Categoria: Enéada I
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Guthrie: Tratado 53,11 (I, 1, 11) — Princípio superior nem sempre usado
THE SUPERIOR PRINCIPLE NOT ALWAYS UTILIZED. 11. But is the superior principle not “ours” also? Surely, but only when we are conscious thereof; for we do not always utilize our possessions. This utilization, however, takes place when we direct this middle part of our being towards either the upper or lower worlds, and when we…
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Guthrie: Tratado 53,12 (I, 1, 12) — A alma tanto impassível como punível
THE SOUL BOTH IMPASSIBLE AND PUNISHABLE. 12. There is a contradiction between our own former opinion that the soul cannot sin, and the universally admitted belief that the soul commits sins, expiates them, undergoes punishments in Hades, and that she passes into new bodies. Although we seem to be in a dilemma, forcing us to…
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Guthrie: Tratado 53,13 (I, 1, 13) — A relação entre o «nós» e a alma
RELATION OF THE “WE” AND THE “SOUL.” 13. Is it “we” or the “soul” which makes these researches? It is we, by means of the soul. The cause of this is, not we who consider the soul because we possess her, but that the soul considers herself. This need not imply motion, as it is…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,13 (I, 1, 13) — Subject of philosophical research
13. And the principle that reasons out these matters? Is it We or the Soul? We, but by the Soul. But how “by the Soul”? Does this mean that the Soul reasons by possession (by contact with the matters of enquiry)? No; by the fact of being Soul. Its Act subsists without movement; or any…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,12 (I, 1, 12) — Impeccability
12. But if Soul is sinless, how come the expiations? Here surely is a contradiction; on the one side the Soul is above all guilt; on the other, we hear of its sin, its purification, its expiation; it is doomed to the lower world, it passes from body to body. We may take either view…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,11 (I, 1, 11) — Conversion
11. In childhood the main activity is in the Couplement and there is but little irradiation from the higher principles of our being: but when these higher principles act but feebly or rarely upon us their action is directed towards the Supreme; they work upon us only when they stand at the mid-point. But does…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,10 (I, 1, 10) — Duality of “us” and purification
10. It will be objected, that if the Soul constitutes the We (the personality) and We are subject to these states then the Soul must be subject to them, and similarly that what We do must be done by the Soul. But it has been observed that the Couplement, too- especially before our emancipation- is…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,9 (I, 1, 9) — Impeccability of the soul and responsability of “us”
9. That Soul, then, in us, will in its nature stand apart from all that can cause any of the evils which man does or suffers; for all such evil, as we have seen, belongs only to the Animate, the Couplement. But there is a difficulty in understanding how the Soul can go guiltless if…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,8 (I, 1, 8) — “Us” and superior realities
8. And towards the Intellectual-Principle what is our relation? By this I mean, not that faculty in the soul which is one of the emanations from the Intellectual-Principle, but The Intellectual-Principle itself (Divine-Mind). This also we possess as the summit of our being. And we have It either as common to all or as our…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,7 (I, 1, 7) — Constitution of the couple
7. The truth lies in the Consideration that the Couplement subsists by virtue of the Soul’s presence. This, however, is not to say that the Soul gives itself as it is in itself to form either the Couplement or the body. No; from the organized body and something else, let us say a light, which…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,6 (I, 1, 6) — Theory of powers
6. It may seem reasonable to lay down as a law that when any powers are contained by a recipient, every action or state expressive of them must be the action or state of that recipient, they themselves remaining unaffected as merely furnishing efficiency. But if this were so, then, since the Animate is the…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,5 (I, 1, 5) — Subject of passions
5. Now this Animate might be merely the body as having life: it might be the Couplement of Soul and body: it might be a third and different entity formed from both. The Soul in turn- apart from the nature of the Animate- must be either impassive, merely causing Sense-Perception in its yoke-fellow, or sympathetic;…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,4 (I, 1, 4) — Subject of passions is a mix of soul and body
4. Let us consider, then, the hypothesis of a coalescence. Now if there is a coalescence, the lower is ennobled, the nobler degraded; the body is raised in the scale of being as made participant in life; the Soul, as associated with death and unreason, is brought lower. How can a lessening of the life-quality…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,3 (I, 1, 3) — Soul using the body as instrument
3. We may treat of the Soul as in the body- whether it be set above it or actually within it- since the association of the two constitutes the one thing called the living organism, the Animate. Now from this relation, from the Soul using the body as an instrument, it does not follow that…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,2 (I, 1, 2) — Subject of passions is the soul
2. This first enquiry obliges us to consider at the outset the nature of the Soul – that is whether a distinction is to be made between Soul and Essential Soul (between an individual Soul and the Soul-Kind in itself).1 If such a distinction holds, then the Soul (in man) is some sort of a…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53,1 (I, 1, 1) — Question of subject
1. Pleasure and distress, fear and courage, desire and aversion, where have these affections and experiences their seat? Clearly, either in the Soul alone, or in the Soul as employing the body, or in some third entity deriving from both. And for this third entity, again, there are two possible modes: it might be either…
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Guthrie: Tratado 53 (I,1) — The Organism and the Self.
FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK ONE. The Organism and the Self.1 TOPICS Psychologic distinctions in soul. The soul as a composite aggregate. The soul is not essence. The soul uses the body as tool. Separation of soul from body. Primitive relation between soul and body. Consequences of mixture of soul and body. Mixture of soul and body.…
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MacKenna: Tratado 53 (I, 1) – THE ANIMATE AND THE MAN.
The First Ennead First Tractate. THE ANIMATE AND THE MAN.
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Igal: Tratado 53,2 (I, 1, 2) — O sujeito das paixões é somente a alma
2. Pero primero hay que estudiar el alma. El alma y la esencia de alma ¿son dos cosas distintas? Porque si lo son, el alma será un compuesto, y ya no será absurdo —si, aun en este caso, lo permitiere el razonamiento— que el alma reciba y que sea ella el sujeto de tales emociones…
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Igal: Tratado 53,3 (I, 1, 3) — A alma usando o corpo como um instrumento
3. De todos modos, hay que suponer que el alma está en el cuerpo1, sea que exista antes que el cuerpo, sea que exista en el cuerpo, pues de la unión del cuerpo y del alma «el conjunto recibió el nombre de animal»2. Pues bien, si el alma se vale del cuerpo como de instrumento,…