Categoria: Enéada-III-2
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Enéada III, 2, 3 — O universo é belo e autárcico
3- No procedería muy justamente quien abominase de este mundo como si se tratase de algo que no es bello ni perfecto, entre los seres corpóreos. Ni estaría bien acusar a quien le dio el ser, porque su existencia es, ante todo, producto de la necesidad y no de una acción reflexiva. El ser superior…
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Enéada III, 2, 2 — O universo é uma imagem inferior do Intelecto
2-De ese mundo verdadero y uno obtiene su existencia este mundo nuestro que no es verdaderamente uno; que es múltiple, añadiremos, y se halla repartido en muchas partes, distantes y extrañas entre sí, en las cuales ya no reina la amistad, sino también el odio, por la misma separación e insuficiencia de cada parte que,…
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Enéada III, 2, 1 — Existe uma providência que governa o universo
1- El atribuir a un hecho casual y fortuito la existencia y la ordenación del mundo es algo verdaderamente absurdo y propio de un hombre incapaz de pensar y de percibir1. Ello es claro antes de todo razonamiento y serían suficientes para probarlo razones que estuviesen bien fundadas. ¿Cuál es, sin embargo, el modo como…
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Enéada III, 2: Comentários de Guthrie
Tradução de Guthrie Plano detalhado do tratado Capítulo 1: Epicuro ensinou o azar e os gnósticos um criador mau Providência particular e universal assumidas como premissas Providência não é particular porque o mundo não tem início Como a inteligência continua a fazer o mundo subsistir Capítulo 2: O mundo dos sentidos criados não por reflexão,…
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Enéada III, 2 – Da providência (I)
Plotin Traités 45-50. Traductions sous la direction de Luc Brisson et Jean-François Pradeau Plano detalhado do Tratado Cap. 1, 1-15: Introdução: existe uma providência que governa o universo. Cap. 1, 15 ao cap. 5: A natureza do universo e aquela da providência Parágrafos 15-45: A providência consiste para o universo a existir conforme ao Intelecto,…
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Logos
These considerations oblige us to state the Logos (the Reason-Principle of the Universe) once again, and more clearly, and to justify its nature. This Reason-Principle, then – let us dare the definition in the hope of conveying the truth – this Logos is not the Intellectual Principle unmingled, not the Absolute Divine Intellect; nor does…
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Mau
III. 2. 17 (Armstrong Selection and Translation from the Enneads) (The imperfect unity of the visible world means that there must necessarily be a place in it for moral evil. But this does not excuse the wicked, for they are souls who exist before they came into this world, and they bring their own characters…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,7 (III,2,7) — Não se deve culpar nem o universo nem a providência pelo mal
7. A preliminary observation: in looking for excellence in this thing of mixture, the Kosmos, we cannot require all that is implied in the excellence of the unmingled; it is folly to ask for Firsts in the Secondary, and since this Universe contains body, we must allow for some bodily influence upon the total and…
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Errar
Now in every living being the upper parts – head, face – are the most beautiful, the mid and lower members inferior. In the Universe the middle and lower members are human beings; above them, the Heavens and the Gods that dwell there; these Gods with the entire circling expanse of the heavens constitute the…
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Bouillet: Tratado 47 (III, 2) – DE LA PROVIDENCE I
(I-II) Il ne suffit pas d’admettre que le monde doit son existence à une cause intelligente; il faut encore montrer comment les maux que nous voyons se concilient avec la sagesse de la Providence. Le monde a pour cause, non une Providence particulière, semblable à la réflexion de l’artiste qui délibère avant d’exécuter son œuvre,…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,18 (III,2,18) — As almas não são todas iguais
18. Souls vary in worth; and the difference is due, among other causes, to an almost initial inequality; it is in reason that, standing to the Reason-Principle, as parts, they should be unequal by the fact of becoming separate. We must also remember that every Soul has its second grade and its third, and that,…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,17 (III,2,17) — O mundo é múltiplo e contem contrários, bons e maus
17. The nature of the Reason-Principle is adequately expressed in its Act and, therefore, the wider its extension the nearer will its productions approach to full contrariety: hence the world of sense is less a unity than is its Reason-Principle; it contains a wider multiplicity and contrariety: its partial members will, therefore, be urged by…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,16 (III,2,16) — Se tudo está bem disposto, como poderia haver males?
16. But if all this is true, what room is left for evil? Where are we to place wrong-doing and sin? How explain that in a world organized in good, the efficient agents (human beings) behave unjustly, commit sin? And how comes misery if neither sin nor injustice exists? Again, if all our action is…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,14 (III,2,14) — A ordem do universo deriva do Intelecto
14. The ordinance of the Kosmos, then, is in keeping with the Intellectual Principle. True, no reasoning went to its creation, but it so stands that the keenest reasoning must wonder – since no reasoning could be able to make it otherwise – at the spectacle before it, a product which, even in the Kinds…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,13 (III,2,13) — A justiça do universo se manifesta através do ciclo das vidas
13. And we must not despise the familiar observation that there is something more to be considered than the present. There are the periods of the past and, again, those in the future; and these have everything to do with fixing worth of place. Thus a man, once a ruler, will be made a slave…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,12 (III,2,12) — A razão tem partes diferentes e o que produz é belo
12. Suppose this Universe were the direct creation of the Reason-Principle applying itself, quite unchanged, to Matter, retaining, that is, the hostility to partition which it derives from its Prior, the Intellectual Principle – then, this its product, so produced, would be of supreme and unparalleled excellence. But the Reason-Principle could not be a thing…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,11 (III,2,11) — As razões produzem tudo, mesmo os males
11. Are we, then, to conclude that particular things are determined by Necessities rooted in Nature and by the sequence of causes, and that everything is as good as anything can be? No: the Reason-Principle is the sovereign, making all: it wills things as they are and, in its reasonable act, it produces even what…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,10 (III,2,10) — O homem é responsável de seus atos
10. But: if the evil in men is involuntary, if their own will has not made them what they are, how can we either blame wrong-doers or even reproach their victims with suffering through their own fault? If there is a Necessity, bringing about human wickedness either by force of the celestial movement or by…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,9 (III,2,9) — A providência não dirige tudo
9. It would not be just, because Providence cannot be a something reducing us to nothingness: to think of Providence as everything, with no other thing in existence, is to annihilate the Universe; such a providence could have no field of action; nothing would exist except the Divine. As things are, the Divine, of course,…
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MacKenna: Tratado 47,8 (III,2,8) — O universo é bem constituído
8. Thus we come to our enquiry as to the degree of excellence found in things of this Sphere, and how far they belong to an ordered system or in what degree they are, at least, not evil. Now in every living being the upper parts – head, face – are the most beautiful, the…