Platonismo

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===== 12,9 (II, 4, 9) — A QUANTIDADE E A GRANDEZA VERSUS A MATÉRIA SENSÍVEL =====
<tabbox Míguez>
9. Se afirma por algunos: ¿qué podremos aprehender de los seres que no posea magnitud? Entiéndase que se trata aquí de algo no idéntico a la cantidad; el ser y la cantidad no son una y la misma cosa, pues existen muchas otras maneras de ser ajenas a la cantidad. En general, toda naturaleza incorpórea debe ser considerada como desprovista de cantidad; y no hay, duda alguna deque la materia es incorpórea. La misma cantidad no se confunde con el ser que la posee, pues éste participa de aquélla; de modo que parece así manifiesto que la cantidad es una forma. Es claro que un objeto se vuelve blanco por la presencia de la blancura, pero lo que produce en el ser animado tanto la blancura como los más diversos colores no es realmente un color variado, sino, si se quiere, una razón variada, Igual acontece con ese principio que produce una determinada cantidad: no es el mismo esta cantidad, sino la propia cantidad en sí, o la cantidad (en abstracto), o la razón de la cantidad. ¿Qué hace la cantidad que se adhiere a la materia? ¿Desenvuelve la materia para adecuarla a la magnitud? En modo alguno; porque la materia no estaba encerrada en un pequeño espacio. (El principio de que hablamos) le da una magnitud que antes no poseía, y le ofrece también una cualidad que antes no era suya.

<tabbox Bouillet>
IX. Mais, nous dira-t–on, comment concevoir une chose sans grandeur? C'est que toute chose n'est pas identique à la quantité. L'être est distinct de la quantité : car il existe beaucoup d'autres choses qu'elle. Il faut admettre que toute nature incorporelle n'a point de quantité. La matière est donc incorporelle (31). D'ailleurs la quantité n'est pas un quantum (ποσόν); un quantum est une chose qui participe à la quantité : nouvelle preuve que la quantité est une forme. De même qu'un objet devient blanc par la présence de la blancheur, et que ce qui produit dans l'animal la blancheur et les diverses couleurs n'est pas une couleur variée, mais une raison variée : de même ce qui produit un quantum n'est pas un quantum, mais le quantum même, ou la quantité même ou la raison. En entrant dans la matière, la quantité l'étend-elle pour lui donner la grandeur? Nullement : la matière n'avait pas été resserrée. La forme donne à la matière la grandeur qu'elle n'avait pas, comme elle lui imprime la qualité dont elle manquait (32).

<tabbox Guthrie>
ANTI-STOIC POLEMIC, AGAINST THE CORPOREITY OF MATTER AND QUANTITY.

9. It may be objected that it would be impossible to conceive of something without magnitude. The fact is that not everything is identical with quantity.

Essence is distinct from quantity; for many other things beside it exist. Consequently no incorporeal nature has any quantity. Matter, therefore, is incorporeal. Besides, even quantity itself is not quantative, which characterizes only what participates in quantity (in general) ; a further proof that quantity is a form, as an object becomes white by the presence of whiteness; and as that which, in the animal, produces whiteness and the different colors, is not a varied color, but a varied reason; likewise that which produces a quantity is not a definite quantity, but either quantity in itself, or quantity as such, or the reason of quantity. Does quantity, on entering into matter extend matter, so as to give it magnitude? By no means, for matter had not been condensed. Form therefore imparts to matter the magnitude which it did not possess, just as form impresses on matter the quality it lacked.

<tabbox Taylor>
IX. How then can any thing which ranks among beings be apprehended, which has no magnitude r Perhaps every thing which is not the same with a certain quantity. For being and a certain quantity are not the same; since there are many other things besides a definite quantity. And, in short, it must be admitted that every incorporeal nature is without quantity. Matter, also, is incorporeal; since quantity itself is not a quantum , but that is a quantum which participates of quantity. Hence, from this it is evident, that quantity is form. As, therefore, a certain white thing is produced by the presence of whiteness; but that which produces a. white colour in an animal, and other various colours, is not a various colour, but a various productive principle; thus also, that which produces a definite quantity, is not a definite quantity, but a quantum itself, or quantity itself, or a productive principle. Does quantity, therefore, acceding, evolve matter into magnitude ? By no means. For it was not contracted into a small space; but it imparts magnitude which prior to this was not, in the same manner as it imparts quality which had not a prior existence.

<tabbox MacKenna>
9. But how can we conceive a thing having existence without having magnitude?

We have only to think of things whose identity does not depend on their quantity - for certainly magnitude can be distinguished from existence as can many other forms and attributes.

In a word, every unembodied Kind must be classed as without quantity, and Matter is unembodied.

Besides quantitativeness itself  does not possess quantity, which belongs only to things participating in it, a consideration which shows that Quantitativeness is an Idea-Principle. A white object becomes white by the presence of whiteness; what makes an organism white or of any other variety of colour is not itself a specific colour but, so to speak, a specific Reason-Principle: in the same way what gives an organism a certain bulk is not itself a thing of magnitude but is Magnitude itself, the abstract Absolute, or the Reason-Principle.

This Magnitude-Absolute, then, enters and beats the Matter out into Magnitude?

Not at all: the Matter was not previously shrunken small: there was no littleness or bigness: the Idea gives Magnitude exactly as it gives every quality not previously present.

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