Categoria: Enéada-II-4
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Corpo Informado
Segundo Brisson & Pradeau (2002, p.128), o corpo para Plotino é o resultado de uma informação parcial da matéria. É uma razão (logos) originária da alma que é a causa da existência do corpo. Ver, em primeiro lugar, a definição que dele dá o Tratado-12. (ibid. p.131) A alma dá ao corpo as qualidades necessárias…
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Bouillet: Tratado 12 (II, 4) – DE LA MATIÈRE
(§ I) Les philosophes s’accordent à définir la matière la substance, le sujet, le réceptacle des formes. Mais les uns [les Stoïciens] regardent la matière comme un corps sans qualité ; les autres [les Pythagoriciens, les Platoniciens, les Péripatéticiens] la croient incorporelle ; quelques-uns de ces derniers en distinguent deux espèces, la substance des corps…
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Matéria: deficiência de Bem
II. 4. 16 (end) (Armstrong Selection and Translation from the Enneads) [Matter is absolutely evil because it is an absolute deficiency of good.] Is matter then evil because it participates in good? Rather, because it lacks it; for this means that it does not have it. Anything which lacks something but has something else might…
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Duas Matérias
II. 4. 5 (Armstrong Selection and Translation from the Enneads) [The difference between matter in the Intelligible World (the unformed living potency of Soul or Noûs, turning in a timeless process to that which is above it to receive form) and the dead matter of the world of the senses.] The botton of each and…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,16 (II,4,16) — A matéria, a alteridade, a privação e o mal
16. Then Matter is simply Alienism [the Principle of Difference]? No: it is merely that part of Alienism which stands in contradiction with the Authentic Existents which are Reason-Principles. So understood, this non-existent has a certain measure of existence; for it is identical with Privation, which also is a thing standing in opposition to the…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,15 (II,4,15) — A matéria e o ilimitado
15. The further question, therefore, is raised whether boundlessness and indetermination are things lodging in something other than themselves as a sort of attribute and whether Privation [or Negation of quality] is also an attribute residing in some separate substratum. Now all that is Number and Reason-Principle is outside of boundlessness: these bestow bound and…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,14 (II,4,14) — A matéria e a privação
14. But is Absence this privation itself, or something in which this Privation is lodged? Anyone maintaining that Matter and Privation are one and the same in substratum but stand separable in reason cannot be excused from assigning to each the precise principle which distinguishes it in reason from the other: that which defines Matter…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,13 (II,4,13) — A matéria versus a qualidade
13. Are we asked to accept as the substratum some attribute or quality present to all the elements in common? Then, first, we must be told what precise attribute this is and, next, how an attribute can be a substratum. The elements are sizeless, and how conceive an attribute where there is neither base nor…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,12 (II,4,12) — Respostas às aporias relativas à noção de uma matéria sem grandeza
12. It is the corporeal, then, that demands magnitude: the Ideal-Forms of body are Ideas installed in Mass. But these Ideas enter, not into Magnitude itself but into some subject that has been brought to Magnitude. For to suppose them entering into Magnitude and not into Matter – is to represent them as being either…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,11 (II,4,11) — Aporias relativas à noção de uma matéria sem grandeza
11. “But, given Magnitude and the properties we know, what else can be necessary to the existence of body?” Some base to be the container of all the rest. “A certain mass then; and if mass, then Magnitude? Obviously if your Base has no Magnitude it offers no footing to any entrant. And suppose it…