Soc. Well, but will you not be equally inclined to, disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read ?
Theaet. What experience ?
Soc. Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the car, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their position.
Theaet. Very true.
Soc. And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note ; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music ?
Theaet. Exactly.
Soc. Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple clements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject ; and if some one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense ?
Theaet. Exactly.
Soc. And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge.
Theaet. We must not.
Soc. Well, and what is the meaning of the term “explanation” ? I think that we have a choice of three meanings.
Theaet. What are they ?
Soc. In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one’s thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation appear to be of this nature ?
Theaet. Certainly ; he who so manifests his thought, is said to explain himself.
Soc. And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything ; and if so, all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation ; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge.
Theaet. True.
Soc. Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word ; for perhaps he only intended to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the clements of the thing.
Theaet. As for example, Socrates… ?
Soc. As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them individually ; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke.
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name — that would be true opinion, and not knowledge ; for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which is composed.
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a waggon ; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to the whole through the elements.
Theaet. And do. you not agree in that view, Socrates ?
Soc. If you do, my friend ; but I want to know first, whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational — is this your view ?
Theaet. Precisely.
Soc. Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that clement of something, or thinks that. the same thing is composed of different elements at different times ?
Theaet. Assuredly not.
Soc. And do you not remember that in your case and in of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read ?
Theaet. You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables ?
Soc. Yes.
Theaet. To be sure ; I perfectly remember, and I am very far from supposing that they who are in this condition, have knowledge.
Soc. When a person, at the time of learning writes the name of Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write Th and e ; but, again meaning to write the name of Theododorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write T and e — can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names ?
Theaet. We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge.
Soc. And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name ?
Theaet. He may.
Soc. And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion ?
Theaet. Clearly.
Soc. But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge ?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And yet he will have explanations, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote ; and this we admit be explanation.
Theaet. True.
Soc. Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge.
Theaet. It would seem so.
Soc. And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation ? And very likely there may be found some one who will not prefer this but the third.
Theaet. You are quite right ; there is still one remaining. The first was the image or expression of the mind in speech ; the second, which has just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements. But what is ; the third definition ?
Soc. There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others.
Theaet. Can you give me any example of such a definition ?
Soc. As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you would be contented with the statement that the sun is, the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth.
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. Understand why : — the reason is, as I was just now saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition or explanation of it ; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs.
Theaet. I understand you, and your account of definition is in my judgment correct.
Soc. But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of which before he had only an opinion.
Theaet. Yes ; that is what we are maintaining.
Soc. Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed ; the picture, which at a distance was not so bad, has now become altogether unintelligible.
Theaet. What do you mean ?
Soc. I will endeavour to explain : I will suppose myself to have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only.
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your difference.
Theaet. True.
Soc. But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your distinguishing characteristics.
Theaet. I suppose not.
Soc. Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature which no more belonged to you than to another.
Theaet. True.
Soc. Tell me, now — How in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else ? Suppose that I imagine Theaetetus to be a man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every other member complete ; how would that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus, or from some outer barbarian ?
Theaet. How could it ?
Soc. Or if I had further conceived of you, not only as having nose and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have any more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me ?
Theaet. Certainly not.
Soc. Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until your snub-nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the snub-nosedness of all others whom I have ever seen, and until your other peculiarities have a like distinctness ; and so when I meet you tomorrow the right opinion will be re-called ?
Theaet. Most true.
Soc. Then right opinion implies the perception of differences ?
Theaet. Clearly.
Soc. What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion ? If the meaning is, that we should form an opinion of the way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is ridiculous.
Theaet. How so ?
Soc. We are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the differences which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right opinion of them, and so we go round and round : — the revolution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory machine, in the same circles, is as nothing compared with such a requirement ; and we may be truly described as the blind directing the blind ; for to add those things which we already have, in order that we may learn what we already think, is like a soul utterly benighted.
Theaet. Tell me ; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question ?
Soc. If, my boy, the argument, in speaking of adding the definition, had used the word to “know,” and not merely “have an opinion” of the difference, this which is the most promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to acquire knowledge.
Theaet. True.
Soc. And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge ? this fair argument will answer “Right opinion with knowledge,” — knowledge, that is, of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is adding the definition.
Theaet. That seems to be true.
Soc. But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything !