tradução desde Míguez
1. Diz-se que o mundo é eterno e que teve e terá sempre o mesmo corpo. Se damos como razão disto a vontade de Deus, é possível que não nos enganemos, mas, contudo, não nos procuramos nenhuma evidência. Por outro lado, oferece-se a transformação dos elementos e, na terra, os animais são presas da destruição. Salvando-se dela tão somente a espécie, coisa que não se entenderá de outro modo no universo, pois o universo possui também um corpo, que sempre se mostra fugidio e fluente. Em meio desta mudança constante, deus pode conservar um mesmo tipo específico, mas o que salva com isso não é a unidade enquanto ao número, senão a unidade mesma enquanto à espécie. Mas, por que as coisas deste mundo hão de possuir somente a eternidade enquanto à espécie, enquanto as coisas do céu a possuem individualmente? Será por que o céu o abarca totalmente que nada há no sujeito para mudar e que nada exterior pode assim mesmo destruí-lo? Encontraremos aqui a causa de sua incorruptibilidade? É claro que poderíamos nos referir à incorruptibilidade do todo, mas o sol e os astros são unicamente partes dele e não constituem cada um um universo. Eis aqui, pois, que nosso raciocínio não é uma prova de sua existência eterna, com o que procederá concedê-los esta enquanto à espécie, o mesmo que fazemos com o fogo e as demais coisas análogas; e igual acontece com o mundo todo. Pois se é certo que nada exterior o destrói, embora suas partes se destruam mutuamente nada impede que nesta destruição constante conserve a identidade de sua espécie e, fluente e toda sua substância, ou recebida de fora o sinal daquela, poderá ocorrer com o universo o mesmo que ocorre com o homem, o cavalo e os demais animais; porque é evidente que sempre há algum homem ou cavalo, sem que se possa dizer que seja o mesmo. Sob esta suposição, não se daria no universo uma parte, como o céu, que existe sempre, e outra, como as coisas da terra, realmente perecedora; tudo pareceria da mesma maneira, e a diferença se mostraria tão somente no tempo, com a ressalva de que as coisas celestes alcançariam uma duração muito maior. Se damos por certo que esta é a única eternidade possível, tanto no todo como nas partes, nossa opinião se faz menos difícil; e mais, toda dificuldade desapareceria por completo se pudéssemos chegar a mostrar que, neste caso, resulta suficiente a vontade divina. Agora bem, se afirmamos que o universo, seja o que seja, é de si eterno, convirá adicionar que a vontade divina pode realmente produzir isto, com o qual seguirão existindo as mesmas dificuldades, já que umas partes serão eternas individualmente e outras por outro lado o serão quanto a sua espécie. O que dizer, por exemplo, das partes do céu? Porque, como elas, haverá que considerar também a seu conjunto.
Míguez
1. Dícese que el mundo es eterno y que tuvo y tendrá siempre el mismo cuerpo. Si damos como razón de esto la voluntad de Dios, es posible que no nos engañemos, pero, con todo, no nos procuramos ninguna evidencia. Por otra parte, ofrécese la transformación de los elementos y, en la tierra, los animales son presa de la destrucción. Salvándose de ella tan sólo la especie, cosa que no se entenderá de otro moda en el universo, pues el universo posee también un cuerpo, que siempre se muestra huidizo y fluyente. En medio de este cambio constante, Dios puede conservar un mismo tipo específico, pero lo que salva con ello no es la unidad en cuanto al número, sino la unidad misma en cuanto a la especie. Más, ¿por qué las cosas de este mundo han de poseer sólo la eternidad en cuanto a la especie, en tanto las cosas del cielo la poseen individualmente? ¿Será porque el cielo lo abarca todo que nada hay en él sujeto a cambio y que nada exterior puede asimismo destruirle? ¿Encontraremos aquí la causa de su incorruptibilidad? Es claro que podríamos referirnos a la incorruptibilidad del todo, pero el sol y los astros son únicamente partes de él y no constituyen cada uno un universo. He aquí, pues, que nuestro razonamiento no es una prueba de su existencia eterna, con lo que procederá concederles ésta en cuanto a la especie, lo mismo que hacemos con el fuego y las demás cosas análogas; e igual acontece con el mundo todo. Pues si es cierto que nada exterior le destruye, aunque sus partes se destruyan mutuamente nada impide que en esta destrucción constante conserve la identidad de su especie y, fluyente y todo su sustancia, o recibida de fuera la señal de aquélla, podrá ocurrir con el universo lo mismo que ocurre con el hombre, el caballo y los demás animales; porque es evidente que hay siempre algún hombre o caballo, sin que pueda decirse que sea el mismo. Bajo este supuesto, no se daría en el universo una parte, como el cielo, que existe siempre, y otra, como las cosas de la tierra, realmente perecedera; todo perecería de la misma manera, y la diferencia se mostraría tan sólo en el tiempo, con la salvedad de que las cosas celestes alcanzarían una duración mucho mayor. Si damos por bueno que ésta es la única eternidad posible, tanto en el todo como en las partes, nuestra opinión se hace menos difícil; y es más, toda dificultad desaparecería por completo si pudiésemos llegar a mostrar que, en este caso, resulta suficiente la voluntad divina. Ahora bien, si afirmamos que el universo, sea el que sea, es de suyo eterno, convendrá añadir que la voluntad divina puede realmente producir esto, con lo cual seguirán existiendo las mismas dificultades, ya que unas partes serán eternas individualmente y otras en cambio lo serán en cuanto a su especie. ¿Qué decir, por ejemplo, de las partes del cielo? Porque, como ellas, habrá que considerar también a su conjunto.
