Categoria: Enéada-VI-7
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,14 (VI, 7, 14) – INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY
INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY AND AS FRIENDSHIP. 14. By intellectual examples we can understand the nature of Intelligence, and see that it could not be a unity which does not admit any kind of difference. As example, consider the (“seminal) reason” of a plant, and that of an animal.…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,13 (VI, 7, 13) – SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS
SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS, BUT INFERS HEIGHT OF SOURCE. 13. Neither Intelligence, nor the Soul that proceeds therefrom, are simple; both contain the universality of things with their infinite variety, so far as these are simple, meaning that they are not composite, but that they are principles and actualizations; for, in…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,12 (VI, 7, 12) – THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE
THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE. 12. We therefore repeat that since we admit that our universe is modeled on the intelligible World, we should so much the more recognize that the latter is the universal living Organism, which constitutes all things because it consists of perfect essence. Consequently in…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,11 (VI, 7, 11) – BUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS?
BUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS? 11. (The Timaeus of Plato) states that heaven has not scorned to receive any of the forms of the animals, of which we see so great a number. The cause must be that this universe was to contain the universality of things. Whence does it…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,10 (VI, 7, 10) – APPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION
APPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION. 10. But how can there be anything imperfect in the intelligible world? Why does the intelligible Animal have horns? Is it for its defense? To be perfect and complete. It is to be perfect as an animal, perfect as intelligence, and perfect as life; so that, if…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,9 (VI, 7, 9) – MANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT
MANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT. 9. It may be objected that Intelligence might (well) contain the ideas of animals of a higher order. But how can it contain the ideas of animals that are vile, or entirely without reason? For we should consider vile every animal devoid of reason and intelligence, since…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,8 (VI, 7, 8) – INTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD
INTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD FOR THEY ARE PRE-EXISTING, AND ARE DISTINCT FROM THEIR CREATING IMAGE. 8. (Now let us pass to the other question we asked). How does it happen that all the Animals who, like the Horse itself, are contained in divine Intelligence, do not incline towards the things here…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,7 (VI, 7, 7) – ANIMAL SEMINAL REASONS MAY BE CONTRARY TO SOUL’S NATURE
ANIMAL SEMINAL REASONS MAY BE CONTRARY TO SOUL’S NATURE; THOUGH NOT TO THE SOUL HERSELF. 7. It may however be objected that if the soul produce the nature of a brute only when she is depraved and degraded, she was not originally destined to produce an ox or a horse; then the (“seminal) reason” of…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,6 (VI, 7, 6) – THE THREE MEN IN EACH OF US
THE THREE MEN IN EACH OF US. 6. What is the relation of the sense-power within the superior Soul (or, in the rational soul) ? Intelligible sensation perceives (intelligible) objects that, speaking strictly, are not sensible, and corresponds to the (intelligible) manner in which they are perceivable. Thus (by this intelligible sense-power) the Soul perceives…
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Guthrie: Tratado 38,5 (VI, 7, 5) – MAN AS A SOUL SUBSISTING IN A SPECIAL REASON
MAN AS A SOUL SUBSISTING IN A SPECIAL REASON. 5. Man must therefore have as “reason” (or, as essence), something else than the soul. Still, in this case, man might be something composite; that is, the soul would subsist in a particular “reason,” admitting that this “reason” was a certain actualization of the soul, though…