Categoria: Tratado 27 (IV,3)
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,21 (IV,3,21) — A alma não está no corpo (2)
21. What does all this come to? What answer do we give to him who, with no opinion of his own to assert, asks us to explain this presence? And what do we say to the question whether there is one only mode of presence of the entire soul or different modes, phase and phase?…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,22 (IV,3,22) — A alma está no corpo como a luz está no ar
22. May we think that the mode of the soul’s presence to body is that of the presence of light to the air? This certainly is presence with distinction: the light penetrates through and through, but nowhere coalesces; the light is the stable thing, the air flows in and out; when the air passes beyond…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,23 (IV,3,23) — Como as faculdades da alma se exercem localmente
23. I explain: A living body is illuminated by soul: each organ and member participates in soul after some manner peculiar to itself; the organ is adapted to a certain function, and this fitness is the vehicle of the soul-faculty under which the function is performed; thus the seeing faculty acts through the eyes, the…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,24 (IV,3,24) — A saída da alma fora do corpo
24. Now comes the question of the soul leaving the body; where does it go? It cannot remain in this world where there is no natural recipient for it; and it cannot remain attached to anything not of a character to hold it: it can be held here when only it is less than wise,…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,26 (IV,3,26) — A memória não pertence ao vivente
26. Now if sensations of the active order depend upon the Couplement of soul and body, sensation must be of that double nature. Hence it is classed as one of the shared acts: the soul, in the feeling, may be compared to the workman in such operations as boring or weaving, the body to the…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,27 (IV,3,27) — A memória não pertence ao vivente
27. But of what soul; of that which we envisage as the more divine, by which we are human beings, or that other which springs from the All? Memory must be admitted in both of these, personal memories and shared memories; and when the two souls are together, the memories also are as one; when…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,28 (IV,3,28) — A memória depende da faculdade representativa (1)
28. Is memory vested in the faculty by which we perceive and learn? Or does it reside in the faculty by which we set things before our minds as objects of desire or of anger, the passionate faculty? This will be maintained on the ground that there could scarcely be both a first faculty in…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,29 (IV,3,29) — A memória depende da faculdade representativa (2)
29. Are we, then, to refer memory to the perceptive faculty and so make one principle of our nature the seat of both awareness and remembrance? Now supposing the very Shade, as we were saying in the case of Hercules, has memory, then the perceptive faculty is twofold. ((And if (on the same supposition) the…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,30 (IV,3,30) — A memória depende da faculdade representativa (3)
30. But what of the memory of mental acts: do these also fall under the imaging faculty? If every mental act is accompanied by an image we may well believe that this image, fixed and like a picture of the thought, would explain how we remember the object of knowledge once entertained. But if there…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,31 (IV,3,31) — Isto que se lembram as almas; a sua saída do corpo (1)
31. But if each of the two phases of the soul, as we have said, possesses memory, and memory is vested in the imaging faculty, there must be two such faculties. Now that is all very well as long as the two souls stand apart; but, when they are at one in us, what becomes…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,31 (IV,3,31) — Isto que se lembram as almas; a sua saída do corpo (2)
32. But the memory of friends, children, wife? Country too, and all that the better sort of man may reasonably remember? All these, the one (the lower man) retains with emotion, the authentic man passively: for the experience, certainly, was first felt in that lower phase from which, however, the best of such impressions pass…
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MacKenna: Tratado 27,2 (IV,3,2) — Alma e Alma-do-Mundo: ser da mesma espécie não significa ser uma parte
2. To this our first answer is that to place certain things under one identical class – by admitting an identical range of operation – is to make them of one common species, and puts an end to all mention of part; the reasonable conclusion would be, on the contrary, that there is one identical…
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Plotino – Tratado 27,9 (IV, 3, 9) — As duas maneiras para a alma de entrar em um corpo
9. Habrá que investigar ahora cómo se introduce el alma en el cuerpo, mejor dicho, cómo y de qué manera. Esto no puede menos de suscitar nuestra admiración y de estimular nuestra búsqueda. Porque de dos modos puede entrar el alma en el cuerpo. En primer lugar, puede ocurrir que el alma se encuentre ya…
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Plotino – Tratado 27,6 (IV, 3, 6) — Porque a Alma-do-Mundo fez o mundo?
6. ¿Por qué entonces el alma del universo, que es semejante a las demás almas, pudo haber hecho el mundo, y, en cambio, no han hecho nada las almas de los individuos particulares, las cuales, sin embargo, tienen todas las cosas en sí mismas? Porque ya se ha dicho que una misma cosa puede existir…
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Plotino – Tratado 27,4 (IV, 3, 4) — Alma e Alma-do-Mundo: uma coisa em todas as outras?
4. Si el alma es, pues, una unidad de esta clase, ¿qué hemos de contestar a los que plantean dificultades como las siguientes? En primer lugar, si es posible que una sola cosa se encuentre a la vez en todas las otras, y en segundo lugar, si puede haber un alma que se dé en…
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Plotino – Tratado 27,31 (IV, 3, 31) — Isto que se lembram as almas; a sua saída do corpo (1)
31. Pero si la memoria se atribuye a la imaginación, como, según se dice, cada una de las dos almas cuenta con su memoria, habrá dos clases de imaginación. No hay dificultad en entenderlo así cuando estas dos almas se encuentran separadas; más, estando unidas en nosotros en un mismo ser, ¿cómo podría haber aquí…
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Plotino – Tratado 27,8 (IV, 3, 8) — Dificuldades relativas à unidade e à multiplicidade da alma
8. Quedan así resueltas las dificultades que se habían planteado. Y tampoco constituye una dificultad la simpatía existente entre las almas, porque es claro que las almas simpatizan entre sí por derivar todas ellas de una misma alma, de la cual proviene también el alma del universo. Se ha dicho, en efecto, que hay un…
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Plotino – Tratado 27,7 (IV, 3, 7) — Alma e Alma-do-Mundo: argumentos do Filebo e do Fedro
7. Pero bastante se ha dicho a este respecto. Ahora nos queda por considerar la sospecha manifestada en el Filebo de que las otras almas son partes del alma del universo 1. Esta opinión platónica no tiene el sentido que algunos quieren darle, sino que significa, en la medida en que era útil para Platón,…
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Plotino – Tratado 27,2 (IV, 3, 2) — Alma e Alma-do-Mundo: ser da mesma espécie não significa ser uma parte
2. Con respecto a esto hemos de responder lo siguiente: admiten (quienes así hablan) que las almas individuales son homogéneas con las del universo, mostrando que alcanzan los mismos objetos y que son de su mismo linaje, lo que equivale a negar que sean partes de él. Mejor podríamos decir que la misma alma es…
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Plotino – Tratado 27,1 (IV, 3, 1) — A alma provém da alma do mundo
1. Seria justo ocuparmo-nos com a alma, com todos os pontos em que nos encontramos em dificuldades sobre ela e devemos chegar a uma solução, ou, continuando apenas nessas dificuldades, pelo menos obter essa vantagem, que sabemos quais são os pontos difíceis. Pois o que se poderia gastar mais razoavelmente tempo discutindo e investigando extensivamente…