Míguez
42. Así, pues, cuando os surja alguna dificultad en esta cuestión y cuando os preguntéis dónde conviene colocar esas realidades a las que os conduce el pensamiento, dejadlas que recaigan en los seres de segundo rango que estimáis venerables y no atribuyáis al Ser Primero cosas que van bien con los seres que le siguen, como tampoco a los seres de segundo rango cosas que correspondan a los del tercero. Lo que deberá hacerse es colocar los seres de tercer rango alrededor de los de segundo rango. Y así dejaréis a cada ser en su lugar y suspenderéis las cosas posteriores de las primeras, no de otro modo que si aquéllas hubiesen de dar vueltas alrededor de las que permanecen en sí mismas. Por lo cual dice (Platón) justamente que “todas las cosas giran alrededor del rey de todo y existen por él” 1 .
Y al decir “todas las cosas” quiere hacerse referencia a todos los seres, lo mismo que cuando se dice “por él” se habla de una causa, puesto que los seres tienden hacía Aquel que es distinto de todos ellos y que nada tiene de lo que ellos mismos tienen. Y éstos ya no serían ciertamente todos los seres si en Aquél estuviese presente algo de lo que ellos poseen. Por tanto, si la Inteligencia es alguno de estos seres, Aquél no posee la Inteligencia. Cuando dice (Platón) que es la causa de todas las cosas hermosas, hace que lo bello se aparezca en las ideas y lo coloca por encima de toda belleza. Al colocar las cosas hermosas en el segundo rango, da a entender que las que vienen después, esto es, las del tercer rango están suspendidas de aquéllas. Es claro, por otra parte, que coloca alrededor de las cosas del tercer rango las que provienen realmente de él, y es así como pone el mundo en un alma.
Digamos, por tanto, que el alma está suspendida de la Inteligencia y la Inteligencia del Bien. Todo queda, pues, referido al Bien aunque por términos intermedios que, o le están próximos, o son vecinos de los que le están próximos. A la distancia mayor nos encontramos con las cosas sensibles, que están adheridas al alma.
Bouillet
XLII, Quand vous êtes embarrassé à ce sujet, et que vous cherchez ce que vous devez faire de ces attributs auxquels le raisonnement vous amène, rejetez ce que vous regardez comme vénérable dans les choses du second ordre; n’attribuez ainsi au Premier rien de ce qui appartient aux choses du second ordre; n’attribuez pas non plus à celles du second ordre [à l’Intelligence] ce qui appartient à celles du troisième [à l’Ame] ; mais rapportez au Premier principe les choses du second ordre, et au second principe les choses du troisième ordre. C’est le vrai moyen de laisser chaque être garder sa nature, et de marquer en même temps le lien qui unit les choses inférieures aux choses supérieures, en montrant que les choses inférieures dépendent des supérieures, tandis que les supérieures demeurent en elles-mêmes. Voilà pourquoi Platon a eu raison de dire: «Toutes choses » sont autour du Roi de tout et existent à cause de lui (157) ; » toutes choses, c’est-à-dire : tous les êtres; toutes choses existent à cause de lui, c’est-à-dire : il est la cause de leur existence et l’objet de leur désir parce qu’il est d’une autre nature qu’elles, qu’il n’a en lui rien de ce qui se trouve en elles, puisqu’elles ne sauraient exister si le Premier possédait quelque attribut de ce qui lui est inférieur. Donc, si l’Intelligence est comprise dans ce qui est appelé toute choses, elle ne saurait appartenir au Premier. Quand Platon appelle Dieu la cause de toute beauté (158), il paraît placer le Beau dans les Idées, et le Bien au-dessus du Beau universel (159). Après avoir ainsi assigné le second rang aux Intelligibles, il fait dépendre de ceux-ci les choses du troisième ordre, qui ne viennent qu’après eux. Enfin, à ce qui occupe le troisième rang, à l’Ame universelle, il rapporte le monde qui en naît. Comme l’Ame dépend de l’Intelligence, et que l’Intelligence dépend du Bien, toutes choses dépendent ainsi du Bien à des degrés divers, immédiatement ou médiatement. A cet égard, les choses lupins éloignées du Bien sont les choses sensibles, lesquelles se rapportent à l’Ame.
Guthrie
THE BEAUTIFUL THE SUPREME OF THREE RANKS OF EXISTENCE.
42. When you are in doubt about this matter, and when you wonder how you should classify these attributes to which reasoning has brought you, reject from among the things of the second order what seems venerable; attribute to the First none of the things that belong to the second order; neither attribute to those of the second order (that is, to Intelligence), what belongs to those of the third (that is, to the Soul); but subsume under the firsfirst Principle the things of the second order, and under the second principle the things of the third. That is the true means of allowing each being to preserve its nature, and at the same time to point out the bond that connects the lower things with the higher, and showing thus that the inferior things depend on the superior ones, while the superior ones remain in themselves. That is why (Plato) was right in saying, “All things surround the King of all, and exist on his account.” “All things” means “all beings.” “All things exist on his account” means that He is the cause of their existence, and the object of their desire, because His nature is different from theirs, because in Him is nothing that is in them, since they could not exist if the First possessed some attribute of what is inferior to Him. Therefore, if Intelligence be comprised within what is meant by “all things,” it could not belong to the First. When (in the same place Plato calls the divinity) “the cause of all beauty,” he seems to classify beauty among the Ideas, and the Good above the universal beauty. After thus having assigned the intelligible (entities) to the second rank, he classifies, as dependent on them, the things of the third order, which follow them. Last, to that which occupies the third rank, to the universal Soul, he subsumes the world that is derived therefrom. As the Soul depends on the Intelligence, and as Intelligence depends on the Good, all things thus depend from the Good in different degrees, mediately or immediately. In this respect, the things which are the most distant from the Good are the objects of sense, which are subsumed under the Soul.
MacKenna
42. Faced by the difficulty of placing these powers, you must in reason allocate to the secondaries what you count august: secondaries must not be foisted upon the First, or tertiaries upon the secondaries. Secondaries are to be ranged under the First, tertiaries under the secondaries: this is giving everything its place, the later dependent on their priors, those priors free.
This is included in that true saying “About the King of All, all has being and in view of Him all is”: we are to understand from the attribution of all things to Him, and from, the words “in view of Him” that He is their cause and they reach to Him as to something differing from them all and containing nothing that they contain: for certainly His very nature requires that nothing of the later be in Him.
Thus, Intellectual-Principle, finding place in the universe, cannot have place in Him. Where we read that He is the cause of all beauty we are clearly to understand that beauty depends upon the Forms, He being set above all that is beautiful here. The Forms are in that passage secondaries, their sequels being attached to them as dependent thirds: it is clear thus that by “the products of the thirds” is meant this world, dependent upon soul.
Soul dependent upon Intellectual-Principle and Intellectual-Principle upon the Good, all is linked to the Supreme by intermediaries, some close, some nearing those of the closer attachment, while the order of sense stands remotest, dependent upon soul.