But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way ; I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection.
Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias ; but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced ; but I should still like to hear what more you have to say.
This is what I would say, he replied : We should agree, if I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous time.
Very true.
And what is the nature of this recollection ? And, in asking this, I mean to ask whether, when a person has already seen or heard or in any way perceived anything, and he knows not only that, but something else of which he has not the same, but another knowledge, we may not fairly say that he recollects that which comes into his mind. Are we agreed about that ?
What do you mean ?
I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance : The knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man ?
True.
And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using ? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind’s eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs ? And this is recollection : and in the same way anyone who sees Simmias may remember Cebes ; and there are endless other things of the same nature.
Yes, indeed, there are — endless, replied Simmias.
And this sort of thing, he said, is recollection, and is most commonly a process of recovering that which has been forgotten through time and inattention.
Very true, he said.
Well ; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre remember a man ? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes ?
True.
Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself ?
True, he said.
And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike ?
That is true.
And when the recollection is derived from like things, then there is sure to be another question, which is, whether the likeness of that which is recollected is in any way defective or not.
Very true, he said.
And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing as equality, not of wood with wood, or of stone with stone, but that, over and above this, there is equality in the abstract ? Shall we affirm this ?
Affirm, yes, and swear to it, replied Simmias, with all the confidence in life.
And do we know the nature of this abstract essence ?
To be sure, he said.
And whence did we obtain this knowledge ? Did we not see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them ? — you will admit that ? Or look at the matter again in this way : Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal ?
That is certain.
But are real equals ever unequal ? or is the idea of equality ever inequality ?
That surely was never yet known, Socrates.
Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality ?
I should say, clearly not, Socrates.
And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea ?
Very true, he said.
Which might be like, or might be unlike them ?
Yes.
But that makes no difference ; whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection ?
Very true.