Soc. Had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the perpetual flux, who say that things are as they seem to each one, were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded 2nd thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in force ; this was especially asserted of justice ; but as to the good, no one had any longer the hardihood to contend of any ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good that these, while they were in force, were really good ; — he who said so would be playing with the name “good,” and would, not touch the real question — it would be a mockery, would it not ?
Theod. Certainly it would.
Soc. He ought not to speak of the name, but of the thing which is contemplated under the name.
Theod. Right.
Soc. Whatever be the term used, the good or expedient is the aim of legislation, and as far as she has an opinion, the state imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expediency ; can legislation have any other aim ?
Theod. Certainly not.
Soc. But is the aim attained always ? do not mistakes often happen ?
Theod. Yes, I think that there are mistakes.
Soc. The possibility of error will be more distinctly recognized, if we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or expedient fall That whole class has to do with the future, and laws are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after-time ; which, in other words, is the future.
Theod. Very true.
Soc. Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a question : — O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man is, as you declare, the measure of all things — white, heavy, light : of all such things he is the judge ; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he thinks that things are such as he experiences them to be, he thinks what is and is true to himself. Is it not so ?
Theod. Yes.
Soc. And do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras (as we shall further say), to the future as well as to the present ; and has he the criterion not only of what in his opinion is but of what will be, and do things always happen to him as he expected ? For example, take the case of heat : — When an ordinary man thinks that he is going to have a fever, and that this kind of heat is coming on, and another person, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion is likely to prove right ? Or are they both right ? — he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician’s judgment ?
Theod. How ludicrous !
Soc. And the vinegrower, if I am not mistaken, is a better judge of the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered than the harp-player ?
Theod. Certainly.
Soc. And in musical composition — the musician will know better than the training master what the training master himself will hereafter think harmonious or the reverse ?
Theod. Of course.
Soc. And the cook will be a better judge than the guest, who is not a cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in preparation ; for of present or past pleasure we are not as yet arguing ; but can we say that every one will be to himself the best judge of the pleasure which will seem to be and will be to him in the future ? — nay, would not you, Protagoras, better guess which arguments in a court would convince any one of us than the ordinary man ?
Theod. Certainly, Socrates, he used to profess in the strongest manner that he was the superior of all men in this respect.
Soc. To be sure, friend : who would have paid a large sum for the privilege of talking to him, if he had really persuaded his visitors that neither a prophet nor any other man was better able to judge what will be and seem to be in the future than every one could for himself ?
Theod. Who indeed ?
Soc. And legislation and expediency are all concerned with the future ; and every one will admit that states, in passing laws, must often fail of their highest interests ?
Theod. Quite true.
Soc. Then we may fairly argue against your master, that he must admit one man to be wiser than another, and that the wiser is a measure : but I, who know nothing, am not at all obliged to accept the honour which the advocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon me, whether I would or not, of being a measure of anything.
Theod. That is the best refutation of him, Socrates ; although he is also caught when he ascribes truth to the opinions of others, who give the lie direct to his own opinion.
Soc. There are many ways, Theodorus, in which the doctrine that every opinion of : every man is true may be refuted ; but there is more difficulty, in proving that states of feeling, which are present to a man, and out of which arise sensations and opinions in accordance with them, are also untrue. And very likely I have been talking nonsense about them ; for they may be unassailable, and those who say that there is clear evidence of them, and that they are matters of knowledge, may probably be right ; in which case our friend Theaetetus was not so far from the mark when he identified perception and knowledge.