Soc. If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words “if you are willing” dispel all my fear ; and, moreover, a god seems to have recalled something to my mind.
Phi. What is that ?
Soc. I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell ; they were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and better than either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her : — Am I not right ?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more clearly as we proceed.
Pro. Capital, Socrates ; pray go on as you propose.
Soc. But, let us first agree on some little points.
Pro. What are they ?
Soc. Is the good perfect or imperfect ?
Pro. The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.
Soc. And is the good sufficient ?
Pro. Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things.
Soc. And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not for the attainment of anything which its not accompanied by good.
Pro. That is undeniable.
Soc. Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom, and pass them in review.
Pro. How do you mean ?
Soc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, then it cannot really be the chief good.
Pro. Impossible.
Soc. And will you help us to test these two lives ?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Then answer.
Pro. Ask.
Soc. Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures ?
Pro. Certainly I should.
Soc. Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure ?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Reflect ; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities ? would you not at any rate want sight ?
Pro. Why should I ? Having pleasure I should have all things.
Soc. Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures ?
Pro. I should.
Soc. But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you ; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were ; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this be otherwise ?
Pro. No.
Soc. But is such a life eligible ?
Pro. I cannot answer you, Socrates ; the argument has taken away from me the power of speech.
Soc. We must keep up our spirits ; — let us now take the life of mind and examine it in turn.
Pro. And what is this life of mind ?
Soc. I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings ?
Pro. Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, or is likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.
Soc. What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two ?
Pro. Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom ?
Soc. Yes, that is the life which I mean.
Pro. There can be no difference of opinion ; not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in addition to them.
Soc. But do you see the consequence ?
Pro. To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal.
Soc. Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to live such a life ; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.
Pro. Certainly that seems to be true.
Soc. And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus, goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good ?
Phi. Neither is your “mind” the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same objections.
Soc. Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my “mind” ; but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed life ; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life ; and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Phoebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third.
Pro. Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall ; in fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them would she still appear as fair as before.