Bouillet
Si l’on admet que le monde, être corporel, a toujours existé et existera toujours, et que l’on rapporte à la volonté de Dieu la cause de sa perpétuité, on énoncera peut-être une chose vraie, mais on n’expliquera rien. Puisque ici bas les éléments changent, que les animaux meurent sans que la forme de l’espèce périsse, ne doit-on pas se demander s’il n’en est pas de même pour l’univers, si, en admettant que son corps soit soumis à un flux et à un écoulement perpétuels, la volonté divine ne peut lui conserver la même forme spécifique malgré ses altérations . successives, en sorte que, sans avoir perpétuellement l’unité numérique, il conserve toujours l’unité spécifique de la forme? Comment se fait-il en effet qu’ici bas, dans les animaux, la forme de l’espèce soit seule perpétuelle, tandis qu’on regarde l’individualité du ciel et des astres comme perpétuelle aussi bien que leur forme?
Si nous attribuons l’incorruptibilité du ciel à ce qu’il comprend toutes choses dans son sein 1, à ce qu’il n’existe aucune autre chose en laquelle il puisse se changer, à ce qu’il ne saurait rencontrer rien d’extérieur qui puisse le détruire, nous expliquerons par là d’une manière raisonnable l’incorruptibilité du ciel considéré comme tout, comme univers; mais nous ne ferons pas voir clairement la raison de la perpétuité du soleil et des autres astres qui sont des parties du ciel au lieu d’être comme lui le tout, l’univers. Il semblera que. les astres et le monde considéré comme univers ne doivent posséder qu’une perpétuité de forme comme le feu et les substances de même nature. Rien n’empêche en effet que le ciel, sans rencontrer rien d’extérieur qui le détruise, ne soit, par cela seul que ses parties se détruisent les unes les autres, soumis à une destruction perpétuelle et qu’il ne conserve rien d’identique que la forme ; dans ce cas, sa substance, étant dans un flux perpétuel, recevrait sa forme d’un autre principe, et nous verrions arriver dans l’animal universel ce qui a lieu dans l’homme, dans le cheval et dans les autres animaux : l’homme [considéré comme espèce] dure toujours, ainsi que le cheval, mais ce n’est pas toujours- le même [individu] qui subsiste. [D’après cette hypothèse], il n’y aura pas dans l’univers une partie toujours permanente, comme le ciel, une autre sans cesse changeante, comme les choses terrestres; toutes ces choses seront soumises à la même condition, ne différant entre elles que par leur durée plus ou moins longue, puisque les corps célestes sont plus durables. Si nous admettons que telle est la perpétuité propre à l’univers et à ses parties, notre opinion présentera moins d’ambiguïté nous ferons même disparaître toute espèce de doute si nous démontrons que la puissance divine est capable de contenir l’univers de cette manière. Si au contraire nous avançons qu’il y a dans le monde quelque chose qui soit perpétuel par son individualité, nous aurons à démontrer que la volonté divine peut produire un tel effet. Mais il restera encore à répondre à cette question : pourquoi certaines choses sont-elles toujours identiques [par leur forme et leur individualité], tandis que les autres ne sont identiques que par leur forme ? Comment se fait-il que les parties du ciel seules soient toujours les mêmes [par leur individualité] ? Car il semble que toutes Ies autres choses devraient rester également identiques [sous le rapport de l’individualité].
Guthrie
HEAVEN, THOUGH IN FLUX, PERPETUATES ITSELF BY FORM.
