Platão e platonismo

Categoria: Enéada-II-4

  • MacKenna: Tratado 12,8 (II,4,8) — A natureza da matéria sensível

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    8. What, then, is this Kind, this Matter, described as one stuff, continuous and without quality? Clearly since it is without quality it is incorporeal; bodiliness would be quality. It must be the basic stuff of all the entities of the sense-world and not merely base to some while being to others achieved form. Clay,…

  • Bouillet: Tratado 12 (II, 4) – DE LA MATIÈRE

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    (§ I) Les philosophes s’accordent à définir la matière la substance, le sujet, le réceptacle des formes. Mais les uns [les Stoïciens] regardent la matière comme un corps sans qualité ; les autres [les Pythagoriciens, les Platoniciens, les Péripatéticiens] la croient incorporelle ; quelques-uns de ces derniers en distinguent deux espèces, la substance des corps…

  • Enéada II, 4, 1 — Considerações iniciais sobre a matéria

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    Capítulo 1: Introdução 1-4. Considera-se em geral a matéria como um substrato e um receptáculo das formas. 4-6. Mas não há entendimento sobre a natureza desta matéria e sobre aquilo que ela recebe. 6-18. Teorias dos estoicos, aristotélicos e platônicos. 1. Lo que llamamos materia es el sujeto y el receptáculo de las formas; ésa…

  • MacKenna: Tratado 12,7 (II,4,7) — Refutação das teorias pré-platônicas sobre a matéria

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    7. Empedokles in identifying his “elements” with Matter is refuted by their decay. Anaxagoras, in identifying his “primal-combination” with Matter – to which he allots no mere aptness to any and every nature or quality but the effective possession of all – withdraws in this way the very Intellectual-Principle he had introduced; for this Mind…

  • Enéada II, 4, 16 — A matéria, a alteridade, a privação e o mal

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    16. ¿Sería la materia idéntica a la alteridad? No, desde luego, sino a esa parte de ella que se opone a los seres por excelencia, esto es, a las razones formales. El no-ser es, por tanto, algo, y puede identificarse con la privación, si la privación es la antítesis de los seres que se dan…

  • Enéada II, 4 – Sobre as duas matérias

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    Plotin Traités 7-21. Dir. Trad. Luc Brisson e Jean-François Pradeau. GF-Flammarion, 2003. Plano detalhado do tratado: Capítulo 1: Introdução 1-4. Considera-se em geral a matéria como um substrato e um receptáculo das formas. 4-6. Mas não há entendimento sobre a natureza desta matéria e sobre aquilo que ela recebe. 6-18. Teorias dos estoicos, aristotélicos e…

  • MacKenna: Tratado 12,5 (II,4,5) — Sobre a matéria e a forma

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    5. It may be objected that the Intellectual-Principle possesses its content in an eternal conjunction so that the two make a perfect unity, and that thus there is no Matter there. But that argument would equally cancel the Matter present in the bodily forms of this realm: body without shape has never existed, always body…

  • Enéada II, 4, 15 — A matéria e o ilimitado

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    15. Convendrá investigar de nuevo, si lo ilimitado y lo indeterminado se encuentran accidentalmente en la materia como en otra naturaleza, cómo pueden realmente ser accidentes y si la privación es también un accidente. Si todos los números y todas las nociones que con ellos tienen relación caen fuera de lo infinito — porque el…

  • Duas Matérias

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    II. 4. 5 (Armstrong Selection and Translation from the Enneads) [The difference between matter in the Intelligible World (the unformed living potency of Soul or Noûs, turning in a timeless process to that which is above it to receive form) and the dead matter of the world of the senses.] The botton of each and…

  • MacKenna: Tratado 12,4 (II,4,4) — A matéria inteligível existe

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    4. The present existence of the Ideal-Forms has been demonstrated elsewhere: we take up our argument from that point. If, then, there is more than one of such forming Ideas, there must of necessity be some character common to all and equally some peculiar character in each keeping them distinct. This peculiar characteristic, this distinguishing…