Soc. In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the ingredients, pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who have their materials ready to their hands.
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And now we must begin to mix them ?
Pro. By all means.
Soc. But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our memories ?
Pro. Of what ?
Soc. Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I believe to be a fair summary of the argument.
Pro. Let me hear.
Soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good of all, and that the two names “good” and “pleasant” are correctly given to one thing and one nature ; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are two, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not this what we were saying, Protarchus ?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And is there not and was there not a further point which was conceded between us ?
Pro. What was it ?
Soc. That the good differs from all other things.
Pro. In what respect ?
Soc. In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of anything else.
Pro. Exactly.
Soc. And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part whatever in pleasure ?
Pro. We did.
Soc. And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient ?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up the enquiry again and set us right ; and assuming memory and wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire — I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, however momentary, of the feeling, — but would he desire to have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him ? And about wisdom I ask the same question ; can you conceive that any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than with a certain degree of wisdom ?
Pro. Certainly not, Socrates ; but why repeat such questions any more ?