Soc. Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says ? The philosopher, whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is.
Theaet. Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me ; and if make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me.
Soc. We will, if we can.
Theaet. Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus — geometry, and those which you just now mentioned — are knowledge ; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen ; these, each and all of, them, are knowledge.
Soc. Too much, Theaetetus, too much ; the nobility and liberality of your nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one simple thing.
Theaet. What do you mean, Socrates ?
Soc. Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning : When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes ?
Theaet. Just so.
Soc. And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements ?
Theaet. I do.
Soc. In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts ?
Theaet. True.
Soc. But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question : we wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right ?
Theaet. Perfectly right.
Soc. Let me offer an illustration : Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing — for example, What is clay ? and we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers ; would not the answer be ridiculous ?
Theaet. Truly.
Soc. In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of “clay,” merely because we added “of the image-makers,” or of any other workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it ?
Theaet. He cannot.
Soc. Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes ?
Theaet. None.
Soc. Nor of any other science ?
Theaet. No.
Soc. And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous ; for the question is, “What is knowledge ?” and he replies, “A knowledge of this or that.”
Theaet. True.
Soc. Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the day, he might have said simply, that clay is moistened earth — what sort of clay is not to the point.