Categoria: Enéada-II-4
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,10 (II,4,10) — Como o Intelecto percebe a matéria
10. But how can I form the conception of the sizelessness of Matter? How do you form the concept of any absence of quality? What is the Act of the Intellect, what is the mental approach, in such a case? The secret is Indetermination. Likeness knows its like: the indeterminate knows the indeterminate. Around this…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,9 (II,4,9) — A quantidade e a grandeza versus a matéria sensível
9. But how can we conceive a thing having existence without having magnitude? We have only to think of things whose identity does not depend on their quantity – for certainly magnitude can be distinguished from existence as can many other forms and attributes. In a word, every unembodied Kind must be classed as without…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,8 (II,4,8) — A natureza da matéria sensível
8. What, then, is this Kind, this Matter, described as one stuff, continuous and without quality? Clearly since it is without quality it is incorporeal; bodiliness would be quality. It must be the basic stuff of all the entities of the sense-world and not merely base to some while being to others achieved form. Clay,…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,7 (II,4,7) — Refutação das teorias pré-platônicas sobre a matéria
7. Empedokles in identifying his “elements” with Matter is refuted by their decay. Anaxagoras, in identifying his “primal-combination” with Matter – to which he allots no mere aptness to any and every nature or quality but the effective possession of all – withdraws in this way the very Intellectual-Principle he had introduced; for this Mind…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,5 (II,4,5) — Sobre a matéria e a forma
5. It may be objected that the Intellectual-Principle possesses its content in an eternal conjunction so that the two make a perfect unity, and that thus there is no Matter there. But that argument would equally cancel the Matter present in the bodily forms of this realm: body without shape has never existed, always body…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,4 (II,4,4) — A matéria inteligível existe
4. The present existence of the Ideal-Forms has been demonstrated elsewhere: we take up our argument from that point. If, then, there is more than one of such forming Ideas, there must of necessity be some character common to all and equally some peculiar character in each keeping them distinct. This peculiar characteristic, this distinguishing…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,3 (II,4,3) — Respostas às objeções contra a matéria inteligível
3. Now it may be observed, first of all, that we cannot hold utterly cheap either the indeterminate, or even a Kind whose very idea implies absence of form, provided only that it offer itself to its Priors and [through them] to the Highest Beings. We have the parallel of the Soul itself in its…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,2 (II,4,2) — Objeções contra a matéria inteligível
2. We are obliged, therefore, at the start, both to establish the existence of this other Kind and to examine its nature and the mode of its Being. Now if Matter must characteristically be undetermined, void of shape, while in that sphere of the Highest there can be nothing that lacks determination, nothing shapeless, there…
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MacKenna: Tratado 12,1 (II,4,1) — Considerações iniciais sobre a matéria
1. By common agreement of all that have arrived at the conception of such a Kind, what is known as Matter is understood to be a certain base, a recipient of Form-Ideas. Thus far all go the same way. But departure begins with the attempt to establish what this basic Kind is in itself, and…
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Enéada II, 4, 16 — A matéria, a alteridade, a privação e o mal
16. ¿Sería la materia idéntica a la alteridad? No, desde luego, sino a esa parte de ella que se opone a los seres por excelencia, esto es, a las razones formales. El no-ser es, por tanto, algo, y puede identificarse con la privación, si la privación es la antítesis de los seres que se dan…