But if they assert that life and soul are nothing else than a spirit or wind, we must enquire what this celebrated spirit introduced by them is, and how it subsists. For they are compelled to fly to this when they admit that there is another efficacious nature besides bodies. If therefore not every spirit is soul, because there are myriads of inanimate spirits, but a spirit subsisting after a certain manner is according to them soul, we ask them whether they say that such a spirit and this habitude is something belonging to beings, or nothing. But if indeed it is nothing, it will be a name alone. And its subsistence after a certain manner will be also merely a name, and thus it will be an accident to beings. Hence, according to them nothing but matter will have an existence, and soul, deity, and every thing [except matter] will be merely names. If, however, habitude is something pertaining to beings, and different from a subject and from matter, and subsists indeed in matter, but is itself immaterial, because it is not again composed from matter; — if this be the case, it will be a certain reason [or productive principle] and will not be body, but of another nature. Farther still, from the following considerations it will be no less manifest that it is impossible for soul to be any body whatever. For it would either be hot or cold, or hard, or soft, or moist, or firm, or black, or white, and all such different qualities as are in different bodies. And if indeed it is hot alone, it will alone heat; if cold alone, it will alone refrigerate. If also it is alone light, it will by its presence cause things to be light; if heavy, it will alone render them heavy; if black, it will blacken; and if white, will cause them to be white. For it is not the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of cold to produce heat. But soul produces different effects in different animals, and contrary effects in the same animal; fixing some things, but diffusing others. And some things indeed it causes to be dense, but others rare, black, white, light and heavy; though from the nature of one body it ought to produce one quality only, and not different qualities. But now it produces many qualities.