Phi. The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding the original statement, but I still feel the defect of which I just now complained.
Soc. Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the argument ?
Phi. Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long asking.
Soc. Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question which, as you say, you have been so long asking ?
Phi. How so ?
Soc. Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom ?
Phi. Certainly.
Soc. And we maintain that they are each of them one ?
Phi. True.
Soc. And the precise question to which the previous discussion desires an answer is, how they are one and also many [i.e., how they have one genus and many species], and are not at once infinite, and what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into infinity.
Pro. That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall answer him ; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let us consider, then, what we are to do : — Socrates, if I understood him rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom.
Soc. Most true, O son of Callias ; and the previous argument showed that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest use in any enquiry.
Pro. That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment ? I will tell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you answered — No, not those, but another class of goods ; and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art and the like. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled ; and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back ; cease then to fight against us in this way.
Soc. In what way ?
Phi. Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we have not as yet any sufficient answer to give ; let us not imagine that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider, then, whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their kinds ; or you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our controversy.