The set of possible translations of the Greek term phronêsis [φϱόνησις] shows the extension of its semantic field in ancient Greek, the development of this notion, and the redistributions to which it gave rise in Greek philosophy, as well as its advent in philosophies in European languages on the basis of its Latin translation by Cicero as prudentia. Originally designating thought, without emotion or desire being necessarily excluded, phronêsis, which was long not distinguished from sophia [σοφία], “wisdom, knowledge, scientific knowledge,” as Plato and even Aristotle often show, came to designate a virtue, an “excellence” ( see VIRTÙ, Box 1 ), exercised in the practical domain. Traditionally included among the four “cardinal” virtues, along with courage, justice, and temperance ( or moderation ), phronêsis nonetheless has a special status. It is a “dianoietic” or “intellectual” virtue ( Aristotle ), and even a “science” ( the Stoics ); but it is also an attitude or behavior that is involved in both private and public affairs—in short, it is, as is usually said, a kind of “practical knowledge.” Every smart manager is a “prudent” person ( phronimos [φϱόνιμος] ); to be such a person “virtuously” or, better, to be one in a “virtuoso” manner, one also has to know how to anticipate the future and not limit oneself to a timid management style. From this point of view, the Greeks’ “prudence” has almost nothing to do with the “prudence in business” to which Descartes alludes in his prefatory epistle to the French translation of the Principles, where he seeks to distinguish it from the wisdom with which philosophy must be conducted. We can take as an indication of this complexity the fact that Cicero himself, who normally translates phronêsis by prudentia, nonetheless sometimes renders this first of the four virtues by the phrase sapientia et prudentia ( De officiis 1.15–16 ) when he wants to distinguish it from the three other cardinal virtues by its status as the intellectual virtue. (BCDU)