Plotino – Tratado 29,1 (IV, 5, 1) — Intermediário entre o órgão e o objeto sensível

1. Como hemos diferido considerar si puede ciertamente verse sin ayuda de ningún medio interpuesto, como por ejemplo el aire o cualquier otro cuerpo transparente, parece llegada la hora de que examinemos la cuestión.

Hemos dicho ya que tanto la visión como, en general, toda sensación, se verifican por intermedio de un cuerpo. El alma, si no cuenta con la colaboración del cuerpo, se mantiene por entero en el mundo inteligible; pero, como sentir es percibir, no realmente las cosas inteligibles, sino tan sólo las cosas sensibles, el alma debe estar en contacto con las cosas sensibles, y valerse de los medios que tengan semejanza con ellas para tratar de conocerlas y experimentarlas. Esta es la razón por la cual el conocimiento de las cosas sensibles se realiza por órganos corpóreos. Y precisamente por medio de estos órganos, combinados ininterrumpidamente a ella, mantiene el alma de algún modo su unidad con las cosas sensibles, basada en la comunidad de afectos entre ella misma y estas cosas.

Veamos, pues: ¿conviene en verdad un contacto del órgano con las cosas conocidas? Parece obvio formularse la cuestión en cuanto a las cosas conocidas por el tacto, pero tratamos aquí de la visión — del oído trataremos más adelante — y hemos de preguntarnos a este respecto si para ver hay necesidad de un cuerpo intermedio entre el ojo y el color.

Podría haber, sin duda, un cuerpo que hiriese el órgano por accidente, pero que, sin embargo, no sirviese para la visión. Ahora bien, si los cuerpos densos, tales como los cuerpos terrestres, son un impedimento para la visión, y si, por otra parte, cuanto más sutil es el medio, mejor vemos en realidad, ¿no deberá ser considerado el medio como un auxiliar de la visión o, al menos, como algo que no la impide? Mas, podría también contestarse, esos mismos medios de que hablamos constituyen un obstáculo para la visión. El cuerpo intermedio es el primero que recibe la afección sensible y, consiguientemente, su misma impronta. Prueba de ello es que si alguno se encuentra delante de nosotros y dirige su mirada hacia un color, ve decididamente ese color, el cual no llegaría hasta nosotros si no contase con el cuerpo intermedio.

Pero no es necesario de todo punto que el medio se vea afectado. Basta que la afección sea experimentada por el órgano, si está en su naturaleza el recibirla, puesto que, en el caso de que el medio la experimente, la recibirá sin duda de manera diferente. Así, por ejemplo, una caña colocada entre mi mano y un pez torpedo no experimenta lo mismo que sufre mi mano, aunque podría decirse que, si no existiese la caña o la crin, mi mano no se vería afectada. El hecho mismo, con todo, ofrece serias dudas, porque se afirma de los pescadores que tienen un torpedo en sus redes que sienten incluso su entumecimiento. Parece posible hablar aquí de un caso de simpatía, porque cuando es propio de la naturaleza de un ser sufrir la influencia de otro por la semejanza que mantiene con él, el medio no sufre esa afección si no es precisamente por razón de semejanza, y, aun en el caso de sufrirla, la sufre desde luego de distinta manera. Si esto es así, el ser que por naturaleza deba ser afectado por otro, lo será en mucho mayor grado cuando no exista ningún ser intermedio, e incluso, de existir éste, aunque pueda naturalmente recibir la afección.

I. Comme nous avons différé de rechercher s’il est possible de voir sans un milieu, tel que l’air ou ce qu’on appelle le corps diaphane, nous allons maintenant examiner cette question.