1. Nothing will be explained by the perfectly true (Stoic) statement that the world, as corporeal being that ever existed and that will ever exist, is indebted for the cause of its perpetuity to the volition of the divinity. We might find an analogy between the change of the elements, and the death of animals without the perishing of the form of the species here below, and the universe above, whose body is subject to a perpetual flux and flow. Thus the divine volition could preserve for it the same specific form in spite of successive alterations, so that, without perpetually retaining numerical unity, it would ever preserve the specific unity of form. It would indeed be a remarkable discrepancy in the methods of nature that here below in animals the form alone should be perpetual, while in the heaven and the stars their individuality should be considered as perpetual as their form.
THERE MUST INEVITABLY BE CHANGE IN HEAVEN.
The incorruptibility of the heaven has been ascribed to its containing within its breast all things, and to the non-existence of any other thing into which it could change, as well as to the impossibility of its meeting anything exterior that could destroy it. These theories would indeed, in a reasonable manner, explain the incorruptibility of heaven considered as totality, and universe; but would fail to explain the perpetuity of the sun and of the other stars which are parts of heaven, instead of being the whole universe, as is the heaven. It would seem more reasonable that, just like the fire and similar things, the stars, and the world considered as universe would possess a perpetuity chiefly of form. It is quite possible that the heaven, without meeting any destructive exterior thing, should be subjected to a perpetual destruction such that it would preserve nothing identical but the form, from the mere mutual destruction of its parts. In this case its substrate, being in a perpetual flux, would receive its form from some other principle; and we would be driven to recognize in the universal living Organism what occurs in man, in the horse, and in other animals; namely, that the man or horse (considered as species) lasts forever, while the individual changes. (According to this view, then) the universe will not be constituted by one ever permanent part, the heaven, and another ceaselessly changing one, composed of terrestrial things. All these things will then be subject to the same condition though they might differ by longer or shorter duration, since celestial bodies are more durable. Such a conception of the perpetuity characteristic of the universe and its parts contains less ambiguity (than the popular notion), and would be freed from all doubt if we were to demonstrate that the divine power is capable of containing the universe in this manner. The theory that the world contains something perpetual in its individuality would demand not only a demonstration that the divine volition can produce such an effect, but also an explanation why certain things (according to that theory) are always identical (in form and individuality), while other things are identical only by their form. If the parts of the heaven alone remained identical (by their individuality), all other things also should logically remain (individually) identical.
MacKenna
1. We hold that the ordered universe, in its material mass, has existed for ever and will for ever endure: but simply to refer this perdurance to the Will of God, however true an explanation, is utterly inadequate.
The elements of this sphere change; the living beings of earth pass away; only the Ideal-form [the species] persists: possibly a similar process obtains in the All.
The Will of God is able to cope with the ceaseless flux and escape of body stuff by ceaselessly reintroducing the known forms in new substances, thus ensuring perpetuity not to the particular item but to the unity of idea: now, seeing that objects of this realm possess no more than duration of form, why should celestial objects, and the celestial system itself, be distinguished by duration of the particular entity?
Let us suppose this persistence to be the result of the all-inclusiveness of the celestial and universal – with its consequence, the absence of any outlying matter into which change could take place or which could break in and destroy.
This explanation would, no doubt, safeguard the integrity of the Whole, of the All; but our sun and the individual being of the other heavenly bodies would not on these terms be secured in perpetuity: they are parts; no one of them is in itself the whole, the all; it would still be probable that theirs is no more than that duration in form which belongs to fire and such entities.
This would apply even to the entire ordered universe itself. For it is very possible that this too, though not in process of destruction from outside, might have only formal duration; its parts may be so wearing each other down as to keep it in a continuous decay while, amid the ceaseless flux of the Kind constituting its base, an outside power ceaselessly restores the form: in this way the living All may lie under the same conditions as man and horse and the rest man and horse persisting but not the individual of the type.
With this, we would have no longer the distinction of one order, the heavenly system, stable for ever, and another, the earthly, in process of decay: all would be alike except in the point of time; the celestial would merely be longer lasting. If, then, we accepted this duration of type alone as a true account of the All equally with its partial members, our difficulties would be eased – or indeed we should have no further problem – once the Will of God were shown to be capable, under these conditions and by such communication, of sustaining the Universe.
But if we are obliged to allow individual persistence to any definite entity within the Kosmos then, firstly, we must show that the Divine Will is adequate to make it so; secondly, we have to face the question, What accounts for some things having individual persistence and others only the persistence of type? and, thirdly, we ask how the partial entities of the celestial system hold a real duration which would thus appear possible to all partial things.