neoplatonismo:plotino:tratado:2:3
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| + | ===== 2,3 (IV, 7, 3) — IMORTALIDADE: | ||
| + | <tabbox tradução> | ||
| + | 3. E se alguém dissesse que assim não se passa, mas que são átomos ou coisas indivisíveis | ||
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| + | E no entretanto, se dizem , posto que este corpo é simples , que não é isto que é material | ||
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| + | <tabbox Míguez> | ||
| + | 3. Si no se admite esto y se afirma en cambio que la reunión de átomos o indivisibles es la que crea al alma, habrá que invocar como contrapartida la unión y la simpatía de las partes del alma, ya que no se produce ninguna intromisión y simpatía entre cuerpos que son impasibles e incapaces de reunirse en uno solo. Pero el alma posee simpatía consigo misma, y en cuanto al cuerpo y a la magnitud no podrían provenir de seres indivisibles. | ||
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| + | Ciertamente, | ||
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| + | <tabbox Guthrie> | ||
| + | **NO ATOMIC AGGREGATION COULD PRODUCE A SELF-HARMONIZING UNITY.** | ||
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| + | 3. (b.) (No aggregation of atoms could form a whole that would be one and sympathetic with itself.) Others, on the contrary, insist that the soul is constituted by the union of atoms or indivisibles (as thought Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus.) To refute this error, we have to examine the nature of sympathy (or community of affection, a Stoic characteristic of a living being — Eneada-II, 3, 5) and juxtaposition (Eneada-II, 7, 1). On the one hand an aggregation of corporeal molecules which are incapable of being united, and which do not feel cannot form a single sympathetic whole such as is the soul, which is sympathetic with herself. On the other hand, how could a body or extension be constituted by (a juxtaposition of) atoms? | ||
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| + | **SOUL IS A SIMPLE SUBSTANCE, WHILE EVERY BODY IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM.** | ||
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| + | (c.) (Every body is a composite of matter and form, while the soul is a simple substance.) Inasmuch as matter possesses no quality (Eneada-II, 4, 7), the matter of no simple body will be said to possess life in itself. That which imparts life to it must then be its form. If form is a " | ||
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| + | **IF SOUL IS ONLY AN AFFECTION OF MATTER, WHENCE THAT AFFECTION? | ||
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| + | (d.) (The soul is not a simple manner of being of matter, because matter could not give itself a form.) Some Stoics might deny that form was a " | ||
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| + | **NO BODY COULD SUBSIST WITHOUT THE POWER OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.** | ||
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| + | (e.) (No body could subsist without the power of the universal soul.) Besides no body could subsist without the power of the universal Soul (from Numenius), Every body, indeed, is in a perpetual flow and movement (as thought Heraclitus, in Plato, Cratylus), and the world would soon perish if it contained nothing but bodies, even if some one of them were to be called soul; for such a soul, being composed of the same matter as the other bodies, would undergo the same fate that they do; or rather, there would not even be any body, everything would remain in the condition of shapeless matter, since there would exist no principle to fashion it. Why, there would not even be any matter, and the universe would be annihilated to nothingness, | ||
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| + | <tabbox MacKenna> | ||
| + | 3. Anyone who rejects this view, and holds that either atoms or some entities void of part coming together produce soul, is refuted by the very unity of soul and by the prevailing sympathy as much as by the very coherence of the constituents. Bodily materials, in nature repugnant to unification and to sensation, could never produce unity or self-sensitiveness, | ||
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| + | Perhaps we will be asked to consider body as a simple entity : they will tell us, then, that no doubt, as purely material, it cannot have a self-springing life - since matter is without quality - but that life is introduced by the fact that the Matter is brought to order under Forming-Idea. But if by this Forming-Idea they mean an essential, a real being, then it is not the conjoint of body and idea that constitutes soul: it must be one of the two items and that one, being outside of the Matter, cannot be body: to make it body would simply force us to repeat our former analysis. | ||
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| + | If on the contrary they do not mean by this Forming-Idea a real being, but some condition or modification of the Matter, they must tell us how and whence this modification, | ||
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| + | It becomes clear that since neither Matter nor body in any mode has this power, life must be brought upon the stage by some directing principle external and transcendent to all that is corporeal. | ||
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| + | In fact, body itself could not exist in any form if soul-power did not: body passes; dissolution is in its very nature; all would disappear in a twinkling if all were body. It is no help to erect some one mode of body into soul; made of the same Matter as the rest, this soul body would fall under the same fate: of course it could never really exist: the universe of things would halt at the material, failing something to bring Matter to shape. | ||
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| + | Nay more: Matter itself could not exist: the totality of things in this sphere is dissolved if it be made to depend upon the coherence of a body which, though elevated to the nominal rank of " | ||
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| + | All bodies are in ceaseless process of dissolution; | ||
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| + | <tabbox Taylor> | ||
| + | III. If some one, however, should say that an assemblage of atoms or impartibles produce soul by their union, such a one will be confuted by similitude of passion, and by apposition; since one thing will not thus be generated through the whole, nor will that which is co-passive be produced from bodies which are without passion and incapable of being united. But soul is co-passive with itself. And of impartibles neither body nor magnitude can consist. Moreover, with respect to a simple body, they will not say that it has life from itself so far as it is material. For matter is void of quality. But they will rather say that what is arranged in body according to form possesses life. Hence, if they say that this form is essence, soul will not be both, but one of these; and this will no longer be body. For this will not also consist of matter; since if it did, we must again analyze it after the same manner. But if they assert that this form is a passion of matter and not essence, they must inform us what that is from which this passion and life are derived into matter. For matter will not give form to itself, nor insert soul in itself. Hence, it is necessary that there should be something which is the supplier of life, whether the supply is to matter, or to a certain body, this supplier being external to, and beyond every corporeal nature. Indeed, neither will there be any body, if there is no psychical power. For body flows, and its nature is in motion. The universe also would rapidly perish if all things were bodies; though some one of them should be denominated soul. For it would suffer the same things as other bodies, since there would be one matter in all of them. Or rather, nothing would be generated, but all things would stop in matter, as there would not be any thing to invest it with form. Perhaps, too, neither would matter have any subsistence whatever. This universe also will be dissolved, if it is committed to the connexion of body, and the order of soul is given to body, as far as to names, viz. to air and a dissipable spirit, and which has not from itself any oneness. For how is it possible, since all bodies are divisible, that this universe if it is committed to any one of them, should not be borne along in a foolish and casual manner ? For what order is there, or reason or intellect, in a pneumatic substance, which is in want of order from soul? But if soul, indeed, has a subsistence, | ||
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| + | </ | ||
