The judgment ( Lat. judicium, from judico, judicare ) that justice entails relates to a much broader sphere; it refers as much to the act of judging in the sense of “pronouncing a verdict,” as to that of judging in the sense of “forming an opinion of, appreciating, thinking”—and it also designates the “faculty” described by Kant ( in the second part of the Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason ) as the “power to subsume within rules,” which is the source of the latter. The Greek krinein [ϰϱίνειν] does not come from the same root ( krinein comes rather from *krin-ye/o, which means “to separate out, to sift”; we find *krin in the Latin cerno, and in the French critique, critère, crise [crisis] or discernement ), but still contains the same breadth of meanings, which range between the judgment of a court and a logical, aesthetic, or moral judgment.