PSYCHOLOGIC DISTINCTIONS IN SOUL.
1. To what part of our nature do pleasure [hedone] and grief [lype], fear [phobos] and boldness [tharre] desire [epithymia] and aversion [apostrophe], and, last, pain [tinos], belong? Is it to the soul [psyche] (herself)1, or to the soul when she uses the body [soma] as an instrument2, or to some third (combination [migma]) of both? Even the latter might be conceived of in a double sense: it might be either the simple mixture [migma] of the soul and the body3, or some different product resulting therefrom4. The same uncertainty obtains about the products of the above mentioned experiences: namely, passions [pathos]5, actions, and opinions. For example, we may ask whether ratiocination [dianoia]6 and opinion [doxa] both, belong to the same principle as the passions; or whether only one of them does; in which case the other would belong to some other principle. We should also inquire concerning the nature and classification of thought7. Last we should study the principle that undertakes this inquiry and which comes to some conclusion about it. But, first of all, who is the agent, who feels? This is the real starting point: for even passions are modes of feeling [aisthesis], or at least they do not exist without it8.
This most direct translation of “pathos,” is defective in that it means rather an experience, a passive state, or modification of the soul. It is a Stoic term. ↩
“Dianoia” is derived from “dia nou,” and indicates that the discursive thought is exercised “by means of the intelligence,” [noûs] receiving its notions, and developing them by ratiocination, see V. 3.3. It is the actualization of discursive reason “to dianoetikon,” or of the reasonable soul (“psyche logike”), which conceives, judges, and reasons (dianoei, krinei, logizetai). ↩
“Noesis” means intuitive thought, the actualization of intelligence. ↩