Categoria: Enéada IV
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Igal: Tratado 4,1 (IV,2,1) – A realidade da alma
1. En lo que hemos investigado sobre la esencia del alma pudimos mostrar que no es un cuerpo, ni tan siquiera, entre los seres incorpóreos, lo que consideramos la armonía o la entelequia de un cuerpo. Esto último no es verdad, tal como se dice, ni tampoco nos indica lo que es el alma, cuya…
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Guthrie: Tratado 4,2 (IV,2,2) — A alma tanto divisível quanto indivisível
SOUL AS BOTH ESSENTIALLY DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE. 2. Such then the nature of the soul had to be. She could not be either purely indivisible, nor purely divisible, but she necessarily had to be both indivisible and divisible, as has just been set forth. This is further proved by the following considerations. If the soul,…
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Guthrie: Tratado 4,1 (IV,2,1) — Esboço do estudo psicológico de IV, 7
OUTLINE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF IV, 7. 1. While studying the nature (“being”) of the soul, we have shown (against the Stoics) that she is not a body; that, among incorporeal entities, she is not a “harmony” (against the Pythagoreans); we have also shown that she is not an “entelechy” (against Aristotle), because this…
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Thomas Taylor: Tratado 4,2 (IV,2,2) — Analise dicotômica da divisibilidade e da indivisibilidade da alma
II. That it is necessary, however, that the nature of soul should be a thing of this kind, and that it is not possible for soul to be any thing besides this, being neither alone impartible, nor alone partible, but that it is necessarily after this manner both these, is manifest from the following considerations.…
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Thomas Taylor: Tratado 4,1 (IV,2,1) — A realidade da alma
I. In investigating the essence of soul, if we show that it is neither body, nor the harmony in incorporeal natures; and likewise if we omit what is said of its being the entelecheia,1 or perfection of the body, as not true, as the words (taken literally) imply, and as not manifesting what the soul…
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MacKenna: Tratado 4,2 (IV,2,2) — Analise dicotômica da divisibilidade e da indivisibilidade da alma
2. It can be demonstrated that soul must, necessarily, be of just this nature and that there can be no other soul than such a being, one neither wholly partible but both at once. If it had the nature of body it would consist of isolated members each unaware of the conditions of every other;…
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MacKenna: Tratado 4,1 (IV,2,1) — A realidade da alma
1. In our attempt to elucidate the Essence of the soul, we show it to be neither a material fabric nor, among immaterial things, a harmony. The theory that it is some final development, some entelechy, we pass by, holding this to be neither true as presented nor practically definitive. No doubt we make a…
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Bouillet: Tratado 4 (IV, 2) – COMMENT L’ÂME TIENT LE MILIEU ENTRE L’ESSENCE INDIVISIBLE ET L’ESSENCE DIVISIBLE
(I) Entre l’essence complètement divisible, dont chaque partie occupe un lieu différent, et l’essence complètement indivisible, dont chaque partie est identique au tout et n’occupe aucun lieu, est une essence intermédiaire, qui, d’un côté, devient divisible dans le corps auquel elle s’unit (sans se partager cependant avec lui comme la forme matérielle), et, d’un autre…
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Enéada IV, 2, 2 – Analise dicotômica da divisibilidade e da indivisibilidade da alma
Capítulo 2: Analise dicotômica da divisibilidade e da indivisibilidade da alma. 5-35. Exame das consequências da hipótese segundo a qual a alma seria somente divisível. Demonstração de sua impossibilidade. 35-39. Demonstração da impossibilidade da hipótese adversa segundo a qual a alma seria exclusivamente indivisível. 39-49. Conclusão: a alma é ao mesmo tempo divisível e indivisível.…
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Enéada IV, 2, 1 – A realidade da alma
Capítulo 1: A realidade da alma 1-10. Resumo das conclusões do Tratado-2 (IV,7): a alma (psyche) é uma realidade divina (theion) e inteligível (noeton). 11-17. O sensível (aisthesis) é dividido. 17-29. O inteligível é indivisível. 29-41. A alma é uma realidade intermediária, ao mesmo tempo indivisível (ameriston) e divisível (meriston). 41-45. A alma é indivisível…
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Enéada IV, 2 – Sobre a realidade da alma (I)
Plotin Traités 1-6. Coordenação da tradução de Luc Brisson e Jean-François Pradeau, Garnier-Flammarion, 2002. Plano detalhado do tratado Capítulo 1: A realidade da alma (psyche) 1-10. Resumo das conclusões: a alma é uma realidade divina (theion) e inteligível (noeton). 11-17. O sensível (aisthesis) é dividido. 17-29. O inteligível (noeton) é indivisível. 29-41. A alma é…
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Guthrie: Tratado 4 (IV, 2) – How the Soul Mediates Between Indivisible and Divisible Essence.
FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. How the Soul Mediates Between Indivisible and Divisible Essence.
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MacKenna: Tratado 4 (IV, 2) — Sobre a realidade da alma (I)
The Fourth Ennead Second tractate. On the essence of the soul (2).
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Tratado 04 (IV,2) – Sobre a realidade da alma (I)
Plotin Traités 1-6. Tradução de Luc Brisson e Jean-François Pradeau, Garnier-Flammarion, 2002. Este tratado é a sequência do Tratado-2, do qual prossegue a conclusão propondo uma definição da alma. Como os últimos capítulos do Tratado-2 lhe deram a ocasião, Plotino diz aqui da alma que ela é uma realidade indivisível, incorruptível e imortal. Esta tese…
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Igal: Tratado 27 (IV, 3, 9-19) — SOBRE LAS DIFICULTADES ACERCA DEL ALMA I
9. Habrá que investigar ahora cómo se introduce el alma en el cuerpo, mejor dicho, cómo y de qué manera. Esto no puede menos de suscitar nuestra admiración y de estimular nuestra búsqueda. Porque de dos modos puede entrar el alma en el cuerpo. En primer lugar, puede ocurrir que el alma se encuentre ya…
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Self – Our Selves – Their Foundation in Nous and Relationship to Universal Soul (Armstrong Selections from the Enneads)
IV. 3- 5 (We remain ourselves in the world of Nous; our particular personalities at their highest are Intellect-Forms in Nous, distinct without separation and united without losing their individuality; on these our souls depend, being expressions of them on a lower and more divided level of being.) But how will there still be one…
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Plotino: Os nervos iniciam no cérebro
The organs of touch are at the ends of the nerves, which also have the power of moving the living creature; it is there that the soul offers itself in that capacity. The nerves start in the brain (enkephalos) and it is there that people locate the principles of perception, impulse and of the whole…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,31 (IV,3,31) — Isto que se lembram as almas; a sua saída do corpo (2)
32. But the memory of friends, children, wife? Country too, and all that the better sort of man may reasonably remember? All these, the one (the lower man) retains with emotion, the authentic man passively: for the experience, certainly, was first felt in that lower phase from which, however, the best of such impressions pass…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,31 (IV,3,31) — Isto que se lembram as almas; a sua saída do corpo (1)
31. But if each of the two phases of the soul, as we have said, possesses memory, and memory is vested in the imaging faculty, there must be two such faculties. Now that is all very well as long as the two souls stand apart; but, when they are at one in us, what becomes…