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| + | ===== PLOTINO - TRATADO 23,8 (VI, 5, 8) — PARTICIPAÇÃO DA MATÉRIA NAS FORMAS ===== | ||
| + | <tabbox Míguez> | ||
| + | 8. Pienso al menos que si se considerase la participación de la materia en las ideas llegaríamos con más razón a una confirmación de lo dicho; ya entonces no se la tendría por imposible ni continuaría ofreciendo dificultades. Hay buenas y necesarias razones para no creer que las ideas y la materia permanecen separadas y que, de lejos y de lo alto, una acción iluminadora de las ideas desciende hasta la materia. Diríamos con ello algo vacío de sentido. Porque, ¿qué queremos expresar con las palabras lejos y separado? En este caso, esa participación de que habíamos no resultaría la más difícil e impracticable, | ||
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| + | Conviene ahora, sin embargo, que nos expresemos de una manera más exacta. Pues no es verdad que el ser de la idea y el ser de la materia ocupen distinto lugar, y que aquélla se refleje sobre ésta como si se tratase de una superficie líquida. Por todas sus partes la materia entra en contacto con la idea, aunque ello no suponga que toca a la totalidad de ésta; pero es esa aproximación la que permite que la materia reciba de la idea todo cuanto pueda recibir y sin que medie ser alguno entre ambas. Y no, desde luego, porque la idea atraviese y circule a través de toda la materia, ya que realmente permanece en sí misma. Ocurre aquí como con el fuego, cuya idea no se encuentra en la materia (entiéndase la materia que sirve de apoyo a los elementos); y es por ello por lo que el fuego en sí, al no recaer en la materia, puede dar su forma a la materia en toda aquella parte que está sujeta a su acción. Partimos del supuesto de que el primer fuego engendrado posee un gran volumen y lo mismo afirmamos de los demás elementos. He aquí, pues, que el fuego en sí y único se aparece en todos los fuegos sensibles y produce en ellos una imagen de sí mismo; ahora bien, como no mantiene separación en cuanto al lugar, no produce esa imagen cual pudiera hacerlo una acción iluminadora visible. Porque, de ser así, todo el fuego sensible existiría ya de alguna manera (se entiende en el fuego inteligible) y se daría como una multiplicación de éste, aunque la idea generadora de los lugares (de los fuegos sensibles) permaneciese ella misma fuera de lugar. Con lo cual tendríamos necesidad de que saliese de sí una cosa que se multiplicase, | ||
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| + | Sería ridículo introducir sucesivamente varias ideas del fuego para admitir que cada una da su forma a una determinada masa; porque entonces es claro que las ideas se multiplicarían infinitamente. Y luego, ¿cómo se podrían separar esas masas, si se ofrece tan sólo un único fuego continuo? Porque si añadimos a esta misma materia un nuevo fuego que la haga todavía mayor, será con todo la misma idea la que actúe sobre esta parte material y no en manera alguna una idea diferente. | ||
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| + | <tabbox Bouillet> | ||
| + | VIII. Je crois que quiconque considérera la participation de la matière aux idées (ἡ τῆς ὕλης τῶν εἰδῶν μετάληψις) ajoutera plus volontiers foi à ce que nous disons ici, ne le déclarera plus impossible et n' | ||
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| + | Puisque l' | ||
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| + | <tabbox Guthrie> | ||
| + | THIS IS PROVED BY THE PARTICIPATION OF MATTER IN IDEAS. | ||
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| + | 8. Whoever will consider the participation of matter in ideas will be impressed with the above theory, will declare it not impossible, and express no further doubts. It is necessary to admit the impossibility of a conception such as the following: on one hand, the ideas separate from matter; on the other hand, matter at a distance from them, and then an irradiation from on high descending on matter. Such a conception would be senseless. What meaning would lie in this separation of the ideas, and this distance of matter? Would it not then be very difficult to explain and to understand what is called the participation of matter in ideas? Only by examples can we make our meaning clear. Doubtless, when we speak of an irradiation, | ||
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| + | THE SOUL, AS ENTIRE, FASHIONED THE WHOLE AND THE INDIVIDUALS. | ||
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| + | Since the idea of fire, for instance, is not in matter, let us imagine matter serving as subject for the elements. The idea of fire, without itself descending into matter, will give the form of the fire to the whole fiery matter, while the fire, first mingled with matter will constitute a multiple mass. The same conception may be applied to the other elements. If then the intelligible fire appear in everything as producing therein an image of itself, it does not produce this image in matter as if it had separated itself therefrom locally, as would have occurred in the irradiation of a visible object; otherwise it would be somewhere, and it would fall under the senses. Since the universal Fire is multiple, we must conclude that, while its idea remains in itself outside of all place, it itself has begotten the localities; otherwise we would have to think that, having become multiple (by its parts), it would extend, by withdrawing from itself, to become multiple in this manner, and to participate several times in the same principle. Now, being indivisible, | ||
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| + | <tabbox MacKenna> | ||
| + | 8. For my part I am satisfied that anyone considering the mode in which Matter participates in the Ideas will be ready enough to accept this tenet of omnipresence in identity, no longer rejecting it as incredible or even difficult. This because it seems reasonable and imperative to dismiss any notion of the Ideas lying apart with Matter illumined from them as from somewhere above - a meaningless conception, for what have distance and separation to do here? | ||
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| + | This participation cannot be thought of as elusive or very perplexing; on the contrary, it is obvious, accessible in many examples. | ||
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| + | Note, however, that when we sometimes speak of the Ideas illuminating Matter this is not to suggest the mode in which material light pours down on a material object; we use the phrase in the sense only that, the material being image while the Ideas are archetypes, the two orders are distinguished somewhat in the manner of illuminant and illuminated. But it is time to be more exact. | ||
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| + | We do not mean that the Idea, locally separate, shows itself in Matter like a reflection in water; the Matter touches the Idea at every point, though not in a physical contact, and, by dint of neighbourhood - nothing to keep them apart - is able to absorb thence all that lies within its capacity, the Idea itself not penetrating, | ||
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| + | We take it, then, that the Idea, say of Fire - for we had best deal with Matter as underlying the elements - is not in the Matter. The Ideal Fire, then, remaining apart, produces the form of fire throughout the entire enfired mass. Now let us suppose - and the same method will apply to all the so-called elements - that this Fire in its first material manifestation is a multiple mass. That single Fire is seen producing an image of itself in all the sensible fires; yet it is not spatially separate; it does not, then, produce that image in the manner of our visible light; for in that case all this sensible fire, supposing that it were a whole of parts , must have generated spatial positions out of itself, since the Idea or Form remains in a non-spatial world; for a principle thus pluralized must first have departed from its own character in order to be present in that many and participate many times in the one same Form. | ||
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| + | The Idea, impartible, gives nothing of itself to the Matter; its unbreaking unity, however, does not prevent it shaping that multiple by its own unity and being present to the entirety of the multiple, bringing it to pattern not by acting part upon part but by presence entire to the object entire. It would be absurd to introduce a multitude of Ideas of Fire, each several fire being shaped by a particular idea; the Ideas of fire would be infinite. Besides, how would these resultant fires be distinct, when fire is a continuous unity? and if we apply yet another fire to certain matter and produce a greater fire, then the same Idea must be allowed to have functioned in the same way in the new matter as in the old; obviously there is no other Idea. | ||
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neoplatonismo/plotino/tratados-eneadas/23/23-8/start.txt · Last modified: by 127.0.0.1