Nous avons déjà dit que l’âme ne peut voir et sentir en général que par l’intermédiaire d’un corps : car, lorsqu’elle est complètement séparée du corps, elle vit dans le monde intelligible. Comme sentir consiste à percevoir, non les choses intelligibles, mais seulement les choses sensibles, il faut que l’âme, étant en quelque sorte en contact avec les choses sensibles, ait avec elles un rapport de connaissance ou d’affection au moyen d’intermédiaires qui possèdent une nature analogue ; c’est pourquoi la connaissance des corps s’acquiert au moyen d’organes corporels. Par ces organes, qui sont liés ensemble ou continus de manière à former une espèce d’unité, l’âme approche des choses sensibles, en sorte qu’il s’établit entre elle et ces choses une communauté d’affection (ὁμοπαθεία). Qu’il doive y avoir contact entre l’organe et l’objet connu, c’est évident pour les objets tangibles, mais c’est douteux pour les objets visibles. Le contact est-il aussi nécessaire pour l’ouïe, c’est une question que nous discuterons plus tard [§ 5]. Pour le moment, nous allons examiner si, pour voir, il est nécessaire qu’il y ait un milieu entre l’œil et la couleur.

S’il y a un milieu, c’est par accident ; il ne contribue en rien à la vision ¹. Puisque les corps opaques, les corps terreux, par exemple, empêchent de voir, et que nous voyons d’autant mieux que le milieu est plus subtil, on pourra dire que les milieux contribuent à la vision, ou que du moins, s’ils n’y contribuent pas, ils ne sont pas un obstacle ; mais on pourra dire également [en se fondant sur le même fait] qu’ils sont un obstacle.

Examinons si [comme on le prétend] le milieu reçoit le premier et transmet l’affection et en quelque sorte l’empreinte. À l’appui de cette opinion, on dira que, si quelqu’un se tient devant nous en dirigeant ses regards vers la couleur, il la voit aussi ; or la couleur ne parviendrait pas jusqu’à nous si le milieu n’éprouvait pas une affection ². — Il ne semble pas nécessaire que l’affection soit éprouvée par le milieu, puisqu’elle est déjà éprouvée par l’œil, dont la fonction consiste précisément à être affecté par la couleur ; ou du moins, si le milieu est affecté, c’est d’une autre manière que l’œil. En effet, le roseau interposé entre la main et le poisson nommé torpille n’éprouve pas la même affection que la main ; cependant, la main ne serait pas affectée, si le roseau ne se trouvait interposé entre elle et le poisson ³. Le fait d’ailleurs donne lieu à examen : car si le pêcheur était dans le filet, il ressentirait encore de la torpeur. Cette question paraît se rapporter aux affections sympathiques (συμπαθείαι). Si tel être peut en vertu de sa nature être affecté sympathiquement par tel autre être, il ne s’en suit pas que le milieu, s’il est différent, partage l’affection ; tout au moins, il n’est pas affecté de la même manière. En ce cas, l’organe destiné à éprouver l’affection l’éprouve bien mieux quand il n’y a pas de milieu, lors même que le milieu est lui-même susceptible d’éprouver quelque affection.

IT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER AN INTERMEDIARY BODY BE IMPLIED BY VISION.

1. Above we suggested the question whether it be possible to see without some medium such as the air or a diaphanous body; we shall now try to consider it. It has already been asserted that in general the soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some body; for, when completely separated from the body (the soul dwells in the intelligible world). But, as touch consists of perception, not indeed of intelligible entities, but only of sense-objects, the soul in order to come in contact with these sense-objects, must enter into cognitive or affective relation with them by the means of intermediaries which must possess an analogous nature; and that is why the knowledge of bodies must be acquired by the means of corporeal organs. Through these organs which are so interrelated as to form a sort of unity, the soul approaches sense-objects in a manner such as to establish effective communion. That contact between the organ and the cognized object must be established is evident enough for tangible objects, but is doubtful for visible objects. Whether contact be necessary for hearing is a question we shall have to discuss later. Here we shall first discuss whether sight demand a medium between the eye and color.

REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE’S INSISTENCE ON A MEDIUM OF SIGHT.

