Categoria: Enéada-V-3
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,12 (V,3,12) — O Uno é absolutamente simples
12. But why, after all, should it not be such a manifold as long as it remains one substantial existence, having the multiplicity not of a compound being but of a unity with a variety of activities? Now, no doubt, if these various activities are not themselves substantial existences – but merely manifestations of latent…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,10 (V,3,10) — A visão intelectual que o Intelecto tem dele mesmo
10. This matter need not be elaborated at present: it suffices to say that if the created were all, these ultimates [the higher] need not exist: but the Supreme does include primals, the primals because the producers. In other words, there must be, with the made, the making source; and, unless these are to be…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,9 (V,3,9) — A alma pode se liberar de tudo
9. In order, then, to know what the Divine Mind is, we must observe soul and especially its most God-like phase. One certain way to this knowledge is to separate first, the man from the body – yourself, that is, from your body – next to put aside that soul which moulded the body, and,…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,8 (V,3,8) — O Intelecto é a mesma coisa que a atividade e a visão inteligíveis (2)
8. Now comes the question what sort of thing does the Intellectual-Principle see in seeing the Intellectual Realm and what in seeing itself? We are not to look for an Intellectual realm reminding us of the colour or shape to be seen on material objects: the intellectual antedates all such things; and even in our…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,7 (V,3,7) — O Intelecto é a mesma coisa que a atividade e a visão inteligíveis (1)
7. The contemplating of God, we might answer. But to admit its knowing God is to be compelled to admit its self-knowing. It will know what it holds from God, what God has given forth or may; with this knowledge, it knows itself at the stroke, for it is itself one of those given things…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,6 (V,3,6) — O Intelecto que se pensa ele mesmo
6. Thus we have shown that there exists that which in the strictest sense possesses self-knowing. This self-knowing agent, perfect in the Intellectual-Principle, is modified in the Soul. The difference is that, while the soul knows itself as within something else, the Intellectual-Principle knows itself as self-depending, knows all its nature and character, and knows…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,4 (V,3,4) — A alma pode se conhecer ela mesma
4. But we, too, are king when we are moulded to the Intellectual-Principle. That correspondence may be brought about in two ways: either the radii from that centre are traced upon us to be our law or we are filled full of the Divine Mind, which again may have become to us a thing seen…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,3 (V,3,3) — O intelecto da alma e o Intelecto “puro”
3. Sense sees a man and transmits the impression to the understanding. What does the understanding say? It has nothing to say as yet; it accepts and waits; unless, rather, it questions within itself “Who is this?” – someone it has met before – and then, drawing on memory, says, “Socrates.” If it should go…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,2 (V,3,2) — As faculdades da alma
2. We begin with the soul, asking whether it is to be allowed self-knowledge and what the knowing principle in it would be and how operating. The sense-principle in it we may at once decide, takes cognisance only of the external; even in any awareness of events within the body it occupies, this is still…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,1 (V,3,1) — É necessário que o que se conhece a si mesmo seja múltiplo?
1. Are we to think that a being knowing itself must contain diversity, that self-knowledge can be affirmed only when some one phase of the self perceives other phases, and that therefore an absolutely simplex entity would be equally incapable of introversion and of self-awareness? No: a being that has no parts or phases may…