Enéada I, 1, 1 – Quem ou o quê é o sujeito de estados e atividades incorporadas (Lloyd)

Pleasures and pains, feelings of fear and boldness, appetites and aversions and feelings of distress – to what do these belong? In fact, they belong either to the soul or to a soul using a body or to some third thing that arises from a combination of these. And this can be understood in two ways: either as a mixture or as something different that arises from the mixture. It is the same for what arises from these states, namely, actions and beliefs. So, then, we must investigate discursive thinking and belief to determine whether they belong to that to which the states belong or whether some of them are like this and some are not. And we should also reflect on how acts of intellection occur and to what they belong, and indeed what is the thing which is itself considering the investigation of these questions and making the judgement. But before that, we should ask: what is the subject of sense-perception? It is appropriate to begin from there, since the (above) states are either acts of sense-perception or else they do not occur without sense-perception. (GERSON, Lloyd P.. Plotinus. Enneads. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 43)