Soc. We must next examine what is their place and under what conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her class was first examined ; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart from pain ever
Pro. If this is the road, let us take it.
Soc. I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of pleasure and pain.
Pro. What do you mean ?
Soc. I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class.
Pro. And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed one ?
Soc. I will my fine fellow, to the best of my ability.
Pro. Very good.
Soc. Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we placed third in the list of four.
Pro. That which followed the infinite and the finite ; and in which you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony.
Soc. Capital ; and now will you please to give me your best attention ?
Pro. Proceed ; I am attending.
Soc. I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain.
Pro. That is very probable.
Soc. And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest moment.
Pro. I believe that you are right, Socrates ; but will you try to be a little plainer ?
Soc. Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest illustration ?
Pro. What phenomena do you mean ?
Soc. Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain.
Pro. True.
Soc. Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure ?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry Place is a pleasure : once more, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own nature is pleasure ?
Pro. Granted ; what you say has a general truth.
Soc. Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described ?
Pro. Good.
Soc. Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious.
Pro. Yes ; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation.
Soc. Right ; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been mentioned ; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good.
Pro. You say most truly that this is the track which the investigation should pursue.
Soc. Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you say : I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small ?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of pain ?
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And do not forget that there is such a state ; it will make a great difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this or not. And I should like to say a few words about it.
Pro. What have you to say ?
Soc. Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral state.
Pro. You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing ?
Soc. Yes ; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom.
Pro. Yes, certainly, we said so.
Soc. Then he will live without pleasure ; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives ?
Pro. If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow.
Soc. Certainly not — there would be a great impropriety in the assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, should she have to resign the first.
Pro. Just so.