Categoria: Enéada-V-3
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Soul in its Relation to Nous (III)
V. 3. 3-4 (Armstrong Selections from the Enneads) (We are not strictly speaking Nous, but soul, which is midway between Nous and sense-perception; in our normal life we are more closely connected with sense-perception; but we can become perfectly conformed to Nous by its own power, transcending our merely human nature, and then we do…
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Tratado 49 (V, 3) – A consciência de si mesmo, e o que está Acima
Plotin Traités 45-50. Traductions sous la direction de Luc Brisson et Jean-François Pradeau Neste tratado, Plotino retoma um assunto que foi examinado várias vezes em seus escritos e que é aquele dos três princípios do real, quer dizer a Alma, o Intelecto e o Uno. A questão foi anteriormente estudada segundo o ponto de vista…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,2 (V,3,2) — As faculdades da alma
2. We begin with the soul, asking whether it is to be allowed self-knowledge and what the knowing principle in it would be and how operating. The sense-principle in it we may at once decide, takes cognisance only of the external; even in any awareness of events within the body it occupies, this is still…
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Enéada V, 3, 6 — O Intelecto que se pensa ele mesmo
6. Se ha probado con este razonamiento que hay un ser que se piensa a sí mismo en términos rigurosamente inteligibles. Pero en cuanto al alma, el pensamiento de sí mismo tiene otro sentido que no puede ser el que, con toda propiedad, se aplica a la Inteligencia. Porque el alma se piensa a si…
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Thomas Taylor: Tratado 49 (V, 3) — OF GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES, AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND THEM.
I. Is it therefore necessary, that intellect should be in itself various, in order that by one of the things contained in itself, having surveyed the rest, it may be thus said to understand itself, as if it would not be able to be converted to, and have an intellectual perception of itself, if it…
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MacKenna: Tratado 49 (V, 3) — As hipóstases e o transcedente
The Fifth Ennead Third tractate. The knowing hypostases and the transcendent.
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MacKenna: Tratado 49,1 (V,3,1) — É necessário que o que se conhece a si mesmo seja múltiplo?
1. Are we to think that a being knowing itself must contain diversity, that self-knowledge can be affirmed only when some one phase of the self perceives other phases, and that therefore an absolutely simplex entity would be equally incapable of introversion and of self-awareness? No: a being that has no parts or phases may…
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Enéada V, 3, 5 — Como o Intelecto se conhece ele mesmo?
5. Pero, ¿ve ella una parte de sí misma con otra de sus partes? Si así fuese, habría, entonces, una cosa que ve y otra que es vista, lo cual no acredita, precisamente, que se vea a sí misma. Más, ¿cómo podría afirmarse esto si ella es un todo de partes semejantes, en el que…
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Thomas Taylor: Tratado 49 (V, 3, 5-10) — OF GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES, AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND THEM.
V. Does intellect, therefore, by one part of itself behold another part? In this case, however, one part will be that which sees, but another, that which is seen. And this is not for the same thing to see itself. What then ? If the whole is a thing of such a kind as to…
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Noûs pensa o Uno em uma multidão de Formas
V. 3. 10-11 (Armstrong Selection and Translation from the Enneads) [The One does not need to think; It possesses Itself perfectly without any need of thought. Knowledge is always a process of completion, the fulfilling of a want. Noûs eternally seeks to know the One, but cannot grasp It in Its absolute Unity and Simplicity,…