If a medium of sight exist, it exists only by accident, and in no way contributes to sight. Since opaque and earthy bodies hinder sight, and as we see so much the better as the medium is more subtle, it may be said, indeed, that mediums contribute to sight, or at least, if they do not contribute such thereto, they may be hindrances as slight (as possible); but evidently a medium, however refined, is some sort of an obstacle, however slight.

THOUGH THE MEDIUM EXPERIENCE AFFECTION, THE ORGANS FEEL IT BETTER WITHOUT THE MEDIUM.

(There is an opinion that) the medium first receives and then transmits the affection, and impression. For instance, if some one stand in front of us, and directs his gaze at some color, he also sees it; but the color would not reach us unless the medium had experienced the affection. To this it may be answered that there is no necessity for the affections to be experienced by the medium, inasmuch as the affection is already experienced by the eye, whose function consists precisely in being affected by color; or at least, if the medium be affected, its affection differs from that of the eye. For instance, a reed interposed between the hand and the fish called the “torpedo,” or “electric ray,” does not feel the same numbness which it nevertheless communicates to the holding hand; still, the hand would not be affected with numbness unless the reed formed a communication between the fish and the hand. However, the matter is not beyond discussion, for (even without any intermediary, if for instance) the fisher were in (direct contact) with the “ray” inside of the net, he would also feel the electric numbness. This communication therefore seems based on sympathetic affections. That, by virtue of its nature, one being can be sympathetically affected by some other being, does not necessarily imply that the medium, if different, shares that affection; at least (it is certain that) it is not affected in the same manner. In such a case, the organ destined to experience the affection experiences it far better when there is no medium, even when the medium itself is susceptible to some affection.

1. We undertook to discuss the question whether sight is possible in the absence of any intervening medium, such as air or some other form of what is known as transparent body: this is the time and place.

It has been explained that seeing and all sense-perception can occur only through the medium of some bodily substance, since in the absence of body the soul is utterly absorbed in the Intellectual Sphere. Sense-perception being the gripping not of the Intellectual but of the sensible alone, the soul, if it is to form any relationship of knowledge, or of impression, with objects of sense, must be brought in some kind of contact with them by means of whatever may bridge the gap.

The knowledge, then, is realized by means of bodily organs: through these, which [in the embodied soul] are almost of one growth with it, being at least its continuations, it comes into something like unity with the alien, since this mutual approach brings about a certain degree of identity [which is the basis of knowledge].

Admitting, then, that some contact with an object is necessary for knowing it, the question of a medium falls to the ground in the case of things identified by any form of touch; but in the case of sight – we leave hearing over for the present – we are still in doubt; is there need of some bodily substance between the eye and the illumined object?

No: such an intervening material may be a favouring circumstance, but essentially it adds nothing to seeing power. !

Dense bodies, such as clay, actually prevent sight; the less material the intervening substance is, the more clearly we see; the intervening substance, then, is a hindrance, or, if not that, at least not a help.

It will be objected that vision implies that whatever intervenes between seen and seer must first [and progressively] experience the object and be, as it were, shaped to it; we will be reminded that [vision is not a direct and single relation between agent and object, but is the perception of something radiated since] anyone facing to the object from the side opposite to ourselves sees it equally; we will be asked to deduce that if all the space intervening between seen and seer did not carry the impression of the object we could not receive it.

But all the need is met when the impression reaches that which is adapted to receive it; there is no need for the intervening space to be impressed. If it is, the impression will be of quite another order: the rod between the fisher’s hand and the torpedo fish is not affected in the same way as the hand that feels the shock. And yet there too, if rod and line did not intervene, the hand would not be affected – though even that may be questioned, since after all the fisherman, we are told, is numbed if the torpedo merely lies in his net.

The whole matter seems to bring us back to that sympathy of which we have treated. If a certain thing is of a nature to be sympathetically affected by another in virtue of some similitude between them, then anything intervening, not sharing in that similitude, will not be affected, or at least not similarly. If this be so, anything naturally disposed to be affected will take the impression more vividly in the absence of intervening substance, even of some substance capable, itself, of being affected.